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ABSTRACT

Author: Kim, Jongsoo. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: May 2018
Title: Three Essays on Strategic Human Capital, Managers and Competitive Advantages
Committee Chair: Richard Makadok

In this dissertation, I investigate the interplay between strategic human capital and the role
of managers in an organization. In Essay 1, using a natural experiment setting with a dataset on
change of interdependence that an organization requires, and unexpected employee exit in a
professional sports league for the period 1992 to 2010, I examine the consequence of losing
strategically important human resources (HR) and shows that how specific organizational
recovering techniques for dealing with HR can help the firm’s strategic renewal process. The data
present that the consequential impact of losing employees is depending upon the type of
interdependence that organization relies on, which are pooled interdependence and reciprocal
interdependence. Furthermore, the results indicate that: (1) during the individual-focused period
(pooled interdependence), loss of star employees harms organizational performance, but this harm
can be mitigated by strong resource-picking skill, and (2) during the collaboration-focused period
(reciprocal interdependence), loss of non-star employees harms organizational performance, but
this harm can be mitigated by strong capability-building skill.
In Essay 2, I try to answer following question: when promoted to management, do former
star performers become superior managers? If so, why? Using performance data from a
professional sports league, this study finds that organizational performance is greater under starperformers-turned-managers (SPTM’s) than other managers. Organizational performance is
driven by the visibility of the manager’s prior career to employees for SPTM’s only, but driven by

xii
managerial competence for other managers only, suggesting a substitution effect between skill and
inspirational role modeling. Consistent with social-comparison and self-enhancement theories, this
inspirational role-modeling effect of SPTM’s on performance is contingent upon the need for selfenhancement by subordinates, and situational salience of the manager’s stardom. The results are
consistent across robustness checks that control for potential selection issues, endogeneity
concerns, and outliers.
In Essay 3, I assess the causal impact of stakeholder orientation on the impact of corporate
social responsibility and CEOs’ wealth and prominence. To obtain exogenous variation in
stakeholder orientation, I exploit the enactment of state-level constituency statutes, which allow
corporate executives and directors to consider non-shareholders’ interests when making business
decisions. Using a cross-section of Texan firms during 2002-2012, I have found that the enactment
of constituency statutes leads to significant increases in the quality of a firm’s corporate social
responsibility (CSR); however, the effect of CSR does not necessarily lead to superior firm
performance or value. I further argue and provide evidence suggesting that the obligated
stakeholder orientation decreases the impact of CSR on CEOs’ compensation but increases the
impact of CSR on CEOs’ media exposure. Finally, I posit that the impact of non-shareholder
orientation on CEOs’ wealth and prominence is salient in non-consumer-focused industries.
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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

A firm with rare, valuable resources gains competitive advantages over its competitors,
resulting in superior organizational performance (Barney, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992;
Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). To maintain this superior performance, the resources that firms
own must prevent competitors from imitating them amid isolating mechanisms and causal
ambiguity (e.g., Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982).
Merely possessing superior resources and implementing strong safeguards to prevent imitation
do not necessarily guarantee the sustainability of competitive advantages since the quality of firm
resources would not last forever, and competitive environment would not be static (e.g.,
BretonMiller & Miller, 2015; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). Accordingly, effective management
of firm resource is the ultimate determinant of organizational performance.
With respect to the human resource, not physical resource, effective resource
management becomes further important because the process that creates value from the human
resources depends heavily on their skills and commitment, and a firm could temporarily borrow
the value from them by contracting (e.g., Snell & Dean, 1992). For example, in the view of a firm,
superior employees are attractive to both their current organization and other competitors, since
their expertise could be valuable, and rare resources to every organization. If the current firm
wants to retain the superior expertise, it would provide the employee with more favorable contract
term than others do. In the view of an employee, the employee might be reluctant to invest in her
own human capital, since too much firm-specific human capital limits the chance to move to other
competing firms (Coff, 1997). Thus, retaining and developing human resources are complex, and
dilemmatic procedures in both firms and employees, and the problems link with critical
organizational issues such as employee mobility, external environment changes, and motivation
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of employees. Resolving these organizational issues, managers play a critical managerial role
because the managers could attenuate the disadvantages from outward employee mobility, make
their employees voluntarily commit themselves to the organization, and further contribute to
value creation. Therefore, in this dissertation, I would propose underexplored managerial
roles/capabilities that affect organizational value creation with respect to “star human capital”.
The main argument in Essay 1 (Chapter 2) is to dig deeper into the details of strategic
renewal process when loss of strategically important human capital. By asking specific research
question: What specific techniques do organization use to recover from the loss of key humancapital resources, and how is the relative effectiveness of these techniques affected by the
organization’s particular situation? Furthermore, I try to empirically construct two possible
recovery techniques, which have labeled “resource picking” and “capability building” (Makadok,
2001) and examine how the relative effectiveness of the two techniques are depending upon the
type of interdependence that an organization requires and how the two techniques are dealing with
the loss of human capital.
The main purpose of Essay 2 (Chapter 3) is to introduce the new type of managers that
prior literature has not considered: star performer-turned manager (SPTM). By revisiting two
conventional wisdom about managers: Matthew effect (former star individual contributors make
better managers) and Peter Principle (people get promoted to their own level of incompetence, and
then get stuck at that level), the research question is whether SPTM’s outperform other managers
depends upon whether the Matthew effect dominates the Peter Principle, or vice versa. This
question is important because having a star performer as a manager may incur considerable costs,
both ex ante and ex post -- e.g., expensive compensation packages, long contractual terms,
uncertain performance, or potential frictions with incumbent employees.

3
The main purpose of Essay 3 (Chapter 4) is to argue that the potential impact of
stakeholder orientation enforced by a government on CSR and its further effects on firm
performance and CEO’s wealth and prominence (i.e., status, reputation). Implementation of CSR
should be followed by a current organization’s needs and capabilities since firms are expected to
be efficient, profitable, and to keep shareholder interests in mind while CSR concerns societal
expectations, such as the expectation that organizations will conduct their affairs in fair and just
ways. Given that one of mechanisms that explain the positive relationship between CSR and firm
performance is that satisfying the need for CSR of stakeholders, and various stakeholders
encourage firms to engage in more and better CSR activity, I examine an unexplored concern
about CSR by asking several research questions: does enforced CSR activity lead to superior firm
performance and firm value? does superior CSR performance lead to superior CEO wealth and
status? The questions are important since 1) it would shed new light on the link between CSR and
firm performance, and 2) verifying one mechanism how CEOs obtain wealth and prominence
followed by social norms. Many researchers have examined the advantages or disadvantages of
having extreme quality of human capital (e.g., Groysberg & Lee, 2009), however, little research
is concerned with how the extreme case of human capital such as stardom arises.
In this dissertation, I explore not only those research questions, but also explore important
business issues such as exogenous policy changes, employee mobility, and corporate social
responsibility. Moreover, this dissertation is designed by multi-/interdisciplinary spirits, which
are including socio-psychology, policy economics, law studies, sports management, OBHR
studies with strategic management.
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CHAPTER 2.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGERIAL
TECHNIQUES IN THE RECOVERY FROM THE UNEXPECTED
LOSS OF EMPLOYEES:EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL
EXPERIEMENT

2.1

Introduction

For many organizations, human capital is a key resource for creating economic value and
maintaining competitive advantage (e.g., Barney & Wright, 1998; Coff, 1997; Huselid, 1995).
Accordingly, much research about employee mobility has focused on the benefits of gaining
superior human capital, with studies examining the contingency factors on the side of the acquiring
organization (Campbell, Saxton, & Banerjee, 2014; Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008), the ex ante
and ex post determinants for obtaining human capital (e.g., Carnahan, Agarwal, & Campbell, 2012),
and other relevant contextual factors (Marx, Strumsky, & Fleming, 2009).
By comparison, relatively little employee mobility research has focused on the effects of
losing strategically important human capital, or on how managers can most effectively help their
organizations to recover from such losses. This question is relevant and important because human
capital cannot be owned by an organization. After all, human capital resides in employees with
free will who, with only very few exceptions (e.g., military service), have the legal right to leave
the organization at any time and may even, in many cases, choose to defect to a direct competitor
(Coff, 1997; 1999). So, the loss of valuable human capital is a ubiquitous threat, and for an
organization in a human-capital-intensive industry, such losses may disrupt its established
capabilities, strategic plan, and business routines so severely that restoring success may require
full-blown strategic renewal in order to recover a damaged competitive advantage (Agarwal &
Helfat, 2009). However, strategic renewal is fraught with managerial challenges even under the
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best of circumstances (Floyd & Lane, 2000), so these challenges may be more severe in situations
where strategic human capital, with all of its attendant management dilemmas (Coff, 1997), is the
resource that most needs to be renewed. Managers serve various roles in this recovery because
their attention is needed for several aspects of an organization’s resource management process
(e.g., Mintzberg, 1973; Simons, 1994; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007).
Specifically, managers are responsible for recognizing the need for recovery after losing
human capital and for alleviating the impact of that loss (Helfat et al., 2009), which may require
specifying which particular capabilities should be renewed, reorganizing existing resources, and
acquiring new resources and integrating them into the organization’s existing structure (Grant,
1996). Conventional wisdom suggests that the damage is more pronounced when a losing a highranking, centrally positioned, or highly skilled employee. However, this may not necessarily be
true if managerial capabilities mitigate the detrimental consequences of losing human assets. For
example, organizational capabilities research provides insight into how the strategic renewal
process can repair a damaged advantage under dynamically competitive conditions (e.g., Helfat &
Martin, 2015).
The purpose of this chapter is to dig deeper into the details of this strategic renewal process
by asking the question: What specific techniques do managers use to recover from the loss of key
human-capital resources, and how is the relative effectiveness of these techniques affected by the
organization’s particular situation? Standard resource-based theory would suggest two possible
recovery techniques, which have labeled “resource picking” and “capability building” (Makadok,
2001). The resource-picking technique consists of acquiring new superior-quality resources into
the organization at a cost that is less than the value that they are expected to create for the
organization. If the resource markets were sufficiently efficient, theory suggests that consistent
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success with this technique requires managers to develop superior insight about the hypothetical
value that a given resource would generate for a particular use by a particular owner (Barney,
1986). By contrast, the capability-building technique consists of increasing the value created by
whatever resources the organization controls (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), which may lead to a
sustainable advantage in the presence of some “isolating mechanism” (Rumelt, 1984).
So, the research question boils down to: When recovering from the loss of strategically
important human capital, is it more effective for managers to focus their efforts on recruiting the
best replacements for departing employees (resource picking) or on improving the performance of
the remaining employees (capability building)? Does the relative effectiveness of these two
techniques vary according to the organization’s situation? If so, how and why?
For reasons to be explained in the following section (Theory and Hypotheses), I argue that
the answer depends critically on the type of interdependence the organization requires Thompson
(1967) distinguishes pooled interdependence, where the separate performance of each individual
employee is more important than the collaboration between employees, from sequential or
reciprocal forms of interdependence, in which collaboration between employees is more important
than individual performance of each employee. Under an individual-focused business model with
pooled interdependence, successfully recovering from the loss of a star requires finding a new star
to replace the outgoing one, so I hypothesize that the resource-picking approach is more beneficial
in such situations. Conversely, I also hypothesize that the capability-building approach is more
beneficial under a collaboration-focused business model with sequential or reciprocal
interdependence, since the success of such organizations requires building a team with a shared
experience of working together effectively.
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An ideal empirical setting for testing these hypotheses would provide: (1) objective and
unambiguous measures of performance at both the individual and organizational levels, (2) some
clearly identifiable variation (either cross-sectional variation between organizations, or
longitudinal variation between time periods) in the type of interdependence that affects the relative
importance of individual skills versus collaboration, and (3) some measure for each organization’s
use of each of the two techniques – i.e., resource picking and capability building. The search for
an ideal empirical setting that would satisfy all three of these criteria – especially the latter two,
which are particularly difficult to find in almost any industry context – led us to professional sports
teams. In particular, I exploit a natural experiment in the National Basketball Association (NBA)
that exogenously and dramatically shifted the primary basis for competition from individual skill
to collaborative teamwork – namely, the “zone defense” rule change in April 2001. Prior to 2001,
zone defenses were disallowed in NBA play, so “man-to-man” defense 1 was the norm, which
0F

made the height, weight, strength, and skill of each individual player critical to overall team
success. Since 2001-02 season, the legalization of zone defenses has made collaboration between
teammates relatively more important, while also diminishing the relevance of individual star
players because the new zone-defense rules now allow a defending team to more easily thwart an
opposing star’s offensive capabilities via “double-teaming” – i.e., assigning two defenders to guard
the opposing team’s strongest offensive player. So, in effect, this natural experiment made the type
of interdependence between a team’s players less pooled and more reciprocal, thereby creating
longitudinal variation in the relative importance of individual skill versus collaborative teamwork.
I exploit this longitudinal variation to test the relative effectiveness of resource picking
versus capability building in response to loss of human capital. Thanks to the availability of

1

I use this common parlance, despite its gender-specificity, because “The term is commonly used in both men's and
women's sports” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-to-man_defense).
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individual-level performance data on NBA players, I measure resource picking as a manager’s
ability to recruit into the organization new employees whose performance subsequently improves
relative to their previous job, and I measure capability building as a manager’s ability to improve
the performance of extant employees who were already in the organization. Both before and after
the natural experiment, I examine how effectively each of these two approaches mitigates the
damage to performance that occurs following the departures of both star and non-star employees.
Consistent with expectations, the results indicate that: (1) during the individual-focused
period before the natural experiment, loss of star employees harms organizational performance,
but this harm can be mitigated by strong resource-picking skill, and (2) during the collaborationfocused period after the natural experiment, loss of non-star employees harms organizational
performance, but this harm can be mitigated by strong capability-building skill.

2.2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

Superior human capital can be a source of competitive advantage (e.g., Barney & Wright,
1998; Hatch & Dyer, 2004) and thereby boost organizational performance (e.g., Aime, Johnson,
Ridge, & Hill, 2010; Franco & Filson, 2006). Yet, in contrast to other resources like physical assets
or intellectual property, human capital cannot be owned by the organization that seeks to exploit
its value. So, even the mere threat that the employee who owns this human capital can leave the
organization, and even possibly go to work for a competitor, creates dilemmas for managers (Coff,
1997) and limits an organization’s ability to appropriate the value generated by the human capital
it hires (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Coff, 1999). When this threat of departure is actually realized,
the loss of valuable human capital to a competitor disrupts both the individual and collective
capabilities of the organization (Tan & Rider, 2017). Indeed, the loss of an organization’s most
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important employees may be so damaging as to necessitate outright strategic renewal in order to
recover a lost competitive advantage (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009).
What is the best method for managers to accomplish such a recovery? Resource-based
theory offers two obvious options. On one hand, strategic factor market logic suggests that a
manager seeking to fill the void left by a key employee’s departure should find bargains by using
private information to identify potential replacements who are systematically undervalued by other
potential employers in the labor market (Barney, 1986), or who would have greater synergies with
the manager’s own organization than with other organizations (Barney, 1988). On the other hand,
the logic of asset stock accumulation (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) suggests that, rather than acquiring
new human capital from the outside to replace a departing employee, a manager could instead
focus on internal development of resources by investing in improving the human capital that still
remains within the organization. Makadok (2001) studied the relationship between these two
mechanisms, labeling the strategic factor market method as “resource picking” and the asset stock
accumulation method as “capability building.” For convenience, I adopt this same terminology.
In the specific case of human capital, resource picking is likely to reside, at least in part, in
an organization’s recruitment and selection processes, while capability building is likely to reside,
at least in part, in its training and development processes. Human capital resource picking requires
identifying, attracting, selecting, and recruiting the best new hires from the external labor market,
despite the facts that certain talents are difficult to replace (Lewis & Heckman, 2006) and that
location-specific and firm-specific requirements affecting the value of human capital (Campbell et
al., 2014; Huckman & Pisano, 2006) may impede the organization’s ability to forecast how the
recruit will perform in a new job. On the other hand, human capital capability building requires
training, socializing, grooming individuals from a pool of incumbent employees, as well as
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creating systems and operating procedures to improve their individual and collective performance
– i.e., an ability to develop resources internally (Ruigrok, Georgakakis, & Greve, 2014).
Since both of these approaches are skilled tasks, different organizations, or even different
managers within the same organization, may differ from each other in their levels of ability for
either approach. For example, Procter & Gamble (P&G) is an outstanding exemplar of superior
resource picking for human capital, because the company’s unique proprietary analytical tool
called Human Resources Research & Analytics (HRRA) assists the company in selecting suitable
employees by integrating a set of fragmented data and visualizing the results of each candidate’s
potential. On the other hand, General Electric (GE) is an outstanding exemplar of superior
capability building for human capital, due to its extensive set of training programs for incumbent
employees, such as the Human Resources Leadership Program (HRLP), which can be customized
for targeted employee groups, such as entry-level employees, mid-career middle managers, and
upper-level executives. Of course, I would never suggest that P&G ignores training of incumbent
employees or that GE makes no effort to hire superior new recruits, but rather I simply note that
organizations like P&G and GE differ in their relative emphasis on the two, so it is important to
understand where and when each one is more effective.
I propose that the relative effectiveness of using resource picking versus capability building
to recover from the loss of human capital depends critically on how human capital affects
organizational performance in the first place – in particular, on whether the organization’s overall
performance is driven more by the separate performance of each individual employee or more by
the effectiveness of collaboration between employees. In business models where individual skill
is paramount and collaboration is relatively unimportant, the performance of the whole can never
be very different from the sum of the parts. This type of organizing is what Thompson (1967)
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called “pooled interdependence.” By contrast, in business models where the effectiveness of
collaboration trumps the skill of the individual, synergies between the parts make overall
performance greater than just the sum of the parts. Thompson (1967) called this type of organizing
either “sequential interdependence” in cases where one part’s performance affects another part’s
performance in a unidirectional way, or “reciprocal interdependence” in cases where the
performance of any two parts can affect each other in a mutual way.
For example, in manufacturing, pre-industrial craft production systems depended more on
the deep skills of individual craftspeople and therefore exhibited pooled interdependence, while
industrial mass production systems – especially those that rely on modern “lean manufacturing”
methods – depend more on effective collaboration than on specific workers’ skills, and therefore
exhibit more sequential or reciprocal forms of interdependence. Similar distinctions can even be
found in the realm of management, where Collins (2001) separates what he calls “level 5
management” with “deep and strong executive teams” from the more individual-focused “‘genius
with a thousand helpers’ model” of management, where the former experience reciprocal
interdependence while the latter experience merely pooled interdependence.
When a star performer departs, what the organization loses – and what the organization
must therefore recover from – depends upon the type of interdependence its business model uses.
Under a more individual-focused model with pooled interdependence (e.g., craft production or
“genius with a thousand helpers”), a lost star can only be replaced by another star, since anything
less than a star replacement would not restore the organization’s performance. In such situations,
the fundamental problem to be solved is finding the highest quality replacement employee the
organization can afford with its scarce funds, which requires skill in resource picking. By contrast,
under a collaboration-focused model with more sequential or reciprocal forms of interdependence
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(e.g., lean manufacturing or “level 5 management”), the departure of a key person really represents
the loss of an integral part of a system, as if a gear had been removed from a precision clockwork
mechanism. Filling that gap does not require finding the world’s best gear, but rather finding the
gear that fits best into the system – i.e., with the right size and shape to replace the missing gear in
a way that meshes seamlessly with the other parts. In such situations, the fundamental problem to
be solved is to mold the replacement employee and the rest of the organization to fit well with each
other so that they work smoothly together, which requires skill in capability building.
Furthermore, I also propose that the type of interdependence embedded in an organization’s
business model also affects the relative amount of damage done by the loss of star versus non-star
employees. Under all types of interdependence, it makes sense to expect that the loss of a star
performer would be more harmful than the loss of a non-star. However, since pooled
interdependence makes individual performance paramount, it makes sense to expect that pooled
interdependence would exhibit a large gap between the damage caused by the loss of a star and
the damage caused by the loss of a non-star. Conversely, since sequential or reciprocal forms of
interdependence make individual performance relatively less important than collaboration, it
makes sense to expect these forms of interdependence to exhibit a relatively smaller gap between
the consequences of losing stars versus non-stars.
There are two possible reasons why this gap might be larger under pooled interdependence
than under sequential or reciprocal interdependence: Either the loss of a star is more damaging
under pooled interdependence than under sequential or reciprocal interdependence, or the loss of
a non-star is more damaging under sequential or reciprocal interdependence than under pooled
interdependence, or some combination of both. I investigate both of these possibilities.
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To summarize all of the arguments outlined above, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: Losing star employees hurts organizational performance more under
pooled interdependence than under reciprocal interdependence.
Hypothesis 2: Losing non-star employees hurts organizational performance more under
reciprocal interdependence than under pooled interdependence.
Hypothesis 3: Resource picking is more effective at mitigating the harm from losing
human capital, especially the loss of star employees, under pooled interdependence than
under reciprocal interdependence.
Hypothesis 4: Capability building is more effective at mitigating the harm from losing
human capital, especially the loss of non-star employees, under reciprocal
interdependence than under pooled interdependence.
These hypotheses exclude the possibility of sequential interdependence simply because it is not
relevant in particular empirical context, but if sequential interdependence did occur, one would
expect it to behave more like reciprocal interdependence than pooled interdependence.

2.3 Data and Methodology
2.3.1 Context: National basketball association
I test hypotheses using data from a major professional sports league in North America, the
National Basketball Association (NBA).

1F

2

In the highly competitive sport of professional

basketball, teams have similar numbers of human assets, which managers combine and utilize to
perform similar interdependent tasks. Basketball team managers (head coaches in this context)
generally have a primary responsibility for undertaking actions involving the management of the

2

Founded in 1946 as the Basketball Association of America, the NBA adopted the name National Basketball
Association after merging with the rival National Basketball league in 1949. In 1976, it then merged with the rival
American Basketball Association (NBA official website). The current setting is fixed to the beginning of the 2004–
05 season. From the 1995–96 season through the 2004–05 season, the NBA had four divisions (Atlantic, Midwest,
Central, and Pacific) with a total of 29 teams. There were 27 teams in these four divisions from the 1991–92 season
to the 1994–95 season. Today, the NBA comprises 30 teams—29 from the United States and one from Canada
(Toronto Raptors)—divided into two conferences (Eastern and Western), each with three five-team divisions (Eastern
Conference: Atlantic, Central, and Southeast divisions; Western Conference: Northwest, Pacific, and Southwest
divisions).
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organization, such as acquiring and training HR and devising specific plans to achieve better
organization performance. Chief executive officers (CEO) in conventional business organizations
perform similar tasks and duties 3.
2F

Several features make the NBA especially suitable for testing the hypotheses. First, the
main argument concerns how organizational capability for manipulating firm resources (e.g.,
resource picking and capability building) from inside and outside the organization (e.g., newlyhired and incumbent employees) affects the strategic renewal process. To better understand this
relationship, I take that losing (both star and non-star) employees is a situation that is needed to
reform organizational strategic initiatives. Taking advantage of widely available archival data on
individual players and managers allows for tracing every employee’s mobility and the motivation
for this mobility (e.g., trade, waive, free-agent). This is important because employee mobility out
is related to an endogeneity concern that poor performance of players or the team cause the
employee mobility, thus, I am able to exploit a player’s voluntary out as an exogenous shock to
alleviate the concern. Second, this sport setting provides us with objective and unambiguous
measures of performance at both individual and organizational levels. Detailed individual-level
performance statistics are available to identify stars and non-stars, and to isolate their respective
effects on organization performance. Third, historical archival data for head coaches allow us to
construct their historical HR management and development with their players.

3
I recognize that general manager also involves in delivering the players, hiring coaching staff, and carrying out
owner’s philosophy (https://www.sbnation.com/2010/7/22/1582380/nba-general-manager-rankings-pat-riley-heat).
Given that the GM recognizes his coach’s capability, thus, it is hard to believe that GM made hiring decision
independently. As a robustness check, I control for GM’s tenure as a general manager, prior player and coaching
experience and obtain similar results.
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2.3.2 Exogenous shock that affects interdependence: Eliminating illegal defense
One of important research questions in this paper is that the effectiveness of resource
picking and capability building would vary according to the type of interdependence an
organization requires. In order to capture identifiable variation in the type of interdependence that
affects the relative importance of individual skills versus collaboration, I carried out a natural
experiment showing a change in industry regulation by a court-rule reform. Before the
commencement of the 2001–02 NBA season, the NBA commissioner announced that the league
was eliminating illegal defense entirely (April 12, 2001) to improve the flow and pace of the game
and to reduce the dependency of a few star players. Up to this point, the NBA had allowed a zone
defense that was a cooperative defensive strategy. This practice was outlawed since January 1947.
Before eliminating illegal defense alignments, each NBA team deployed a one-on-one
defensive strategy, because Illegal Defensive Alignments 1981-82 did not allow double-teamed
defensive strategies on the weak side 4. Teams often used an isolation offensive strategy: once one
3F

player got the ball, other teammates moved to the other side of the court to draw their defenders
as far away from the ball as possible, while the ball-handler tried to beat his opponent one-on-one.
In this strategy, the importance of star players that can beat a one-on-one match-up was significant.
Every team ran isolation strategies, particularly in end-of-quarter or end-of-game situations.
Yet there was a significant downside to the isolation strategy; teams that become too reliant on a
single star player could become stagnant on offense, too one-dimensional, and too vulnerable to
teams that had one lock-down defender who can thwart the isolation play. After eliminating the
illegal defensive strategy, two or three players could face one star player on the floor, and some
players could make a zone that restrained a star player’s penetration. From this rule change,

4

1981-82 Illegal Defensive Alignments (c): Player without the ball may not be double-teamed from weak side.
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cooperative, team-oriented tactics became much more important than before, shaping from pooled
interdependence to reciprocal interdependence that each team requires 5. Figure 2.1 describes how
4F

the rule revision shapes a team’s defensive strategy before and after the rule change 6.
5F

<Before the Rule Change: Isolation offense>

<After the Ru le Change: Cooperative defense>

Figure 2.1 Effect of the rule change on the court defensive strategy 7
6F

5
I also recognize that the 2001 rule reform referenced was accompanied by another new rule: “a new defensive
three-second rule” that prohibits a defensive player from remaining in the box for more than three consecutive
seconds. Although it is still difficult for teams to employ a purely zone defensive strategy or even a meaningful
man-help scheme, however, many teams practiced the way of ‘zoning’ at the boarder of box (just a few inch off
from the box) and staying in the box for 2.9 seconds.
6
Some may argue that the rule change in 2001 was endogenously determined collectively by team leaders. At that
time, only a few selective committee members made the decision during two months, and some opponents of the
rule changes privately accused commissioner David Stern. One of reasons was “the rule change was too
radical”.(https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/12/sports/pro-basketball-nba-s-illegal-defense-rule-will-most-likely-beeliminated.html)
7
Before the rule change, if a player was not within arms-length away from someone for three seconds it was illegal

defense. What this meant is that teams were able to spread the floor more and double-teams were not as effective.
After the rule change, double team-defense and zone-defense were legalized. After the rule change, a star’s isolation
strategy was likely to face a double-team defense team and other defensive players could set up a zone that blocked
the attack.

17
2.3.3 Sample
The research sample consisted of data on sports teams that competed in the NBA from the
1992–93 season through the 2009–10 season. This resulted in a total of 522 samples (255 before
the rule change and 267 after the rule change) 8. Each regular NBA season begins in late October
7F

or early November and runs through May of the next year. In general, each team plays 82 regular
games in a single season, and the top 16 teams have playoff games to determine the league
champion. Only regular-season games were considered, as most organizations use different game
strategies and rosters in the post-season.

2.3.4 Dependent variable: organizational performance
To measure performance, I used organizational performance as the percentage of team wins
within each season. A team’s winning percentage not only is a visible, intuitive metric of
performance in this context but is consistent with absolute measures of organizational performance
used in prior studies on sports teams (e.g., Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002; Hill, Aime, & Ridge,
2016; Holcomb, Holmes Jr, & Connelly, 2009; Moliterno & Wiersema, 2007). An alternative
operationalization was the financial performance of games (e.g., attendance, ticket sales). To
improve the competitive balance, each NBA team pays similar player salaries due to salary caps
and revenue sharing (Fonti & Maoret, 2015; Fort, Sanderson, & Siegfried, 2003) imposed under
the philosophy that teams should “cooperate financially in order to compete effectively” (Day,
Gordon, & Fink, 2012: 401; Fonti & Maoret, 2015). Therefore, financial performance does not
capture the competitive dynamics among teams. Game performance is a more reliable
8

During the sample period, there were 27 teams from the 1992–93 to 1994–95 seasons. From the 1994–95 to 2002–
03 seasons, there were 29 teams, and the current 30 teams setting holds as of the 2003–04 season. In addition, NBA
players carried out two lockouts, in the 1998–99, seeking changes to the league’s salary cap system and a ceiling on
individual player salaries. Consequently, the 1998–99 season comprised 50 games.
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measurement for the theoretical argument focusing on motivating and stimulating subordinate
employees to invest in human capital 9.
8F

2.3.5 Independent variables: Stars and non-stars employees lost
To capture the impact of outward employee mobility on the organizational outcome, I
traced inter-team movement during the sample period. Taking advantage of the current sports
setting, the data allowed for identifying if an employee’s (e.g., player’s) exit was voluntary or
involuntary 10. This identification was critical because it would not be a serious situation for a firm
9F

that needed strategic renewal if the turnover was the intention of the firm and not the employee.
For example, in general, team waives and trades are regarded as exemplifying involuntary turnover
and the modification HR as exemplifying a strategic action on the part of the team. In other words,
outward free-agent (FA) mobility driven by a player is likely to be an example of voluntary
turnover, which affects the organization’s routine and current team strategy. In addition,
involuntary turnover on the part of low performers should occur more often in an organization
(Carnahan et al., 2012); thus, I limited the focus to starters, rather than rotators, in a game roster 11.
10 F

Furthermore, these starters had changed employment status since the previous off-season. In order
to understand the effect of losing employees, I categorized two types of employee mobility with
respect to their previous rating.
I defined a star employee as a player listed in the top 5% of the league in terms of their
Player Efficiency Rating (PER) (e.g., Fonti & Maoret, 2015). For example, 2006-07 season, there

9

As a robustness check, I perform an OLS with alternative dependent variable, financial performance, that is
measured as the number of attendance and find qualitatively consistent results.
10
For the clarification, here voluntary and involuntary are at the employee-level.
11
I can recognize whether a player is a starter or rotator by observing the number of games they played as starters. I
define a starter as a player who played the most games during the season. Additionally, Real GM and BasketballReference, a prominent website for NBA information, yielded information about whether a certain player was a
starter or not.
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were total 333 registered players and 17 players (=333*0.05) would categorize into the stars. After
2006-07 season, Zach Randolph, who ranked 15th in terms of PER out of 333, voluntarily moved
from Blazers to Knicks. So I coded that Blazers lost one star loss before 2007-08 season. PER was
calculated by accurately weighting multiple individual statistics (e.g., points scored, missed shots,
rebounds, steals, blocks, turnovers, assists) and by standardizing for minutes played and the team
paces resulting from offensive and defensive team strategies. The resulting indicator most closely
captured individual players’ quality, ruling out the possible team effects. I coded 1 for a voluntarily
outgoing player listed in the top 5% of the league, and then counted the total number of specific
cases. Thus, the variable Star Employee Out represents the number of outward star players before
a focal season. Similarly, I defined a non-star player as one with a rating in below the top 5%. I
coded the variable Non-Star Employee Out as 1 in the case of a voluntarily outgoing player listed
below the top 5% of the league, and then counted the number of cases 12.
1 1F

2.3.6 Measuring resource picking and capability building
In general, every NBA team has two options for filling vacancies from the loss of valuable
HR. The first option is to find a replacement from external markets, including from competing
opponents, foreign basketball leagues, and rookie drafts from domestic universities. The second
option is to fill vacancies with incumbent players who have been on a team. In order to capture the
two distinctive techniques with respect to HR, I collected items that represent the improvements
in the quality of HR. Using the seasonal depth chart provided at Real GM.com and Basketball

12

In general, about 300–350 players are listed in the NBA league. For example, in the 2004–05 season, there were
336 players listed in the league, and 17 players were listed in the top 5%. Our calculations revealed a possible
maximum PER of 30 and a league average of 15. In that season, the best player in PER was Kevin Garnett (MIN,
28.29) and the 17th player was Manu Ginobili (SAS, 22.2). The two players were also chosen as the ALL Star game
in the season too.
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Reference.com, reliable websites for basketball statistics and transactions, I traced every player’s
off-season mobility in and out as well as the change of the player’s rating between the seasons.
From the process, I categorized two different player’s pool which are ‘newly-hired’ and
‘incumbents’ and gathered eight items (components) that may represent the organization’s HR
management capability: (1) the amount of change in a newly-hired starting player’s efficiency
rating over the previous season, (2) the number of improved newly-hired starting players, (3) the
amount of change in a newly-hired rotating player’s efficiency rating over the previous season, (4)
the number of improved newly-hired rotating players, (5) the amount of change in an incumbent
starting player’s efficiency rating over the previous season, (6) the number of improved incumbent
starting players, (7) the amount of change in an incumbent rotating player’s efficiency rating over
the previous season, and (8) the number of improved incumbent rotating players.
Assuming that the improvement of newly-hired employees is related to resource picking
and that of incumbent employees is related to capability building, I first conducted exploratory
factor analysis to account for potential differences in the correlation and to examine the
dimensionality among the items. By using factor analyses, I was able to confirm eight components
were falling into two factors, since there are two factors that exceeded one in eigenvalues (see
screeplot in the Appendix B). Table 2.1 presents the results of a principal components factor
analysis after varimax rotation. The two factors that were retained explained 70.1 percent of the
variance in the data. It appears that the two factors deal with qualitatively different types of
organization resource techniques. In the case of first factor, the components that are related to
“newly-hired employees”, and therefore confirmed this factor ‘resource picking’. The second
factor, by contrast, relates with “incumbent employees”. I therefore labeled this factor ‘capability
building’.
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Table 2.1 Varimax rotated factor pattern
Items

Resource Picking
(Factor 1)

Capability
Building (Factor
2)

The amount of change in a newly-hired starting
0.5082
player’s PER over the previous season
The amount of change in a newly-hired rotating
0.1984
player’s PER over the previous season
The number of improved newly-hired staring
0.5901
players
The number of improved newly-hired rotating
0.2801
players
The amount of change in an incumbent starting
0.1566
player’s PER over the previous season
The amount of change in an incumbent rotating
-0.1654
player’s PER over the previous season
The number of improved incumbent starting
0.4458
players
The number of improved incumbent rotating
-0.0503
players
Variance of Explained
70.1
Note: Bold print indicates the largest factor loading for each component
organization HR

-0.3882
-0.0407
-0.5618
-0.0995
0.5485
0.1969
0.9119
0.1957
of dealing with

2.3.7 Control variables
To exclude alternative explanations and endogenous concerns, I included various control
variables at different levels: team, manager, and external market levels. First, I controlled for the
general team level property affecting team performance. I controlled for previous organizational
performance, measured as previous season’s winning percentage. Assuming that the relationship
between the age of player and organization performance would be inverted U-shape, I controlled
for player’s age and its squared term. In the similar vein, I controlled for a manager’s age and its
squared term. Additionally, to eliminate the concern that certain characteristics of managers may
affect organizational performance, I included various variables related to managers’ idiosyncratic
features as controls: manager-GM dual role, a manager hired from an outside team, manager’s
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other league experience, and manager’s organizational and league tenures. Some NBA managers
have a dual role, serving as both head coach and team executive (or general manager) (e.g., Don
Nelson, Gregg Popovich, Mike Dunleavy). I controlled for manager outsider status because the
origin of a manager might affect firm performance (e.g., Karaevli, 2007; Zhang & Rajagopalan,
2010). I also controlled for a manager’s experience in foreign or amateur leagues (e.g., NCAA
league) by counting the number of seasons that each manager served as head coach. I also
separated manager’s NBA experiences into team-specific and league tenures. Manager’s
organizational tenure was measured by counting the number of seasons with the current team, and
manager’s league tenure was measured by counting the number of seasons of assuming the head
coach role in the NBA.
Next, following the literature on organization performance, I measured organization
payroll by total compensation. Additionally, I included the number of rookies on a roster. I
controlled for each team’s market size because teams from large markets are likely to hire better
players and managers. The indicator variable took the value of 1 for the top 15 teams by the
population of the city where their stadiums are located, and 0 otherwise. Finally, season, division,
and team dummies were included to control for unobserved differences at various levels.
2.3.8 Empirical models
Organizational performance, the dependent variable, is continuous, indicating the
appropriateness of the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model for estimating the
relationship between the two distinct mechanisms of facing the loss of employees and
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organizational outcomes 13. First, the relationship between the outcomes and loss of employees is
12F

represented by the following equation:
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽2 𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 − 𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽5 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , --- Eq. (1)

where i indexes teams and t indexes seasons (years). Loss of star employee is a discrete variable
relating to the number of star players that left between seasons, and loss of non-star employee is a
discrete variable relating to the number of non-star players that left between seasons. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a
vector of control variables that can determine a team’s performance, and 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 , 𝛿𝛿, and 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 represent

manager (head coach), firm, division and season fixed effects. In order to compare the magnitude
of coefficients between before and after rule change separately, I run add the interaction term of
Post Rule Change X Loss of Stars and Post Rule Change X Loss of Non-stars to the Equation (1)
to test H1-H2. In addition, I add three-way interaction terms to verify how the two distinct
mechanisms to mitigate the loss of employee loss to the Eq. (1) (e.g., Post Rule Change X Loss of
Stars X Resource Picking (H3), Post Rule Change X Loss of Non-stars X Capability Building (H4)).
Robust standard errors clustered at the team-season level account for the non-independence of the
observations (Peterson, 2009).

2.4 Results
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive summary statistics and correlation matrix for the
variables used to estimate organizational performance. Table 2.3 reports the results of the panel
OLS regression model with team fixed effects. Models 1-4 in Table 2.3 present full sample
analyses to show the consequence of loss of stars and non-stars employee. Models 5 and 6 display

13

As a robustness check, I perform Tobit regression since the winning percentage limited between 0 and 100 and
find qualitatively consistent results.
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the impact of outward employee mobility before and after rule change, separately. In Model 1
(baseline), the coefficients for Star employee loss and non-star employee demonstrate the
employee loss is detrimental to organization performance, not surprisingly suggesting that the loss
of star is more hurt to organization performance than the loss non-star employee (β𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 =

−0.111, p < 0.05, β𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛−𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = −0.021, p < 0.05). To test hypothesis 1, focal explanatory

variable that is the interaction term of Post rule change X Star employee loss is added to Model 2.
The coefficient on the Star employee loss variable in Model 2 demonstrates that the negative
relationship between the loss of a star and the organizational outcome is mitigated when an
organization requires reciprocal interdependence. In other words, the loss of a star hurts more when
an organization requires pooled interdependence (𝛽𝛽 = 0.104, p < 0.05), supporting hypothesis 1.
Conversely the coefficient on the post rule change X non-star employee loss in Model 3
demonstrates that the relationship between the loss of a non-star employee and organizational
outcome is negatively moderated (𝛽𝛽 = -0.019, p < 0.05). It suggests that losing non-star employees
hurts organizational performance more under reciprocal interdependence than under pooled
interdependence, supporting hypothesis 2. The results indicate that the negative impact on the loss
of human resource is depending upon the type of interdependence that an organization requires. In
particular, the value of star employee is much more important under pooled interdependence, but
the value of non-star employee is much more important under reciprocal interdependence.
In order to better understand the hypotheses 1 and 2, I conduct subsample analyses by
separating before and after the rule change in Models 5 and 6. Interestingly the loss of star is
detrimental to the organization, however, the loss of non-star is not necessarily detrimental to the
organization performance before the rule change. Conversely, the star departures do not negatively
affect organization performance after the rule change, but the non-star departures hurt organization
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performance. To compare the two coefficients from two different equations, I conduct Chow test
(Chow, 1960). The Chow test presents that the null hypothesis that the two coefficients on star
employee loss from Models 5 and 6 are same was rejected at 95 significance level (before-after; 5.73**). In a similar vein, the Chow test rejects the null hypothesis that two coefficients on nonstar employee loss from Models 5 and 6 are same (before-after; 9.73***). The Figure 2.2 is a
coefficient plot to compare the coefficients in Table 2.3, suggesting that the consequential impact
of loss of employees is depending upon the type of interdependence that organizations require.
Further, this shows that the loss of star employees is not always harmful, but sometimes the loss
of non-star employees is critical for creating firm value.

Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Variables
M SD Min. Max. 1
2
3
4
1. Organization
0.50 0.16 0.13 0.88 1
Performance
2. Star Loss
0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 -0.09 1
3. Non-star Loss
1.20 1.09 0.00 5.00 -0.34 0.06 1
4. Post Rule Change
0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 1
5. Previous Org.
0.50 0.16 0.00 0.88 0.65 0.00 -0.29 0.01
Performance
6. Resource picking
0.00 1.00 -3.63 4.20 0.06 0.15 -0.02 -0.06
7. Capability Building
0.00 1.00 -3.15 3.01 0.18 0.00 -0.15 0.01
8. Employee Age
27 1.43 23 31 0.50 -0.08 -0.17 -0.22
9. Employee Age Squared 741 78.22 555 1019 0.50 -0.08 -0.17 -0.22
10. Manager Age
49 7.65 33 71 0.07 0.02 -0.10 0.13
11. Manager Age Squared 2536 784 1089 5041 0.07 0.02 -0.10 0.14
12. Manager-Exec. Duality 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.14
13. Manager Outsiderness 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.05
14. Manager Other Exp.
0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.02
15. Organization Payroll 17.54 0.53 15.70 18.66 0.13 -0.03 -0.02 0.75
16. Manager Org. Tenure 3.38 3.07 1.00 20.00 0.30 0.00 -0.15 0.03
17. Manager. Lea. Tenure 7.34 7.00 0.00 31.00 0.16 0.01 -0.11 0.07
Note: N=522. Bolded pairwise correlations are significant at the 0.05 level.

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1
0.04
-0.05
-0.05
0.05
0.04
0.00
0.02
0.04
-0.05
0.01
0.00

1
-0.17
-0.17
-0.10
-0.10
-0.01
0.01
0.02
-0.02
-0.15
-0.11

1
0.99
-0.05
-0.05
0.00
-0.10
0.04
0.03
0.15
0.05

1
-0.05
-0.05
-0.01
-0.10
0.04
0.03
0.15
0.05

1
0.99
0.01
0.17
0.08
0.15
0.17
0.74

1
0.01
0.15
0.08
0.16
0.16
0.76

1
0.12
0.07
-0.09
0.02
0.06

13

14

15

16

17

1
-0.01
0.03
0.56
0.56
0.09
0.09
-0.11
-0.13
-0.03
0.16
0.30
0.21

1
0.09 1
0.06 0.03 1
-0.16 -0.07 0.05 1
0.17 -0.05 0.12 0.22

1
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Table 2.3 The effect of employee loss on organization performance
Dependent Variable
Estimation
Sample
Hypotheses
Models
Post Rule Change X
Star Employee Out
Post Rule Change X
Non-Star Employee Out
Star Employee Out
Non-Star Employee Out
Post Rule Change
Resource Picking
Capability Building
Previous Organization
Performance
Employee Age
Employee Age Squared
Manager Age
Manager Age Squared
Manager-Executive
Duality
Manager Outsiderness
Manager Other League
Experience
Organization Payroll
Manager Tenure
Manager League Tenure
Season/Div./Org./
Manager FE

Baseline
1

-0.111***
(0.027)
-0.021***
(0.005)
0.004
(0.034)
0.014***
(0.005)
0.026***
(0.005)
0.282***
(0.047)
0.098
(0.109)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.006
(0.009)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.022
(0.020)
0.022
(0.015)
0.017
(0.011)
0.066**
(0.028)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.002
(0.001)
Yes

Organization Performance
Panel OLS Fixed Effects
Full Sample
H1
H2
Full
2
3
4
0.104**
0.098*
(0.053)
(0.055)
-0.019**
-0.016*
(0.010)
(0.010)
-0.118***
-0.096***
-0.113***
(0.037)
(0.027)
(0.037)
-0.022***
-0.011
-0.013*
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.007)
-0.002
-0.087
-0.088
(0.021)
(0.053)
(0.054)
0.015***
0.015***
0.015***
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
0.025***
0.025***
0.025***
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
0.303***
0.280***
0.283***
(0.045)
(0.047)
(0.047)
0.150
0.081
0.108
(0.107)
(0.108)
(0.109)
-0.002
-0.001
-0.001
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.007
-0.004
-0.005
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.009)
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.024
-0.023
-0.023
(0.019)
(0.020)
(0.020)
0.021
0.021
0.021
(0.014)
(0.015)
(0.015)
0.017
0.018
0.019*
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
0.013
0.076***
0.071**
(0.017)
(0.029)
(0.029)
0.005**
0.005**
0.005**
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
0.002
0.002
0.002
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Yes

Yes

-2.368
-2.116
-2.259
(1.552)
(1.502)
(1.537)
Observations
522
522
522
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2
0.515
0.583
0.526
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the organization in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Constant

Subsample
Before
After
5
6

-0.118***
(0.038)
-0.007
(0.008)

-0.019
(0.041)
-0.033***
(0.007)

0.001
(0.008)
0.010
(0.008)
0.260***
(0.072)
0.265
(0.169)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.019
(0.014)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.004
(0.028)
0.006
(0.023)
0.009
(0.018)
0.073
(0.048)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.005*
(0.002)

0.022***
(0.007)
0.030***
(0.007)
0.175***
(0.065)
0.023
(0.175)
0.000
(0.003)
-0.032**
(0.014)
0.000**
(0.000)
-0.021
(0.038)
0.048*
(0.024)
0.033*
(0.017)
0.067*
(0.039)
0.002
(0.003)
0.000
(0.002)

Yes

Yes

Yes

-2.534
(1.545)
522
0.526

-5.390**
(2.519)
255
0.594

-0.641
(2.405)
267
0.500
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Figure 2.2 The coefficient plots of the consequence from unexpected employee loss 14
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Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present how organization’s resource picking and capability building
heterogeneously affect the recovery of the loss of employees. To capture the effects of resource
picking and capability building on the recovery of the loss before and after the elimination of
illegal defense, I conduct three-way interactions analyses. Table 2.4 shows whether resource
picking is more efficient on the recovery from the loss of star employee under pooled or reciprocal
interdependence. Model 7 in Table 2.4 demonstrates that presents superior resource picking is
more efficient when the business model relies on pooled interdependence than reciprocal
independence (𝛽𝛽 = -0.057, p < 0.1). In order to better understand the three-way interaction term, I
conduct subsample analysis by separating before and after the rule change. Models 8 and 9 show

14

The error bars in the coefficient plots represents 95% confidence interval.
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that the rate of recovery from the loss of star employee is more efficient when the business model
is driven by pooled interdependence, suggesting that resource picking is valid when the loss of star
employees matters.
Table 2.5 presents whether capability building is more efficient on the recovery from the
loss of non-star employee under pooled or reciprocal interdependence. Model 10 in Table 2.5
demonstrates that the negative relationship between after rule change and the loss of non-star
employee out is mitigated when the business model is driven by reciprocal interdependence,
suggesting that capability building is more efficient when the loss of non-star employees is
impactful on the organization performance. In a similar vein, I conduct subsample analysis in order
to understand the three-way interaction results. In particular, Model 12 demonstrates that the
capability building is valid when the illegal defense is eliminated, suggesting that capability
building is efficient on the recovery from loss of non-star employees.
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Table 2.4 The effect of resource picking on recovery from loss of star employee
Dependent Variable
Estimation
Sample
Hypotheses
Models
Post Rule Change X Star Employee Out X
Resource Picking

Organization Performance
Panel OLS Fixed Effects
Subsample
Before
After
8
9

Full
H3
7
-0.057*
(0.033)
0.141*
Post Rule Change X Star Employee Out
(0.070)
0.065***
0.016
0.054**
Star Employee Out X Resource Picking
(0.018)
(0.031)
(0.024)
-0.161***
-0.161***
-0.033
Star Employee Out
(0.036)
(0.038)
(0.061)
-0.018***
-0.008
-0.031***
Non-Star Employee Out
(0.005)
(0.009)
(0.008)
-0.084*
Post Rule Change
(0.045)
-0.003
-0.008
0.022***
Resource Picking
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.006)
0.025***
0.009
0.031***
Capability Building
(0.006)
(0.011)
(0.007)
0.419***
0.269***
0.182*
Previous Organization Performance
(0.056)
(0.067)
(0.096)
0.093
0.252
0.008
Employee Age
(0.119)
(0.257)
(0.180)
-0.001
-0.004
0.000
Employee Age Squared
(0.002)
(0.005)
(0.003)
-0.009
0.016
-0.035**
Manager Age
(0.006)
(0.012)
(0.013)
0.000
-0.000
0.000**
Manager Age Squared
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.013
-0.001
-0.020
Manager-Executive Duality
(0.020)
(0.035)
(0.033)
0.013
0.013
0.052**
Manager Outsiderness
(0.011)
(0.029)
(0.025)
0.012
0.010
0.035*
Manager Other League Experience
(0.010)
(0.023)
(0.020)
0.052
0.070
0.068**
Organization Payroll
(0.034)
(0.058)
(0.033)
0.008***
0.007*
0.002
Manager Tenure
(0.001)
(0.004)
(0.002)
0.000
0.005*
0.000
Manager League Tenure
(0.001)
(0.003)
(0.002)
0.023*
Post Rule Change X Resource Picking
(0.012)
Season/Div./Org./Manager FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
-1.932
-5.076
-0.396
Constant
(1.388)
(3.169)
(2.438)
Observations
522
255
267
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2
0.515
0.604
0.492
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the organization level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5 The effect of capability building on recovery from loss of non-star employee
Dependent Variable
Estimation
Hypotheses
Models
Post Rule Change X Non-Star Employee Out X
Capability Building

Organization Performance

Full
Subsample
Before
After
H4
10
11
12
0.018**
(0.008)
-0.015*
Post Rule Change X Non-Star Employee Out
(0.009)
-0.004
-0.002
0.011**
Non-Star Employee Out X Capability Building
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.005)
-0.016*
-0.007
-0.029***
Non-Star Employee Out
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.007)
-0.065**
-0.117***
-0.028
Star Employee Out
(0.029)
(0.032)
(0.039)
-0.128*
Post Rule Change
(0.064)
0.017*
0.012
0.020**
Resource Picking
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.009)
0.014***
0.001
0.022***
Capability Building
(0.005)
(0.010)
(0.006)
0.278***
0.259***
0.177***
Previous Organization Performance
-0.045
(0.065)
(0.062)
0.152
0.269
0.008
Employee Age
(0.139)
(0.249)
(0.166)
-0.002
-0.005
0.000
Employee Age Squared
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.003)
0.001
0.019
-0.029**
Manager Age
(0.008)
(0.012)
(0.013)
-0.000
-0.000
0.000**
Manager Age Squared
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.036
0.004
-0.017
Manager-Executive Duality
(0.025)
(0.037)
(0.035)
0.005
0.006
0.039
Manager Outsiderness
(0.018)
(0.033)
(0.024)
0.015
0.009
0.027
Manager Other League Experience
(0.015)
(0.024)
(0.017)
0.105**
0.074
0.076**
Organization Payroll
(0.043)
(0.058)
(0.037)
0.006***
0.007*
0.002
Manager Tenure
(0.002)
(0.004)
(0.003)
0.005***
0.005
0.001
Manager League Tenure
(0.001)
(0.003)
(0.002)
0.003
Reciprocal Interdependence X Capability Building
(0.013)
Season/Div./Org./Manager FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
-3.858**
-5.460*
-0.635
Constant
(1.733)
(3.095)
(2.285)
Observations
522
255
267
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2
0.567
0.592
0.535
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the organization level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

32
2.4.1 Supplementary analyses
Despite the argument that the NBA’s elimination of illegal defense that allowed any type
of defensive strategy would affect the value of top performers and the impact of the loss of HR,
the results raised another question about how the rule reform indeed affected the value of
individual players. Accordingly, I performed several supplementary analyses to strengthen the
validity of the suggested arguments. First, I assumed that dependency upon star players might
decrease because isolation offense (pooled interdependence) would be weaker under any type of
defense and would affect the value of each player after the rule change (reciprocal
interdependence). In other words, the value of star players who are skilled at defeating opponent
players one-on-one would decrease, while the value of non-star players who can be part of a
systematic defensive strategy would increase. The conjecture that follows is that the exogenous
shock would affect each team’s compensation structure. In fact, after the rule change, the
organizational payroll would be flatter compared to the isolation era. Thus, I measured
compensation dispersion and observed the dispersion differences between the periods before and
after the rule change. Following other studies on compensation dispersion and labor economics
(e.g., Bloom, 1999; Carnahan et al., 2014), I used the Gini coefficient to measure compensation
dispersion. This coefficient ranged between zero (totally egalitarian pay structure) and one (totally
hierarchical structure), and it was calculated with individual employee salary. The Gini coefficient
was calculated as follows:
𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 =

2 ∑𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛 ∑𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖

−

𝑛𝑛+1
𝑛𝑛

,

where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is the salary of the ith ranked individual on a team and is indexed in non-decreasing

order—that is, i = 1 indicates the lowest paid player and n is the number of players on the team.

Notably, the team-level sample mean of the Gini Coefficient, 0.48, is greater than the average Gini
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of 0.25 noted by Bloom and Michael (2002) in their study on managers in firms from a variety of
industries, and lower than the Gini of 0.60 reported in Bloom’s (1999) study on professional
baseball teams. Appendix C shows the panel OLS regression results for the relationship between
post-rule change and each team’s compensation Gini coefficients. The coefficient on the post-rule
change is negative and statistically significant (𝛽𝛽 = −0.025, p < 0.05). These results indicate that,
on average, each team’s compensation dispersion was flatter compared to the period before the
rule change. This can be interpreted in two ways: first, dependency on star players would decrease;
second, the importance of non-star players would increase. Indeed, both could also occur.

2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In the strategic renewal process, firm managers are critical agents who recognize the need
for change, set the strategic initiatives, and assume the full responsibility for the restructuring
process. Employee departures to join competing firms not only mean the immediate loss of the
firm’s competitive advantage but also further disrupt the firm’s entire resource management
process. However, researchers have not examined the strategic consequences of such departures
from the perspective of the losing firms and how the losing firms respond to the loss of talent. The
present study investigated an organization’s two distinguished recovery techniques response in the
aftermath of losing human capital to the fore by examining how employee mobility affects the
losing firm’s resource management by categorizing two types of employees—high and mundane
performers—in the context of resource picking and capability building. This research integrates
works in resource-based view (RBV), HRM, and the dynamic managerial capability to contribute
new insights into employee mobility and the firm strategic renewal process.
In order to understand how the type of interdependence that an organization require affect
the loss of unexpected employee departure, and the how two distinct mechanisms for dealing with
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the loss of human resources heterogeneously affect the recovery process, I exploit a natural
experiment provided by radical rule changes in NBA court, 2001, which transfers from pooled
interdependence to reciprocal interdependence. Benefited by the availability of individual-level
performance data on NBA players, I first propose a new construct of resource picking as an
organizational ability to recruit into the organization new employees whose performance
subsequently improves relative to their previous job, and I also propose a new construct of
capability building as an organizational ability to improve the performance of extant employees
who were already in the organization. Thus, I examine how effectively each of these two
approaches mitigates the damage to performance that occurs following the departures of both star
and non-star employees before and after the rule changes.
Consistent with expectations, the results indicate that: (1) during the individual-focused
period (before the rule change), loss of star employees harms organizational performance, but this
harm can be mitigated by strong resource-picking skill, and (2) during the collaboration-focused
period (after the rule change), loss of non-star employees harms organizational performance, but
this harm can be mitigated by strong capability-building skill.
Therefore, the results suggest that a firm that has superior managerial expertise in HRM
can adapt and change more successfully than a firm that is less effective in the renewal process.
The specific managerial capability outlined in this research help a firm effectively recover from a
disruption in its human resource pool, and the effectiveness of the managerial capability also
depends on the type of loss and the level of interdependence that an organization needs. This has
implications for competitive advantage and disadvantage as firms.
The implications of this study extend beyond extant research on strategic renewal by
focusing on managerial capability under conditions of change. Although many scholars have
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documented the importance of the strategic renewal process and managerial roles, few empirical
studies have been conducted because it is difficult to observe specific factors under conditions of
change and measure managerial capability. By using a natural experiment under conditions of
change and measuring the two distinct types of managerial expertise, this research not only
provided a proper empirical setting for the topic at hand but also depicted very specific managerial
effects on firm recovering.
This study also reveals the importance of industrial conditions (e.g., desired
interdependence) for firm HRM and development. The consequences of industrial environmental
change have been well-documented. However, researchers have recently acknowledged the need
to better understand the impact of external factors and the role of managers in the strategic renewal
process (Helfat & Martin, 2015). The present study was a response to this call by proposing
managerial capabilities as an important mechanism for recovering a firm’s established capabilities
and routines that have been disrupted by unexpected external and internal hazards. Superior
resource picking is more effective when an organization capability is driven by a few talented
human assets, and capability building is much more important when an organization capability is
driven by coordinated human capital.
The results of this study also partly answer the question of how managerial capabilities and
their underpinnings interact with a firm’s resource portfolio to influence strategic renewal (e.g.,
Helfat & Martin, 2015). Expertise in dealing with HR from an internal or external market can
alleviate or sometimes exacerbate the organizational renewal efforts (Finkelstein, Hambrick, &
Cannella, 2009). For instance, an organization which has a high level of resource picking is not
beneficial to certain organizations that lose many mundane performers (see Appendix C). This
suggests that the matching between certain managerial capabilities and the quality of HR is critical
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for reorganizing a firm’s resource portfolio, and each firm should recognize what kind of
managerial expertise its top managers possess for managing HR in order to generate more firm
value.
Lastly but not least, this study theoretically and empirically complements the existing
literature which focuses on the effectiveness of recruiting and training human resources (e.g., Baird
& Meshoulam, 1988; Huselid, 1995). Theoretically, although many researchers in HRM have
documented that the effectiveness of recruiting and training programs on firm performance and
boundary conditions on the effectiveness, however, little literature touches upon the possibility
that effectiveness is depending on the quality of human resources, and the interdependence that an
organization requires. Furthermore, little literature considers the fact that the value of human
resources is depending upon the type of interdependence. Many researchers in HR examine that
the effectiveness of recruiting or training on firm performance separately, since the effect of
recruiting and training is hard to be decomposed and measured empirically. Due to our new
suggested constructs for two techniques, I am able to test the effectiveness of recruiting and
training simultaneously and to capture the relative effectiveness of two practices that deal with
human resources in an organization.
In general, given the conditions of change and human capital loss with restructuring the
organizational resource, this topic has implications for research into both resource configuration
and organization design. Its focus on individual managers and managerial HR capabilities have a
critical role to play in research on the micro-foundations of strategic leadership.

2.5.1 Limitations and future research
All studies have limitations, and like all studies, the limitations of this study can offer
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opportunities for future research. Despite the advantages of the sports team setting, these
organizations do not represent all the features of organizational activities. The roles of sports team
managers (head coaches or general managers (GM)) are similar to those of managers in business
corporations—namely, selecting, deploying, and developing resources, including HR. The zerosum competition and winner-take-it-all regime of sport teams’ competitive environment (e.g.,
Yanadori & Cui, 2013), however, are not the case in the real business world. Even though I could
observe each organizational ability to deal with HR by taking advantage of the sports setting, it
might be beneficial to complement the findings of this study with research in a general business
setting.
Regarding another important limitation of this study, it is not possible to suggest that a
correspondence exists between annual winning percentages and overall organizational
performance. Although the winning percentage is a critical source of general organization
outcomes in sports industries, this does not reflect the outcome for the entire organization. Since a
manager’s specific status can have different effects on various aspects of the organization, it could
be interesting to investigate how much a particular manager’s status contributes to overall
organizational performance and how strongly it affects different parts of the organization. In
addition, I propose that a causal relationship exists between the loss of employees and
organizational outcomes, but the loss of a manager would incur other problems. Therefore, a field
study method combining qualitative research and a longitudinal setting could complement the
current research outcomes and setting. I hope that future research will explore such issues in other
contexts and identify the causal mechanisms that might be needed to extend the generalizability of
the present findings.
Although I distinguish two different managerial capabilities for dealing with HR under
conditions of change, the two managerial capabilities are not completely exclusive. The two
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distinct but related managerial capabilities could be complemented or substituted to create
organizational value (Makadok, 2001) . Thus, future research should examine the interaction
between these two different managerial capabilities in the organizational outcome. Further, the
two mechanisms could be determinants for employee mobility. For instance, some employees who
believe that they are underdeveloped would prefer to work with managers who are experts at
developing their subordinates, or very talented employees may not care what kind of employers or
managers they work for, if they believe that they do not need to be developed. This kind of need
for motivation or self-enhancement would serve as another determinant of employee departures.
In future studies, it might be interesting to test the effects of the two possible recovery techniques
on employee turnover decisions and the underexplored relationship between the micro-foundations
of the effectiveness of techniques and interactions between employees and their managers.
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CHAPTER 3.
WHERE THE STARS STILL SHINE: WHETHER AND
WHY FORMER STAR PERFORMERS BECOME SUPERIOR
MANAGERS

3.1 Introduction
The best way to support dreams and stretch is to set apart small ideas with big potential, then
give people positive role models and the resources to turn small projects into big businesses.
Jack Welch (Former GE CEO)
Some employees are obviously more valuable to an organization than others. Researchers
have consistently found that employees at the top of the performance distribution are many times
more valuable than their lower-performing colleagues (e.g., Groysberg et al., 2008; Hess &
Rothaermel, 2011; Lepak & Snell, 1999). The highest-performing star employees often generate
superior economic value, providing a rare but critical opportunity for an organization to increase
its competitive advantage through human capital, especially in situations where the contribution
of a star employee cannot easily be replaced by alternative options, such as hiring a larger number
of non-star employees or substituting non-human resources (Barney & Wright, 1998). Indeed,
many organizations have a practice of filling management positions with employees who have
previously demonstrated star-level performance in an individual contributor role, either at the same
organization or at a competing organization, resulting in the phenomenon of the star-performerturned-manager (SPTM). Although this practice of promoting star performers into management
roles is so common as to be taken for granted, little research has examined either its goals or its
effectiveness. On one hand, organizations may benefit from this practice even before a star actually
gets promoted. For example, many organizations use the prospect or promise of promotion to
management as one weapon in the “war for talent” (Chambers, Foulon, Handfield-Jones, Hankin,
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& Michaels, 1998; Michaels, Handfield-Jones, & Axelrod, 2001) by establishing career ladders in
order to attract, motivate, and retain top-performing individual contributors (e.g., Bloom & Michel,
2002; Zenger, 1992).
However, it would seem surprising if this practice of promoting stars into management
were adopted for such motivational reasons alone. One would naturally expect some part of the
organization’s benefit from this practice to occur after the promotion takes place. Yet little research
has addressed questions about such post-promotion benefits: Do SPTM’s achieve more success in
managerial roles than other managers? If so, why? What factors or mechanisms determine the
performance of SPTM’s? Are those different than the factors or mechanisms that determine the
performance of other managers?

3.1.1 Performance of SPTM’s: Matthew effect vs. Peter principle
Conventional wisdom about whether former star individual contributors make better
managers is split, pitting the Matthew effect against the Peter Principle. On one hand, research on
the Matthew effect 15 indicates that past success begets subsequent success in a broad range of
14F

fields as diverse as science (Merton, 1968), politics (Richards, 1969), health care (Link & Milcarek,
1980), education (Walberg & Tsai, 1983), publishing (Levitt & Nass, 1989), investment banking
(Podolny, 1993), litigation (Cooney, 1994), semiconductors (Podolny, Stuart, & Hannan, 1996),
venture capital (Hsu, 2004), motion pictures (Waguespack & Sorenson, 2010), engineering
(Simcoe & Waguespack, 2010), and wine (Roberts, Khaire, & Rider, 2011). Indeed, research
indicates that past success in one activity can even beget subsequent success in a different but

15

This term is derived from the New Testament Book of Matthew: “For whoever has will be given more, and they
will have an abundance. Whoever does not have, even what they have will be taken from them.” (Matthew 25:29
NIV)
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related activity (Van Looy, Ranga, Callaert, Debackere, & Zimmermann, 2004). This Mattheweffect logic suggests one might reasonably expect that past success as an individual contributor in
a given field may beget subsequent success as manager in that same field.
On the other hand, conventional wisdom from the Peter Principle (Peter & Hull, 1969)
suggests, somewhat cynically, that people get promoted to their own level of incompetence, and
then get stuck at that level, so that past success may actually diminish subsequent success. As
reviewed by Lazear (2004), evidence in favor of the Peter Principle may be seen in the performance
patterns of mutual fund managers (Grubel, 1979), sales managers (Anderson, Dubinsky, & Mehta,
1999), government employees (Lewis, 1997), engineers (Kennedy, 2009), and financial service
personnel (Barmby, Eberth, & Ma, 2012), in the general effect of organizational tenure on job
performance (Ng & Feldman, 2010), and in the effects of job tenure on both compensation (Baker,
Gibbs, & Holmstrom, 1994; Lazaer, 1992) and self-evaluations of performance (Medoff &
Abraham, 1980).
So, the question of whether SPTM’s outperform other managers depends upon whether the
Matthew effect dominates the Peter Principle, or vice versa. This question is important because
having a star performer as a manager may incur considerable costs, both ex ante and ex post -- e.g.,
expensive compensation packages, long contractual terms, uncertain performance, or potential
frictions with incumbent employees.

3.1.2 Typology of possible SPTM performance effects
However, the question of whether SPTM’s outperform other managers is easier to answer
than the question of why SPTM’s might outperform other managers. Perhaps the two most obvious
possible mechanisms for the success of SPTM’s would be skill-based and motivation-based. Let
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us consider each of these two categories of mechanisms in turn, and I shall see that within each
category, some mechanisms are employee-focused in the sense that they involve the SPTM directly
and personally changing the employees’ skills or motivations themselves, while other mechanisms
are organization-focused in the sense that they involve the SPTM changing the way that employees’
skills or motivation are deployed/harnessed. Table 3.1 summarizes these dimensions as a typology.

Table 3.1 Typology of possible mechanisms for SPTM’s to benefit organizational performance

EmployeeFocused

OrganizationFocused

Skill-Based Mechanisms

Motivation-Based Mechanisms

Teaching:

Inspiring:

SPTM is more effective than other

SPTM is more effective than other

managers at transferring star-level

managers at motivating employees, due

skills to employees.

to inspirational role modeling.

Positioning:

Monitoring:

SPTM is more effective than other

SPTM is more effective than other

managers at recognizing specific skills managers at recognizing or measuring
of individual employees and using this employees’ effort or performance, and
knowledge of employees’ individual

using this knowledge to dole out

skills to assign specific employees to

rewards and punishments in a more

specific roles or tasks.

precisely targeted way.
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Skill-based mechanisms would focus on ways in which the SPTM either improves the skills
of his/her employees or improves the utilization or deployment of their skills. On one hand, the
SPTM may be able to teach employees the skills that made him/her a star performer in the first
place, in a way that other managers cannot. This teaching mechanism (top left cell in Table 3.1)
would represent an employee-focused effect of the SPTM on the organization’s skills, in the sense
that it directly changes an employee’s skills themselves. On the other hand, SPTM’s may have a
superior ability to recognize the specific skills of each employee (as in the adage, “It takes one to
know one”), and therefore may do a better job than other managers in assigning specific roles and
tasks to specific employees. In this way, the SPTM may be able to utilize each employee’s existing
skills more thoroughly and deploy them more effectively than other managers, even if the SPTM
does nothing to improve the employees’ skills themselves. This mechanism of positioning (bottom
left cell in Table 3.1) would represent a contextual organization-focused effect of the SPTM on
the organization’s skills, because it extracts more value from individual employees’ skills by
simply positioning those skills in the right place at the right time to do the most good, while leaving
the skills themselves unchanged.
In contrast to skill-based explanations, motivation-based explanations would focus on
ways in which the SPTM increases the level of effort that employees apply in their work. For
example, if SPTM’s have a superior ability to recognize or measure each employee’s effort or
performance, then they may dole out rewards and punishments with greater precision and
effectiveness than other managers can, and thereby motivate greater effort from each employee.
This mechanism of monitoring (bottom right cell of Table 3.1) would be an organization-focused
way for a SPTM to boost the motivation of employees. On the other hand, simply working for a
boss who is a former star performer may be intrinsically motivational in itself if the employee
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views the SPTM as an inspirational role model. Role modeling occurs when a person admires and
identifies with a reference individual, and seeks to emulate the behavior and values of that
individual (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Merton, 1957). This mechanism of inspiring (top right cell
of Table 3.1) would be an employee-focused way for a SPTM to boost employees’ motivation.

3.1.3 Empirical challenges to measuring SPTM effects
An ideal empirical setting for this topic would allow the researcher to identify SPTM’s,
measure their relative success versus other managers, and then decompose this relative success
into distinct components that are due to each of the four mechanisms in this taxonomy – i.e.,
separate percentages due to teaching (intrinsic skill-based mechanism), to positioning (extrinsic
skill-based mechanism), to monitoring (extrinsic motivation-based mechanism), and to inspiring
(intrinsic motivation-based mechanism). Although one might be able to artificially construct such
an idealized context in a laboratory experiment, it is not readily available in any real-world
organization because it would require direct measures for all four mechanisms.
However, as an imperfect substitute, one type of real-world organization that allows for
indirect measures for some of these mechanisms is a professional sports team managed by a team
coach. This empirical context is particularly well-suited for four reasons: First, it is easy to identify
which team coaches were previously star athletes in their sport. Second, it is easy to measure the
performance of each coach, since the goal of winning games is universally shared, unambiguous,
and objectively measured. Third, one of the four mechanisms – inspiring – is at least indirectly
measurable. For example, as mentioned earlier, admiration of the role model is an essential
ingredient of inspirational role modeling, and admiration of sports stars is highly geographically
specific. Although every rule has its exceptions, the overwhelming majority of sports fans’
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admiration is focused on hometown heroes from the local team, both due to their greater visibility
in the local media and due to geographic loyalties. 16 Thus, an athlete who shares a geographic
15F

connection with a coach – e.g., growing up in the same city where the coach had played on a
professional team, or attending the same college where the coach had played on a collegiate team
– is more likely to have admired that coach as a role model. So, even though inspiring may seem
like a highly subjective mechanism, it can nevertheless be measured at least somewhat objectively.
Finally, the fourth reason why professional sports teams offer a particularly useful context for
studying SPTM’s is that another one of the four mechanisms – monitoring – can largely be
eliminated from consideration as irrelevant in this particular organizational setting, thereby
simplifying the task of isolating the other mechanisms. Monitoring is relatively unimportant in this
setting for two reasons: (1) Because a professional athlete’s performance is done in a public setting
– indeed, often televised, as well as scrutinized by journalists – the team coach has little advantage
over anyone else in monitoring that performance. (2) The coach has relatively little discretionary
influence over the allocation of financial rewards and punishments to members of the team. Any
performance-based financial incentives written into the athlete’s contract are negotiated with the
team’s owner, president, or general manager, rather than with the coach. Furthermore, the
performance criteria for an athlete to earn such incentives (e.g., points scored, games won) are
objectively measured in a way that does not require any involvement from the coach.
Although the empirical setting of professional sports teams helpfully allows us to measure
the mechanism of inspiring (at least indirectly) and to simplify the analysis by eliminating the
mechanism of monitoring, unfortunately it does not provide much help in distinguishing or
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Exceptions to this rule would include the few international superstars who epitomize the very pinnacle of
performance in their sport (e.g., Michael Jordan, Wayne Gretzky, David Beckham, Babe Ruth), since their fans are
more geographically dispersed.
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measuring the other two mechanisms of teaching and positioning. Therefore, the scope of this
study is limited to studying just the one specific mechanism of inspirational role modeling.

3.1.4 Unpacking the mechanism of inspirational role modeling
Drawing from the literature on social comparison theory and self-enhancement processes
(e.g., Collins, 1996; Festinger, 1954; Kilduff, Landis, & Burt, 2010), I focus on inspirational role
model effects. Although researchers have documented that a star’s individual performance can
directly boost overall organizational performance (e.g., Goodall, Kahn, & Oswald, 2011;
Groysberg, 2010; Groysberg & Lee, 2009; Kehoe & Tzabbar, 2015), little research has considered
how star performers can also indirectly influence organizational performance by motivating their
coworkers to improve. Since people naturally observe their similarities and differences with others
in order to compare status (Ertug & Castellucci, 2013; Martin, Feldman, Hatch, & Sitkin, 1983),
the status inequality between stars and non-stars may prompt the latter to emulate and strive toward
the former, especially when star-level performance is understood to be a route for promotion into
management. In this regard, SPTM’s may be an even stronger source of inspiration to employees
than other star coworkers.
Similarly, the determinants of success for SPTM’s may be different than for other
managers, who cannot provide the same kind of inspiration. Specifically, in the professional sports
context, I show that geographic connections between members of the team have and their coach
(e.g., attending the same college, or living where the coach had played professionally) boost
performance only for SPTM’s but not for other coaches. This result makes sense in light of
interpretation of such geographic connections as a proxy for inspirational role modeling. In
contrast, prior success in coaching boosts performance for other coaches, but not for SPTM’s. So,
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I interpret these two pairs of results as indicating that the performance of SPTM’s is driven by the
mechanism of inspiring rather than by skill-based mechanisms, that the performance of other
managers is driven by skill-based mechanisms rather than by inspirational role modeling, and that
these two mechanisms serve as substitutes for each other.
Furthermore, the empirical results also demonstrate when a SPTM’s inspirational role
modeling matters the most. By its very nature as a process of social comparison, the inspirational
role modeling of SPTM’s would naturally be more effective under two types of circumstances: (1)
The SPTM’s prior stardom is highly salient in the minds of employees, and (2) the employees have
a high need for inspirational motivation toward self-enhancement. Consider each of these in turn.
First, the salience of a SPTM’s prior stardom is stronger in the minds of employees who
have directly observed that past star performance for themselves. For example, in professional
sports team context, if the SPTM coach is substantially older than the players on the team, then
they may be too young to have personally witnessed the coach as a star player, which would reduce
the salience of the coach’s prior star performance in their minds. Empirical results support this
effect. Also, the salience of a SPTM’s prior stardom in the minds of employees can be diluted or
obscured in the presence of other stars who can also serve as alternative inspirational role models.
In professional sports, when the team has a current star player who is in the game, other players
may look to that teammate for their inspiration, and thereby have less need for inspiration from a
SPTM. Conversely, if a current star player is absent from the game (e.g., due to injury) and thereby
deprives teammates from this substitute source of inspiration, then the SPTM’s role modeling
becomes more salient. The empirical results also support this effect. Second, the need for
inspirational motivation toward self-enhancement is greater among employees who are less secure
about whether their skills can meet the challenges of the job. For example, inexperienced
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employees with underdeveloped skills have a greater need to invest in their human capital in order
to fulfill their potential (e.g., Huselid, 1995; Zhang & Bartol, 2010). Empirical results support this
effect as well.

3.2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
3.2.1 Star performer and star performer-turned-manager
Strategic human capital researchers have examined the important role of star employees in
creating economic value and boosting an organization’s competitive advantage (Groysberg & Lee,
2009; Groysberg et al., 2008; Sonnenfeld & Peiperl, 1988) via at least four different mechanisms:
First, star performers themselves are valuable, rare, and inimitable resources. For example,
Groysberg (2010) finds that a star computer programmer is eight times more productive than a
non-star, and that the top one percent of investors are five to ten times more productive than others.
Hess and Rothaermel (2011) find that the top one percent of scientists in the pharmaceutical
industry account for almost 40 percent of all publications. Second, a star performer’s superior
expertise opens new opportunities for value creation. For instance, Kehoe and Tzabbar (2015)
show that a star performer increases organizational innovation performance by facilitating access
to and management of tangible and intangible resources. Extreme performers also have the ability
to recognize opportunities to identify, evaluate, and pursue successful business projects (Goodall
et al., 2011; Paruchuri, 2010). Third, star performers also provide knowledge spillovers and
developmental support to colleagues. For example, Azoulay, Zivin, and Wang (2008) find that
academic collaborators suffer an 8.79% decrease in their publication rate after their superstar
coauthor dies. Fourth, from a relational perspective, star performers have better social capital than
non-star performers. (e.g., Burt, 2010; Oldroyd & Morris, 2012). Former star employees are highly
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visible in the labor market, and others are likely to seek relationships with them, so star performers
can develop very high levels of social capital that can positively affect firm performance
(Groysberg et al., 2008; Oldroyd & Morris, 2012).
Organizations try to retain the star performers, not only because their superior human
capital leads to organizational success, but also because they may leave to work for a competing
organization, or create their own organization that competes directly with their former employers
(e.g., Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012; Carnahan et al., 2012; Groysberg & Lee, 2009). One
common employee retention tool is a promotion ladder (Bloom & Michel, 2002). For example,
Groysberg et al (2008) found that, in 8.4% of employee turnover cases in the investment bank
industry, employees were promoted within the organization in order to retain them. In addition to
this retention benefit, promotion ladders may also help solve the problem of motivating employees
to make investments in firm-specific human capital (e.g., Campbell et al., 2012; Hatch & Dyer,
2004; Huselid, 1995; Snell & Dean, 1992), insofar as the prospect of promotion to management
may increase an employee’s incentive to make such investments. Note that this motivational
benefit may encourage organizations to offer promotion ladders even if star performers do not
necessarily become particularly good managers.
Despite making great efforts to understand the role of star performers, researchers have
given little attention to understanding the role of SPTMs. Although the prevalence of SPTM’s in
business environments makes practitioners keenly interested in finding ways to help them to
succeed (Adler, 1996; McKee, 2015), rigorous research on this topic is scarce. For example, even
though firms may expect (or at least hope) for their star employees to become star managers, as in
the Matthew Effect, the question of whether they actually do remains a largely untested hypothesis.
Indeed, the Peter Principle predicts the opposite, for several reasons: Expertise may decrease over
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time if it is not updated, or may be so organization-specific or situation-specific that it lacks
relevance in a managerial role. Most importantly, an employee’s job is different than a manager’s,
and skill at performing in an employee role may be very different from skill at managing others in
that role. Having a skill is different from teaching that skill, and having motivation to perform is
different from motivating others to perform. Managers also have more responsibilities than
employees, such as setting organization goals, synchronizing a variety of resources, and resolving
conflicts between employees (e.g., Holcomb et al., 2009; Mannor, Shamsie, & Conlon, 2015;
Sirmon et al., 2007).

3.2.2 Inspirational role model effects of the star performer-turned-manager
Inspirational role modeling is a motivational mechanism, so it may contribute to the
longstanding quest by strategic human capital researchers (e.g., Campbell et al., 2012; Hatch &
Dyer, 2004; Huselid, 1995; Snell & Dean, 1992) to find methods of motivating employees to invest
in improving their human capital. After all, unlike financial and physical resources, increasing or
improving a person’s skills requires the person to exert effort in training and/or practice, either of
which requires motivation (Huselid, 1995). As illustrated earlier in Table 3.1, inspirational role
modeling is only one of several ways that a SPTM might outperform other managers, but it is the
one that can most easily be measured, albeit indirectly, in this empirical context.
Individuals seek career role models whom they perceive as similar to them in certain
characteristics because they assume that those characteristics would apply to their own career as
well (Bandura, 1986). Therefore, SPTM’s exemplify the possible goals of their subordinate
employees’ career paths. Social comparison theory supports the idea that SPTM’s are good role
models to subordinate employees. Social comparison refers to the human tendency to observe
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similarities and differences and compare one’s situation to those of others. This tendency is
important in the workplace for discipline, ability, personal status, rewards, promotion, and
interaction with coworkers—including managers (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Kacperczyk, Beckman, &
Moliterno, 2015). Moreover, an individual employee might suffer from social deprivation or might
feel superior based on social comparisons across “neighbors” or “near peers” (Burt, 2010: 256;
Kacperczyk et al., 2015). So, the psychological process of upward comparison to superior
colleagues can serve as a motivational source that encourages employees to invest in improving
their human capital, inspires them toward higher levels of performance, and helps them define
their self-concept (Bucher & Stelling, 1977; Ibarra, 1999).
Self-concept orientation is the general tendency to consider the self in terms of individual
characteristics, role relationships, reference groups, social status, roles, and goals (Cooper &
Thatcher, 2010). In the social comparison process at the workplace, individuals are likely to
observe and compare themselves to others. Hogg and Terry (2000) argue that self-enhancement is
motivated by the desire to view oneself positively in relation to others whose attributes, status, and
other characteristics can be reference points for what an individual pursues. In this compare-andcontrast process with reference individuals (or groups), role model effects can lead to selfenhancement, consisting of the beliefs like “I want to be like that person” or “I wish I could be that
person.” In a similar vein, Lockwood and Kunda (1997) argue that another’s status as a star
performer in a similar domain is likely to encourage employees’ self-enhancement, providing
positive role model effects. These possible (but underexplored) mechanisms can extend current
literature on the role of stars, the effect of a manager’s prior stardom, and human resource
management. Accordingly, I posit that, in this way, the presence of a star performer-turnedmanager can serve as an inspirational role model (Collins, 1996; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Wood,
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1989), and the role model effect will positively impact organization performance: an individual’s
effectiveness in completing his or her core job or role-based responsibilities (e.g., Kehoe, Lepak,
& Bentley, 2016). Thus, I propose the following baseline hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus (even after controlling for each manager’s capability), an
organization managed by a star performer turned manager experiences greater
organization performance than an organization managed by other managers (i.e., non-star
performer turned manager).

3.2.3 Distinguishing inspirational role modeling from skill-based mechanisms
In order to verify that the effect of the prior stardom of a SPTM on organizational
performance is driven by inspirational role-model effects, it is necessary to carefully control for
the skill-based mechanisms described earlier in Table 3.1 17. Although several studies suggest that
16 F

the expertise of managers is an important source of competitive advantage (e.g., Goodall et al.,
2011; Kehoe & Tzabbar, 2015), it is certainly possible that the effects expertise and inspiration
have been conflated in past research, since no studies have seriously attempted to separately
identify these two effects empirically. What allows us to distinguish these two effects in the
particular empirical context is the fact that I can observe a proxy for the past visibility of managers’
performances in their prior careers to each employee.
Such visibility is important because inspirational motivation depends upon the employee
having observed the role model’s past performance (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). An employee
who has been carefully following a person’s career for a long time is more likely to consider that
person as a role model. Such visibility of the potential role model’s career performance is certainly
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As mentioned earlier, the other motivation-based mechanism in Table 3.1 – namely, monitoring – is irrelevant in
our particular empirical context. So, here I focus only on distinguishing inspirational role modeling from skill-based
mechanisms.
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greater when the two people have been in the same place at the same time – i.e., a geographic
connection. Indeed, because social comparison is an act of imagination, it is impossible without
visibility. In order for role modeling to work, the inspired person must imagine becoming more
like the role model, which requires observing a role model that one can realistically imagine
oneself being. If nobody similar to oneself can be visibly observed in a given role, then it becomes
more difficult to realistically imagine oneself in that same role. For instance, in a randomized
natural experiment, Beaman, Duflo, Pande, and Topalova (2012) show that visibility of female
leadership influences adolescent girls’ career aspirations and educational attainment. In this regard,
similarity may enhance visibility, since employees may simply disregard a potential role model
who is so different from themselves that they cannot imagine becoming like that person (e.g.,
Beaman et al., 2012; Marx, Ko, & Friedman, 2009). Accordingly, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus (even after controlling for managerial capability), the
organizational performance benefit of a visibility connection (e.g., geographic connection)
between managers and their subordinate employees is greater for SPTM’s than for other
managers (e.g., non-SPTM).

3.2.4 Are inspirational role modeling and skill complementary?
Since a manager’s former stardom can provide an intangible asset that is unavailable to
other managers, one might expect SPTM’s to take different paths in affecting organizational
performance (e.g., Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010). For example, do skill-based mechanisms
matter more for the performance of SPTM’s than for other managers, or vice versa? On one hand,
strategy research provides both theoretical rationale (Makadok, 2003) and empirical evidence
(Feldman & Montgomery, 2015) for a synergistic, complementary relationship between incentivebased motivation and skill. By this logic, if inspirational motivation works similarly to incentivebased motivation, then managerial skill will have a greater benefit for organizational performance
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under the inspirational leadership of SPTM’s than under the leadership of other managers who
cannot motivate employees via inspirational role modeling. Accordingly, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: The organizational performance benefits derived from expertise (e.g.,
managerial capability) are greater for SPTM’s than for other managers (e.g., non-SPTMs).
However, some anecdotal evidence directly contradicts the conclusion of this logic. For example,
I interviewed one 13-year veteran Korean professional basketball league player, who commented
that:
Two coaches that I had been with were sort of stars when they were players. In my opinion,
their playing capability does not necessarily lead to their managerial capability, because
sometimes they didn’t understand when a player failed to do some tactical movement that
they easily did as star players. At the same time, star player-turned-coaches are very
charismatic, so most players generally trust and follow what they say even if their strategy
sometimes seems not doable... So, I don’t think that every star player-turned-manager is a
better manager, but I don’t think their prior stardom should be ignored either.

3.2.5 Contingent effects of inspirational role modeling on organization performance
Employees’ need for self-enhancement. Because individuals differ in their human capital,
they may also differ in their need for self-enhancement (Leavitt & Sluss, 2015). Economic and
psychological research indicates that younger individuals are more likely to seek to enhance
themselves in comparison to older role models and their behaviors (e.g., Bettinger & Long, 2005;
Smoll, Smith, Barnett, & Everett, 1993) because younger workers may have weaker self-identity,
greater plasticity or flexibility to change, less power, and stronger incentives to follow role models.
In the career-development theory proposed by Super (1963), the process of self-concept
development, or self-enhancement, moves toward stability, ending at the “establishment” stage
around age 40. Moreover, Cross and Markus (1991) find that older and younger individuals differ
in their “possible selves” because older people have more concrete self-concepts than younger
people, and younger people are more likely to experiment with different possible selves in many
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domains. During this process, role models may help younger people to both define their selfconcept and motivate their self-enhancement.
I interviewed several junior-level employees (tenure 3-5 years) and one partner-level
employee (tenure 12 years) in an investment bank to understand the nature of interactions between
junior-level employees and their seniors or managers, and to gain clarity regarding how former
star employees create firm value and interact with their subordinates. One junior employee
commented that:
Actually, my boss was a legendary person in our industry because he performed very well
– even in the financial crisis era. He had been awarded “the employee of the year” many
times. His compensation had been increased exponentially. I am not just excited to work
with him, I also sincerely reflect myself in him as a mirror. Sometimes as his subordinate
it is really stressful for me to meet his expectations, but I have been trying to do my best.
Yes, I really want to be a star like him – actually, like the star employee that he was.
By contrast, the comments of a veteran partner-level employee who manages a group of 15 juniorlevel bankers clearly show how this inspirational source of motivation diminishes with age and
seniority:
I remember one of my seniors. I thought he was doing really well; he always came to the
office at 5:00 a.m., and he was promoted to partner level quickly. So I also tried to be in
the office earlier, and I think that led to my current position. However, now I don’t have
anyone else that I want to be anymore. I want to create my own story, instead of mirroring
myself to others.
Similarly, the 13-year veteran Korean professional basketball league player mentioned earlier also
said:
My current coach took the head coach position three years ago, which was my tenth career
season. He was a very famous star guard, and he was my teammate for three seasons. To
me, my image of him was not a coach; it was a teammate. I was less excited to have him
as a coach because I was very familiar with him, and I doubted his coaching experience.
However, my other colleagues, especially younger players who had watched the coach’s
playing on television, were excited to have him as their coach because he is a kind of star
to them. Actually, one of my current teammates told me the coach was his role model.
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Accordingly, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4a: The positive effects of SPTM on organizational performance is stronger
when the subordinate employees are younger.
Furthermore, inspirational role model effects may be magnified when employees have
experienced lower performance, since motivation for self-enhancement may rise when one’s
performance falls below expectations or aspirations (Liu, Lee, Hui, Kwan, & Wu, 2013), in order
to sustain and improve self-esteem (Gecas, 1982). Role models can assist in this process, as
indicated by how a follower’s self-esteem is affected by leadership style (Shamir, House, & Arthur,
1993). Accordingly, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4b: The positive effects of SPTM on organizational performance is stronger
when previous performance of subordinate employee is lower.
Situational salience of the role-model. Prior research on role modeling has typically
assumed that the salience of the role model is static. In this context, I assume that a manager’s
prior stardom might be more or less relevant to the motivation of employees, depending upon the
organization’s situation. Specifically, I consider three particular conditions that may affect the
salience of a SPTM’s past performance: First, when there are other star employees present in the
organization, then employees have an alternative source of inspirational role modeling available
as a substitute for a SPTM, thereby diluting or obscuring the inspirational effect of the SPTM. By
contrast, when other stars are absent, a SPTM is the only available source of inspirational role
modeling, and therefore more salient to employees. Second, employees’ familiarity with their
managers’ heyday of star performance may strengthen the role model effects, as indicated by the
veteran Korean basketball player’s comment that “players who had watched the coach’s playing
on television, were excited to have him as their coach because he is a kind of star to them.”
However, employees who are much younger than a SPTM may never have personally witnessed
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that star performance, making it less salient to them. Furthermore, a large age difference may also
lead employees to believe – either correctly or incorrectly – that the SPTM’s past success is no
longer relevant to them because it was so long ago that the competitive or organizational
environment has changed drastically since then. The manager’s tenure in the organization may
also have similar effects, independent of age. So, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5a: The positive effect of a SPTM on organizational performance is stronger
when a star employee is absent in the organization.
Hypothesis 5b: The positive effect of a SPTM on organizational performance is weaker
when the manager has longer tenure in the organization.
Hypothesis 5c: The positive effect of a SPTM on organizational is weaker when the
manager is older.

3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Data and sample
I test the hypotheses on a sample of managers (head coach), employees (players), and
organizations (teams) in the National Basketball Association (NBA), one of four major sports
leagues in North America. 18 Several features make the empirical context of professional sports
17F

teams, and especially the NBA, particularly well-suited for testing these hypotheses. Availability
of individual-level data has made professional sports teams an attractive context for empirical
studies of strategic human capital (e.g., Berman et al., 2002; Ertug & Castellucci, 2013; Hill et al.,
2016; Holcomb et al., 2009). For the purposes of the present study, objective performance
measures, reliably and transparently observed at both the individual and team levels, allows

18

Founded in 1946 as the Basketball Association of America, the NBA adopted the name National Basketball
Association after merging with the rival National Basketball league in 1949. In 1976, it further merged with the rival
American Basketball Association. During our sample period, the NBA grew from 27 to 30 teams, and its number of
regional divisions grew from 4 to 6.
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managers to be tracked through their entire career histories, including their prior performance as
players on professional and collegiate teams. In this way, it is straightforward to identify SPTM’s
and compare their performance to other coaches. Furthermore, detailed biographical data allows
us to recognize connections between coaches and their players that can be used as a proxy for
inspirational role modeling. Finally, as mentioned earlier, another benefit of using professional
sports teams to isolate the inspirational role modeling effect of SPTM’s is that the monitoring
mechanism from Table 3.1 is irrelevant in this context because (1) the public nature of a player’s
performance leaves the coach with little or no observational advantage over anyone else, (2)
financial performance incentives are contractually fixed in a way that is outside the coach’s control
and based on objectively measured criteria that do not require the coach to verify.
Compared to other professional sports, basketball is better suited to capturing SPTM effects
for three reasons: First, basketball teams are relatively smaller than other professional sports teams.
In the NBA, the active team roster can be no larger than 15 players, compared to 23 for the National
Hockey League (NHL), 25 for Major League Baseball (MLB), 25 for the Union of European
Football Associations (UEFA), and 53 for the National Football League (NFL). This narrower
span of control means that, on average, each NBA player can get more of the head coach’s time
and attention than players in other sports. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the roles of
basketball players are relatively more fluid and flexible than players in other sports where roles
are more rigidly specialized. Basketball has neither specialized defensive roles like goalkeeper
(hockey or soccer) nor specialized offensive roles like quarterback or receiver (football), nor
specialized roles for initiating play like pitcher (baseball) or placekicker (football). Indeed,
basketball is virtually unique in that all players on must be heavily involved in both offensive and
defensive phases of play, unlike football, hockey, soccer, and even, to some extent, baseball (with
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its designated hitter). Since basketball players must necessarily play a more generalist role than
players in other professional sports, basketball players may identify with SPTM’s more than
players in other sports where roles are more specialized. In baseball, for example, it may be more
difficult for a pitcher to identify with a SPTM whose playing career was spent as an outfielder than
it would be for another outfielder. Indeed, Ted Williams, a former star outfielder turned manager
who once said “Pitchers are the dumbest people in the world,” was known to have strained
relationships with the pitchers he managed. 19 Because of the more generalist nature of a basketball
1 8F

player’s role, such role-specific barriers to a player identifying with a SPTM are largely absent.
Finally, the third reason why basketball is better suited for capturing SPTM effects than other
sports is that basketball teams have the smallest and flattest hierarchy of coaches. Obviously, the
smaller and flatter a coaching staff is, the less hierarchical distance separates the players from their
head coach, and therefore the closer their relationship can be. NBA head coaches typically oversee
only about 5 or 6 assistant coaches, with league rules limiting teams to only 3 assistant coaches on
the bench during games. Also, NBA assistant coaches generally report directly to the head coach,
for a two-level hierarchy. By contrast, in 2014, every NFL team had at least 16 assistant coaches,
with some teams having as many as 25, and with a league average of 21. Indeed, the coaching staff
for some NFL teams has as many as four levels of hierarchy. Between the two extremes of NBA
and NFL, the coaching staffs of MLB teams range from 9 to 13. With their smaller and flatter
coaching hierarchies, NBA teams can have closer relationships between players and their head

19
He also said, “Pitchers are dumb. They don't play but once every four days. They're scratchin' their a** or pickin'
their nose or somethin' the rest of the time. They're pitchin', most of 'em, because they can't do anything else.” For
details, see: https://sportsday.dallasnews.com/texas-rangers/rangers/2015/12/16/five-greatest-characters-rangershistory-mick-quick-amazing-emu, http://www.esquire.com/sports/interviews/a1460/learned-ted-williams-0499, and
https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/110242096.
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coaches than other professional sports, which one would naturally expect to make any SPTM
effects easier to observe.
In this paper, the sample consists of every game played by every NBA team from the 1991–
92 season to 2014–15 season, for a total of 27,940 unique games. 20 Each NBA team plays 82
19 F

regular games in a season, after which the top 16 teams have playoff games for the league
championship. 21 I consider only regular-season games since most teams use different game
20F

strategies and rosters in the post-season.

3.3.2 Dependent variable: winning a game
The performance of sports teams is often measured by each team’s winning percentage at
the end of the season. A team’s winning percentage not only is a visible, intuitive metric of
performance in this context but is consistent with absolute measures of organizational performance
used in prior studies on sports teams (e.g., Berman et al., 2002; Hill et al., 2016; Holcomb et al.,
2009; Moliterno & Wiersema, 2007). 22
21 F

20
In each game’s observation, I take the home team as the focal team in order to avoid having the same game appear
twice in the data set. So, a team’s away games only appears in the data set as the opponent’s home game. In addition
to avoiding duplication, this choice of focusing on the home games has the benefit of eliminating any potential for
location-specific effects due to the focal team playing in different venues.
21
During the sample period, two NBA seasons were shortened due to lockouts, in 1998–99 (50 games) and 2011–12
seasons (66 games). Also, one game (Indiana at Boston) was canceled after the Boston Marathon bombing during the
2012–13 season.
22
An alternative measure would be financial performance. However, to improve the league’s competitive balance, the

NBA imposes salary caps and revenue sharing (Fonti & Maoret, 2015; Fort et al., 2003) under the philosophy of that
teams should “cooperate financially in order to compete effectively” (Day et al., 2012: 401; Fonti & Maoret, 2015).
So, financial measures do not capture a coach’s performance. Empirical results in Table 2 support this argument. The
focal team’s payroll and opponent team’s payroll have a high correlation (0.86). In any case, game performance is
more relevant for this paper’s theoretical argument focused on motivating subordinate employees to invest in human
capital.
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However, I use individual games, rather than entire seasons, as the unit of observation for
several reasons: First, the main argument in this paper is that specific characteristics embedded in
managers might affect organization performance, but in the NBA, managers’ jobs are often
terminated even during the regular season, and many managers are hired during the season. During
the sample period, 81 managers held positions during the season. 23 Also, game-level data are better
2 2F

for observing inspirational role model effects on performance than season-level data. For example,
the absence of star players can best be tracked on a game-by-game basis, as a potential indicator
of the situational salience of SPTM effects. Finally, game-level data reveal the dynamics of the
opponent teams’ quality and that of each division, which is helpful because competitors’ resource
quality significantly affects the studied organization’s performance. The winning a game
dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the focal team wins the game and 0 otherwise.

3.3.3 Independent variables
The main independent variable in the model is star performer-turned-manager. I define a
star performer-turned-manager as a manager who had been selected to play in the NBA All-Star
Game 24. Of the 169 managers in the sample, 32 managers (19%) had star status as NBA players
23 F

(see Appendix F).
I use two variables to disentangle inspiration from skill-based mechanisms. First, to
capture inspirational role-model effects, I measure the degree of geographic connection between
a team and its coach. I count the number of players in a game’s roster who born in the same state

23

The dataset for the sample period has 169 managers (or head coaches). From the first season (1946–47) to the final
sample season in this study (2014–15), the NBA has had 309 managers. Thus, the sample includes approximately 55%
of entire NBA history.
24
During our sample period, starting players for the All-Star Game were chosen by vote of the fans, and reserve players
were chosen by vote of each division’s coaches, who were prohibited from voting for players on their own team.
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or attended same college as their coach. For example, in his first game of the 1997-98 season,
SPTM head coach Larry Brown of the Philadelphia 76ers had three players who graduated from
his alma mater University of North Carolina (Eric Montross, Jerry Stackhouse, Scott Williams),
and one who was born in his home state of New York (Kebu Stewart). As discussed earlier, the
logic behind this measure is that inspirational effects are enhanced when players are managed by
their hometown hero, since the visibility of the role-modeling source is stronger. Second, to capture
skill-based mechanisms, I measure each coach’s individual managerial capability. Managerial
capability has been defined as the knowledge, skills, and experience that reside with and is utilized
by managers (e.g., Hitt, Biermant, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001; Kor, 2003), and it derives from the
two main sources of domain expertise and resource expertise (Holcomb et al., 2009). Domain
expertise refers to managers’ understanding of the industry context and their organization’s
strategies, markets, and routines (e.g., Kor, 2003). Resource expertise refers to managers’ ability
to select and configure optimal resource bundles from their current resource portfolios and the
expertise is also related to avoid possessing less valuable resources (Makadok, 2001; Sirmon et al.,
2007). Following research on managerial capability (e.g., Dirks, 2000; Holcomb et al., 2009), I
calculate the weighted career winning percentage for each manager over the entire NBA head
coaching career to assess the extent to which each manager has been consistently successful or
unsuccessful: career winning percentage before a focal game X (1-(1/total number of games as a
head coach)). To calculate this measure, I track every manager’s career history before the sample
period. 25.
24F
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For example, Kevin Loughery, the Miami head coach during the 1991–1995 season, started his career as an NBA
head coach in the 1972–73 season. I calculate his career winning percentage starting from his initial season (1972).
Some adjustments to this measure were necessary for rookie managers at the very start of their NBA careers: First, I
used zero as the prior career winning percentage for a manager’s first NBA career game. Also, I did not scale the
career winning percentage by the number of games at his second game, since doing so would produce zero. From third
career game, I applied the formula as shown above. As a robustness check, for the rookie managers, I applied their
career winning percentage averaged by 18 games (25% of a season’s 82 games), and 41 (50% of a season’s 82 games)
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3.3.4 Contingent variables
I test for the contingency of inspirational role model effects on two proxies for employees’
need for self-enhancement (age of employees, previous performance of employees) and three
proxies for the situational salience of the manager’s prior stardom (star performer absence,
manager organization tenure, manager age). Age of employees refers to the average age of the
employees managed by a manager. Every NBA team has to disclose a game roster before matches
begin. I calculate the average age of player on every game roster. Previous performance of
employees refers to the average pre-season performance of the players managed by a coach,
reflecting the quality of their human capital. Specifically, I use the Player Efficiency Rating (PER)
to measure each player’s prior performance. Developed by John Hollinger, the Vice President of
Basketball Operations for the NBA’s Memphis Grizzlies and a former analyst and writer for ESPN
and Sports Illustrated, PER provides an all-in-one weighted rating of a player’s overall
contributions per minute, adjusting for the pace of the game, and taking into account both successes
(e.g., rebounds, assists, blocks, steals, and various types of scoring) and failures (e.g., missed shots,
turnovers, and fouls) and has therefore proven useful in prior strategic human capital research (e.g.,
Fonti & Maoret, 2015). 26 To account for the quality of each team’s human resources, I consider
2 5F

the players available to each team at the beginning of each game and average their PER based on
their previous season record. 27 Star performer absence refers to whether a star player plays in a
26F

given game, where star players are identified by their selection for the NBA All-Star Game in the
previous season. This indicator variable is coded 1 if a star performer does not play a game and 0

for their first and second games, and the results are consistent with our main results. Moreover, more broadly, I applied
the number of seasons rather than the number of games and obtain consistent results.
26
The mere fact that a single overall performance metric like PER can be meaningfully applied to basketball
players, regardless of position, is further evidence for our earlier point that basketball players take more flexible and
fluid generalist roles than players of other sports. Such a universal performance metric would be impossible in sports
with more rigidly specialized roles, like baseball, football, hockey, or soccer.
27
Rookie players in their first NBA season have no prior NBA performance, so I exclude them from this average.
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if the star performer does plays a game. 28 Manager organization tenure is measured by counting
27 F

the years since a manager began a career as a head coach on a given team.

3.3.5. Control variables
To exclude alternative explanations, I include various control variables at different levels:
the manager, team, and game levels. First, at the manager level, I control for managers’ league
tenure and current status. I measure league tenure by counting the years since a manager first
served as a head coach in the NBA, and current status by whether a manager received a Coach of
the Year award in the previous season (Holcomb et al., 2009). Also, to eliminate concerns that
certain types of managers may affect organizational performance, I include dummy variables to
control for three types of managers – namely, manager/executive dual roles, managers hired from
an outside team, and interim managers. I control for manager outsider status because the origin of
a manager might affect firm performance (e.g., Karaevli, 2007; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010). I
control for interim manager status because it is an indicator that some kind of disruption (e.g.,
firing or resignation) has occurred, perhaps unexpectedly, and the interim manager may therefore
be viewed as less prepared and/or less qualified. I also control for experience coaching in foreign
or amateur leagues (e.g., Spanish league, NCAA) and as a NBA assistant coach. These two
variables are measured by counting the number of years that a manager has worked in those roles.
Next, at the team level, I control for the team’s total payroll compensation, team age (years
since founding), team size (number of players on game rosters), and media market size. Similarly,
at the game level, I control for the opponent team’s human capital quality and total payroll. Finally,

28

In a robustness check, I recalculate this measure in a way that ignores cases where a star player is intentionally
missing (e.g., giving star players rest during the last few regular-season games in order to prepare for playoffs), and
the main findings remain largely consistent.
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I include season, division, team, and game order dummy variables to control for unobserved
differences at these levels.

3.3.6 Statistical methods
The dependent variable is dichotomous, and the independent variables are measured at
several levels of analysis, including the individual manager level, the organization level, and the
game level. Moreover, the models include cross-level interaction term (e.g., manager-level X
organization-level, manager-level X game-level). Without considering these cross-level aspects of
the data, the coefficient might be biased due to non-independence and heteroscedasticity problems
(e.g., Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Culpepper, 2013; Bliese, 2000; Hofmann, 1997). Thus, I use a
multilevel mixed logistic regression model. In addition, robust standard errors are clustered at the
manger level to account for heteroscedasticity and non-independence of the observations. 29
28F

3.4 Results
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive summary statistics and correlation matrix for the data. In
Table 3.3, I report the results of the multi-level mixed logit regression model. Model 1 displays
the results of the baseline hypothesis whether a SPTM performs better or worse than other
managers (non-SPTM). Specifically, the coefficient on the SPTM variable in Model 1 is positive
and statistically significant (𝛽𝛽=0.151, p<0.01), supporting hypothesis 1. The outcome variable is
the result of the non-hierarchical regression model, so I take the coefficient in calculating its
marginal effects to interpret its economic impact (Hoetker, 2007). An analysis of the practical

29

As a robustness check, I perform clustering at the organization level and find qualitatively consistent results.
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significance of the findings indicates that, on average, after controlling for all of the other factors
discussed earlier, an organization managed by a SPTM has a 5.6 percentage point higher winning
probability than an organization managed by other managers. 30 To put the magnitude of this into
29 F

perspective, out of the 24 NBA teams that did not finish the 2015–2016 season as their division’s
leader, 8 of those teams (33.3%) would have gained at least one position in the division’s rankings
(for example, moving from second place to first place) if they had raised their winning percentage
by 5.6 percentage points, and 3 of them (12.5%) would have gained two positions in rank (for
example, moving from third place to first place). So, although 5.6% may sound relatively small in
the context of a single game, nevertheless, in aggregate over an entire season, it is certainly big
enough to have a substantial effect on a team’s overall final standing.
Models 2–4 display the multivariate results for the tests of hypotheses 2 and 3. Hypothesis
2 posits that SPTMs have stronger effects on organizational performance when they have more
employees with whom they are geographically connected, since that magnifies their visibility of
the former stardom. The coefficient of the interaction term between SPTM and geographic
connection in Model 2 is positive and significant (𝛽𝛽=0.055, p<0.05), supporting hypothesis 2. In
order to verify whether skill-based mechanism and motivation-based mechanism substitute or
complement each other, I use another interaction term – namely, SPTM with managerial capability
– to test hypothesis 3. Surprisingly, the coefficient of this interaction term in Model 3 is negative
and significant (𝛽𝛽= –0.493, p<0.01), directly contradicting hypothesis 3. In other words, it seems
that the motivation-based mechanism of inspirational role modeling actually substitutes for, rather
than complements, the skill-based mechanism. In order to better analyze this interaction, I also
split the full sample into three subsamples based on each manager’s status when he was an

30

Following common practice, I interpret marginal effects each logit coefficient while keeping other variables at
their mean values.
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employee (i.e., player): (1) All-Star NBA player (i.e., SPTM), (2) NBA player but non-All-Star,
or (3) no NBA player experience. Models 5-7 show these subsample results, which show that the
geographic connection effect is positive and statistically significant (𝛽𝛽=0.050, p<0.05) for the
SPTM subsample of Model 5, but non-significant for both non-SPTM subsamples in Models 6 and
7. Conversely, the managerial capability effect is positive and statistically significant for both
non-SPTM subsamples in Model 6 (𝛽𝛽=0.561, p<0.01) and Model 7 (𝛽𝛽=0.561, p<0.01), but
non-significant for the SPTM subsample of Model 5. 31 This result suggests that SPTM’s and
30F

non-SPTM’s affect organizational performance through different causal mechanisms: SPTM’s
succeed more when they can serve as inspirational role models for more of their employees, but
not when they have greater managerial skill. By contrast, other managers succeed when they have
greater managerial skill, but not due to any inspirational role modeling. In effect, these two causal
mechanisms seem to substitute for each other.

31

I recognize a possible endogeneity issue that a manager is likely to select or draft players from same hometown or
college. So, as a robustness check, I exclude certain players that were hired after a manager takes his position and
perform same regression process. I find consistent support for the finding in Table 3.3

Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
M SD Min Max 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. Winning a Game 0.60 0.49 0
1
1
2. SPTM
0.23 0.42 0
1 0.03 1
3. Employee Age
27.1 1.45 23.5 31.9 0.16 0.02 1
4. Prev. Perf
13.1 1.01 9.84 16.6 0.15 0.00 0.20 1
5. Star Absence
0.08 0.26 0
1 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 0.07 1
6. Manager Tenure 2.33 3.13 0 21 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.04 1
7. Manager Age
50.5 7.72 32 71 0.02 0.16 -0.05 0.10 0.03 0.34 1
8. Geo. Connection 1.82 1.69 0
6 -0.02 0.17 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.10 1
9. Manage. Cap.
0.45 0.21 0 0.85 0.12 0.06 0.25 0.18 0.09 0.41 0.32 0.00 1
10. Manager Leg. 6.93 6.90 0 31 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.44 0.71 0.05 0.50 1
11. Manager Status 0.03 0.18 0
1 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 1
12. Manager-GM
0.07 0.26 0
1 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.07 -0.02 1
13. Manage. Out.
0.74 0.44 0
1 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.18 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.23 0.02 0.11 1
14. Interim Manager 0.07 0.25 0
1 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 -0.17 -0.03 -0.06 -0.35 -0.16 -0.05 0.04 -0.24 1
15. Ass. Manager
1.48 1.28 0
8 0.00 -0.21 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.20 -0.06 -0.24 0.01 -0.17 -0.18 0.09 1
16. Other Man. Exp 3.00 4.64 0 31 0.01 -0.18 0.04 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.20 -0.04 0.02 0.13 0.01 -0.01 0.14 -0.06 -0.15 1
17. Org. Payroll
17.6 0.56 15.7 18.6 0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.13 0.16 -0.11 0.05 0.07 -0.01 -0.11 0.08 -0.01 0.09 -0.02 1
18. Org. Age
36.7 16.6 1 70 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.10 -0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.09 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.35 1
19. Org. Size
16.1 2.40 9 31 -0.06 0.04 -0.10 -0.14 0.00 -0.11 0.01 0.11 -0.10 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.23 0.02 1
20. Opp. Prev. Perf 13.3 4.14 9.84 118 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 1
21. Opp. Payroll
17.6 0.57 15.7 18.7 -0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.08 0.03 0.10 0.15 -0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.09 0.09 -0.01 0.12 0.00 0.86 0.29 0.23 -0.08 1
Note: N=27,940. Bolded pairwise correlations are significant at the 0.05 level.
Normally, the average winning percentage in a sport setting has a 0.5 mean due to its zero-sum property. To avoid duplicating games effects, I compile
every game played at each team’s home stadium to capture unique game effects. Thus, the mean of wins is 0.6. Interestingly, the 60% shows home-advantage
effects as well.
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Table 3.3 The effect of SPTM on organizational performance
Dependent Variable

Win (1) Loss (0)

Estimation

Multi-level Mixed Logit Regression

Models

1

2

3

4

Hypotheses

H1

H2

H3

Full

5

6
Teasing Mechanism

SPTM
Sample

Full Sample

SPTM X
Geographic
Connection

0.056**

(0.026)

(0.026)
-0.493***

-0.491**

(0.173)

(0.212)

0.373***

0.018

0.223*

(0.085)

(0.096)

(0.130)

-0.011

-0.030**

-0.029**

0.050**

SPTM X
Managerial Capability
Star Performer Turned 0.151***
Manager (SPTM)
(0.038)
Geographic
Connection

-0.009

NBA
All-Star

0.055**

7

Non-SPTM
Never
Non-Star
Played in
Player
NBA

-0.013

0.014

(0.009)

(0.009)

(0.013)

(0.013)

(0.022)

(0.014)

(0.018)

0.633***

0.728***

0.407***

0.523***

-0.161

0.579***

0.561***

(0.087)

(0.092)

(0.107)

(0.117)

(0.213)

(0.141)

(0.151)

0.159***

0.191***

0.165***

0.140***

0.133***

0.143***

0.067***

(0.012)

(0.015)

(0.017)

(0.014)

(0.026)

(0.019)

(0.024)

Prior Performance of
Employees

0.190***

0.158***

0.141***

0.162***

0.123***

0.170***

0.173***

(0.015)

(0.012)

(0.014)

(0.017)

(0.037)

(0.024)

(0.024)

Star Performer
Absence

-0.330***

-0.328***

-0.340***

-0.339***

-0.091

-0.414***

-0.416***

(0.050)

(0.050)

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.115)

(0.074)

(0.084)

0.007

0.009

0.000

-0.000

-0.021

0.013

0.029**

(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.009)

(0.009)

(0.016)

(0.014)

(0.013)

-0.009***

-0.010***

-0.010*

-0.010*

0.003

-0.001

-0.008*

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.016)

(0.007)

(0.005)

Managerial Capability
Age of Employees

Manager Org. Tenure
Manager Age
Manager League
Tenure
Manager Social Status
Manager-Executive
Dual Roles
Manager Outsiderness
Interim Manager

0.001

0.002

0.002

0.002

-0.005

0.002

-0.013*

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.014)

(0.007)

(0.008)

0.725***

0.725***

0.657***

0.649***

0.472**

0.737***

0.872***

(0.083)

(0.083)

(0.089)

(0.089)

(0.216)

(0.114)

(0.172)

-0.086

-0.089*

-0.220***

-0.215***

-0.049

-0.249***

-0.115

(0.054)

(0.054)

(0.080)

(0.080)

(0.146)

(0.096)

(0.090)

0.022

0.008

0.024

0.025

0.528***

-0.096

0.064

(0.038)

(0.038)

(0.067)

(0.067)

(0.189)

(0.070)

(0.073)

-0.201***

-0.203***

-0.176**

-0.168**

0.105

-0.333***

-0.046

(0.060)

(0.060)

(0.070)

(0.070)

(0.194)

(0.096)

(0.089)
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Table 3.3 continued
Assistant Manager
Experience
Other League Manager
Experience
Organization Payroll
Organization Age
Organization Size
Opponents' Previous
Performance
Opponents' Payroll
Constant
Season/Market/Div./
Org./Game-Order
dummy

-0.017

-0.013

-0.025

-0.024

-0.121**

-0.085***

0.028

(0.013)

(0.013)

(0.023)

(0.023)

(0.061)

(0.029)

(0.019)

0.007**

0.008**

0.009

0.010

-0.007

0.010

-0.002

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.024)

(0.006)

(0.006)

0.468***

0.465***

0.620***

0.629***

0.573***

0.784***

0.868***

(0.078)

(0.077)

(0.074)

(0.074)

(0.180)

(0.094)

(0.125)

-0.080

0.002

0.019***

0.018***

0.027*

-0.003

-0.012

(0.062)

(0.003)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.015)

(0.007)

(0.008)

-0.030***

-0.031***

-0.028***

-0.028***

-0.036***

-0.018*

-0.034***

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.013)

(0.010)

(0.010)

-0.009***

-0.009***

-0.010***

-0.010***

-0.006

-0.004

-0.041

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.006)

(0.004)

(0.043)

-1.043***

-1.041***

-0.920***

-0.917***

-0.913***

-0.802***

-0.805***

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.058)

(0.058)

(0.135)

(0.092)

(0.098)

7.519**

3.830**

-0.298

-0.442

0.035

-4.566***

-2.884*

(3.113)

(1.627)

(1.102)

(1.101)

(2.156)

(1.341)

(1.570)

Included.

Included.

Included.

Included.

Included.

Included.

Included.

27, 940
27, 940
27, 940
27, 940
6,420
11,672
10.364
(169)
(169)
(169)
(169)
(32)
(60)
(77)
2
2003.1*** 2013.5*** 2013.2*** 2015.8*** 558.8*** 1109.5*** 886.6***
Wald 𝑥𝑥
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the manager level in parentheses. SPTM refers to Star performer-turnedmanager. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
N (Managers)

In Table 3.4, I report the results of contingent effects of the inspirational role model effects.
Hypothesis 4a predicts that SPTM’s have stronger effects on organizational performance when the
employees are younger. The coefficient of the interaction in Model 8 is negative and statistically
significant (𝛽𝛽= –0.050, p<0.05), supporting hypothesis 4a. Hypothesis 4b predicts that SPTMs
have stronger effects on organizational performance when the employees’ previous performance
is lower. The coefficient of the interaction in Model 9 is negative and statistically significant (𝛽𝛽=
–0.088, p<0.05), supporting hypothesis 4b.
Hypothesis 5a predicts that star performer absence positively moderates the relationship
between organizational performance and managers’ previous star-performer status. Based on the
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coefficient of the interaction term reported in Model 10 (𝛽𝛽=0.273, p<0.02), the hypothesis has
statistical support. In other words, the inspirational role model effects are stronger when an
organization lacks star performers. Models 11 and 12 show the results of the tests for hypotheses
5b and 5c. Model 11 examines whether managerial organization tenure weakens the relationship
between organization performance and SPTM’s. The results support hypothesis 5b, which posits
that the relationship weakens as a manager’s experience as a manager grows longer in an
organization, because the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant (𝛽𝛽= –0.031,
p<0.01). Model 12 tests the interaction between manager age and star performers turned managers.
The coefficient for the interaction term between the age and type of manager is negative and
statistically significant (𝛽𝛽= –0.009, p<0.10), supporting hypothesis 5c. 32
31 F

32
Model 13, the full model, includes all the interaction terms. SPTMs are found to be significantly and positively
related to organization performance (p<0.01). The interaction effects of the managers with characteristics of
employees (age and previous performance), star performer absence, and manager career tenure remain significant.
However, the interaction of managers with manager age becomes marginally insignificant; the empirical formulation
might have included too many interactions associated with the same variables, leading to high correlations among
covariates. Therefore, the interpretation of the results is based on Models 8–12.
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Table 3.4 Contingent effects of SPTM on organizational performance
Dependent Variable
Estimation
Models
Hypotheses
SPTM X Age of Employees
SPTM X Previous Performance of
Employees
SPTM X Star Performer Absence
SPTM X Manager Tenure

8
H4a
-0.050**
(0.024)

Win (=1) Loss (=0)
Multi-Level Mixed Logit Regression
9
10
11
12
H4b
H5a
H5b
H5c

-0.088**
(0.035)
0.273**
(0.125)
-0.031***
(0.012)

-0.009*
(0.005)
1.499** 1.297*** 0.133*** 0.208***
0.613**
Star Performer Turned Manager
(SPTM)
(0.636)
(0.462)
(0.039)
(0.044)
(0.246)
0.172*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.175***
Age of Employees
(0.013)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
0.194*** 0.209*** 0.190*** 0.188*** 0.189***
Previous Performance of Employees
(0.015)
(0.017)
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.014)
-0.328*** -0.332*** -0.383*** -0.329*** -0.305***
Star Performer Absence
(0.050)
(0.050)
(0.055)
(0.050)
(0.050)
0.008
0.007
0.007
0.020**
0.011*
Manager Organization
Tenure
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.007)
-0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009***
Manager Age
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
-0.012
-0.011
-0.009
-0.008
-0.008
Geographic Connection
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)
0.628*** 0.636*** 0.635*** 0.605*** 0.633***
Managerial Capability
(0.086)
(0.087)
(0.087)
(0.087)
(0.086)
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.005
Manager League Tenure
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.744*** 0.725*** 0.718*** 0.718*** 0.851***
Manager Social Status
(0.083)
(0.083)
(0.084)
(0.084)
(0.083)
-0.090*
-0.094*
-0.085
-0.087
-0.118**
Manager-Executive Dual Roles
(0.054)
(0.055)
(0.055)
(0.054)
(0.054)
0.007
0.029
0.023
0.019
0.032
Manager Outsiderness
(0.038)
(0.039)
(0.038)
(0.039)
(0.039)
-0.207*** -0.199*** -0.201*** -0.199*** -0.208***
Interim Manager
(0.060)
(0.060)
(0.060)
(0.060)
(0.060)
SPTM X Manager Age

13
Full
-0.053**
(0.024)
-0.075**
(0.036)
0.321**
(0.125)
-0.035***
(0.013)
0.003
(0.005)
2.442***
(0.844)
0.172***
(0.014)
0.205***
(0.017)
-0.393***
(0.055)
0.020**
(0.009)
-0.010***
(0.003)
-0.010
(0.009)
0.596***
(0.087)
0.001
(0.004)
0.717***
(0.084)
-0.094*
(0.055)
0.026
(0.039)
-0.199***
(0.060)
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Table 3.4. continued
Assistant Manager Experience
Other League Manager Experience
Organization Payroll
Organization Age
Organization Size
Opponents' Previous Performance
Opponents' Payroll
Constant

-0.015

-0.018

-0.017

-0.014

-0.014

-0.016

(0.013)

(0.013)

(0.013)

(0.013)

(0.013)

(0.013)

0.007**

0.007**

0.007**

0.007**

0.011***

0.006*

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

0.453***

0.461***

0.472***

0.462***

0.530***

0.450***

(0.077)

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.078)

0.002

-0.076

-0.082

-0.082

-0.079

-0.074

(0.003)

(0.062)

(0.062)

(0.062)

(0.062)

(0.062)

-0.031*** -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.042*** -0.032***
(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

-0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

-1.042*** -1.044*** -1.044*** -1.042*** -1.035*** -1.044***
(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

3.662**

7.215**

7.547**

7.768**

8.441***

7.063**

(1.629)
(3.118)
(3.114)
(3.115)
(3.122)
(3.127)
Season/Big-Market/Division/Org.
Included. Included. Included. Included. Included. Included.
Game-Order Dummy
N (Managers)
27,940
27,940
27,940
27,940
27,940
27,940
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the manager level in parentheses. SPTM refers to Star performer-turnedmanager. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

To illustrate the effect of stardom visibility, Figure 3.1 shows how SPTM’s differ from
other managers in the effect of geographic connection between a manager and subordinate
employees, showing that there is a very small difference of winning percentage between SPTM
and other managers when the managers have smaller number of employees geographically
connected (1 standard deviation below the mean), but a much bigger difference when the managers
have larger number of employees geographically connected (1 standard deviation above the mean).
I also plot the significant interactions for both SPTM and Non-SPTM, defining “significant” here
as p<0.10, in Figures 3.2–3.6. Figures 3.2–3.3 display the contingent effect of subordinate human
capital on inspirational role model effects, showing that although SPTM-managed organizations
perform better overall, this performance boost is greater when subordinates are younger, and lessdeveloped.
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Figures 3.4–3.6 illustrate the contingent effects of the salience of a manager’s stardom on
inspirational role models effects. Figure 3.4 shows that organizational performance is better when
an organization has star performers at the employee-level, regardless of its type of manager, but a
SPTM-managed organization is less vulnerable to reduced performance with the absence of their
star employees. In Figure 3.5, the slope of organizational performance becomes much steeper
when the manager’s organization tenure is shorter. Interestingly, the Figure shows that there is
almost no difference of winning percentage between SPTM and non-SPTM when the managers
have longer organizational manger career 33. Additionally, Figure 3.6 shows that the slope is much
32 F

steeper for an organization with younger managers than an organization with older managers. The
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 imply that the inspirational role model effects decrease as managers gain more
experience as managers and get farther from their heyday as star employees.
0.63

Winning Probability

0.62
0.61
0.6
0.59
0.58
0.57

,,

----------------------,'----------,,

,,------------------,-,,,_::;;...---

,,
_________,,,,,'

0.56
0.55
0.54
Other Manager (Non-SPTM)

Star Performer-turned Manager

Fewer Employees Geographically Related
More Employees Geographically Related

Figure 3.1 Effects of geographic connection on organizational performance

33

In the slope of longer manager organization tenure, the graph illustrates that averaged winning percentage of star
performer-turned-manager is 0.624, and that of non-star performer-turned-manager is 0.621.
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Winning Probability

0.65

-----------------

0.6
0.55
0.5
0.45
Other Managers (Non-SPTM)
Older Employees

Star Performer-turned Manager
Younger Employees

Figure 3.2 Effects of employee age on organizational performance

0.68

Winning Probability

0.66
0.64

-----------------

0.62
0.6
0.58
0.56
0.54
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Other Managers (Non-SPTM)

Star Performer-turned Manager

Lower Previous Performance of Employees
Higher Previous Performance of Employees

Figure 3.3 Effects of prior performance on organizational performance
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0.64

Winining Probability

0.62
0.6

---------------

0.58
0.56
0.54
0.52
0.5
Other Managers (Non-SPTM)
Star Performer Presence

Star Performer-turned Manager
Star Performer Absence

Figure 3.4 Effects of star performer absence on organizational performance

0.65
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0.6
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Other Manager (Non-SPTM)
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Star Performer-turned Manager
Longer Manager Organization Tenure

Figure 3.5 Effects of manager tenure on organizational performance
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Figure 3.6 Effects of manager age on organizational performance
3.4.1 Robustness checks
I investigate the robustness of the main results in several ways. First, I examine the
possibility that the hiring of SPTM’s is endogenous, rather than random. I assume that labormarket demand for managers among the best performers as employees might exceed the supply of
the certain type of managers because star performers turned managers might have celebrity effects,
i.e., certification, visibility, or fame (e.g., Hayward et al., 2004; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin,
2006), on the audience and the decision makers who have authority over the hiring process. So, I
use a two-stage instrumental-variable probit model to correct for any potential biases due to such
an endogeneity problem. I use two distinct dichotomous instruments in this analysis: The first
takes the value of 1 if a manager was born in the state where a team that he currently manages is
located, or 0 otherwise. The second takes the value of 1 if a manager attended high school in the
state where a team that he currently manages is located, or 0 otherwise. The logic for using these
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instrumental variables is that family and personal ties to a state increase the likelihood of taking a
job there, but that the location of a manager’s birth or education is unlikely to have a direct effect
on the team’s current performance.
In Table 3.5, I report the results of the first- and second-stage models of the two-stage
instrumental variable probit estimation, using the ivprobit command in STATA 15. The results of
the first-stage model indicate that both instrumental variables are meaningful in explaining the
presence of a star performer turned manager with a team (p<0.01). To ensure the validity of the
instruments, I perform several diagnostic tests for under-identification, weak-identification, and
exogeneity of the instruments. The under-identification statistic, Kleibergen-Paap rk LM, results
in a p value of less than 0.01, suggesting that the instruments have sufficient correlations with the
endogenous variable. The weak identification test statistics, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics,
are greater than the 10-percent maximal IV size Stock-Yogo critical values, confirming the
relevance of the instruments (Stock & Yogo, 2005). In addition, the two instrumental variables are
found to be exogenous and valid because the Sargan test of overidentifying restriction cannot reject
the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity (p=0.3445). Unsurprisingly, the two instrument
variables are both positive and statistically significant (p<0.01). Consistent with the main findings,
the results of the second stage indicate that the coefficient of the instrumental value of star
performer turned manager on organizational performance is positive and statistically significant
(p<0.05). For interaction effects, I obtain largely consistent results, except for age of employees
and star performer absence that are insignificant. 34
33 F

34
To correct the forbidden regression when performing the 2SLS-IV regression (Angrist & Pischke, 2008;
Wooldridge, 2010), I estimate the 2SLS using instruments and fitted probabilities of endogenous and other variables.
In addition, when estimating interactions with the endogenous variable, I input the products of an instrument between
a contingent variable to correct the 2SLS-IV (e.g., born in the state X age of employees). This leads to a
multicollnearity problem in the model, so the results might be different from the main results in Table 3.3
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Table 3.5 Robustness check: two-stage instrumental variable probit regression model
Estimation
Hypotheses
Models
SPTM X Geo.
Connection
SPTM X
Managerial Capa.
SPTM X
Age of employees
SPTM X
Pre. Performance
SPTM X Star
Performer absence
SPTM X Manager
organization tenure
SPTM X
Manager age
Star performerturned -manager
Born in the state

1st
1

2nd (H1)
2

Sargan test (pvalue)

2SLS-IV Probit Regression Model
H2b&c
H3a
H3b
4
5
6

H4a
7

H4b
8

H4c
9

-0.418*
(0.241)
-0.033
(0.039)
-0.165***
(0.062)
-0.212
(0.255)
-0.039***
(0.015)

0.398***
(0.151)

0.397***
(0.145)

1.132
(1.095)

2.434***
(0.874)

0.194**
(0.086)

-0.022***
(0.006)
0.201** 1.292***
(0.083)
(0.338)

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included Included

Included.

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included Included

8.939***
(3.100)

2.680***
1.035**
(0.731)
(0.482)
27,940 (169)

229.88***

187.57**
*

296.29**
*

140.16

46.94

74.445

59.37

31.67

43.84

94.65

82.28

0.3445

0.4861

0.4298

0.2084

0.6748

0.4512

0.1959

0.3095

0.524**
(0.221)
0.099***
(0.010)
0.123***
(0.010)
Included

Attended a high
school in the state
Control Variables
Included
Season/Div,/Org./
Included Included
Game order dummy
-2.142*** -0.147**
Constant
(0.480)
(0.075)
N (Manager)
Underidentification
(Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM)
Weak identification
(Kleibergen-Paap
Wald)

H2a
3
0.042*
(0.024)

2.189*** 2.456*** 2.688*** 2.957***
(0.721)
(0.717)
(0.727)
(0.744)

218.27*** 112.28*** 151.56*** 306.77***

259.10**
*

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. STATA 14 does not provide post-estimation after the 2SLS IV
model when calculating and using clustered standard errors, so I use only robust standard errors in this model. The
main model for this robustness check was a two-stage instrumental variable probit regression model (ivprobit in
Stata 14). However, an ivprobit does not provide post-estimation after the regression, so I use ivreg2 to calculate
the post-estimation. The reduced form in an ivprobit is the same linear equation as appears in a standard 2SLS
estimation framework, so treating the 1st stage equation in the ivprobit as linear would not violate (Wooldridge
2015) 35. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity
(Wooldridge, 2006).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
34F

35

http://www.statalist.org/forums/forum/general-stata-discussion/general/1295919-underidentification-and-weakidentification-test-for-ivprobit
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I also consider the possibility that extreme outliers might bias the results. For example,
legendary NBA manager Jerry Sloan, who was also a two-time NBA All-Star player, and a fourtimes NBA All-Defensive First Team during his 755 games in the NBA league, and won 1,221 of
2,024 games (60.3% total career winning percentage) in his career from the 1979–2011 season to
his retirement as a head coach in the 2010–2011 season. Over his 24-year career as a head coach,
he won two West Conference championships, led his team to the post-season 20 times, and was
named to the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame as a head coach in 2009. Such extreme
performance as a player and as a manager might produce upward bias to the empirical results. To
exclude this possibility, I test a subsample without games involving Sloan. The results are largely
consistent with the main results and support all the hypotheses (with the same directions and small
differences in coefficients and significance levels). These results are available upon request.

3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this essay, I highlight how a manager’s previous performance as an employee can affect
overall organizational performance. Drawing on social comparison theory and the selfenhancement mechanism in the socio psychology literature (e.g., Collins, 1996; Festinger, 1954;
Wood, 1989), the results suggest that SPTMs succeed more when they can serve as inspirational
role models for employees – in contrast to other managers, whose success is driven more by skillbased mechanisms. The managerial impacts of the inspirational role models provided by SPTM’s
are contingent upon both the human capital characteristics of subordinate employees and the
visibility and situational salience of the manager’s former stardom. In particular, inspirational role
model effects are stronger when the subordinates are less experienced, when star-performing
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subordinates are absent, and when the SPTM is younger. These results imply that, by serving as
inspirational role models, SPTM’s can benefit organizational performance.
This study contributes to understanding the effects of stars on organizational performance
in several ways: First, this study contributes to strategic human capital research by highlighting
the ongoing roles that star performers can continue to play even after being promoted into
management. Specifically, the taxonomy I introduce in Table 3.1 contributes to theory by
categorizing the various mechanisms that a SPTM might, at least in principle, employ to help an
organization create and/or capture more value than other managers. Second, this study introduces
the SPTM as a new concept for strategic human capital research – moreover, a phenomenon that
merits further study because it is already known to be of great interest and practical relevance to
managers (Adler, 1996; McKee, 2015). Third, I specifically disentangle how SPTM’s and other
managers differ in the mechanisms by which they succeed. Specifically, the results suggest that
SPTM’s can improve organizational performance via inspirational role modeling, while other
managers do not. Finally, I capture manager-specific, subordinate-specific, and situation-specific
contingency factors that influence the strength of this inspirational role modeling effect in a way
that is consistent with social comparison theory. In this regard, the present study provides a bridge
between the resource-based view of human capital and socio-psychological theories of human
resource development.
The findings also have practical managerial implications for human capital recruitment. By
identifying the importance of an effective match between employees and their manager, the results
can begin to answer questions like: What kinds of employees should be hired to work under
SPTM’s versus other managers? What kinds of organizations should hire SPTM’s versus other
managers? For example, the results suggest that SPTM’s can be more effective as managers of
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employees who: (1) have themselves directly witnessed the manager’s prior star-level performance,
(2) are less experienced, (3) have experienced poor performance, (4) do not have star-level
colleagues, and (5) are closer in age to the SPTM. So, organizations composed of such employees
may benefit more from hiring a SPTM, and organizations that are led by a SPTM may benefit
more from hiring such employees.

3.5.1 Limitations and future research
Like all studies, the limitations of this study can offer opportunities for future research.
Perhaps the most obvious limitation of this study is the generalizability of its results. In this regard,
the professional sports context is a double-edged sword. While this context provides data at a level
of transparency and specificity that is generally unavailable elsewhere, professional sports teams
also clearly differ from other organizations in numerous ways that may severely limit the relevance
of results to other industries. For example, with a total of fewer than 25 players and coaches
combined, a NBA team is a fairly small and simple organization, with a single purpose and no
diversification. Also, the zero-sum, winner-take-it-all nature of sports competition (e.g., Yanadori
& Cui, 2013) is different from many industries. Furthermore, the fact that NBA players and
coaches do much of their work in public and are subject to intense press scrutiny is also quite
unusual. In addition, unlike many industries, NBA teams do not promote players to coach simply
to provide a motivational career ladder. For these reasons, it will be valuable to compare the
findings to future research in other settings.
This study highlights the importance of inspirational role modeling as a mechanism by
which SPTM’s affect organizational performance, but its measurement of this effect is indirect
and coarse-grained, based on geographic connections between employees and their manager. It
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would be useful for future research to measure inspirational role model effects in a more direct
and fine-grained way, perhaps through interviews or surveys of employees, in order to capture
their actual thoughts and feelings about their manager, and thereby measure the degree to which
they identify with their manager, view their manager as a role model, and feel inspired by the
manager’s example. Such detailed data would allow for a more fine-grained analysis of the
conditions under which SPTM’s and other managers inspire employees to take specific actions.
In addition, although empirical context enabled this study to isolate the inspirational role
model mechanism from the other three mechanisms in Table 3.1, this is only a first step toward
answering the question of how SPTM’s affect organizational performance. Ideally, in order to fully
answer this question, it would be important for future studies to find measures for all four
mechanisms from Table 3.1, so that their relative strengths could be compared and so that any
interactions between them could be captured.
Finally, although this study has focused on organizational performance as its dependent
variable, it would also be useful to understand the effects of SPTM’s on other outcomes as well.
For example: Are SPTM’s more susceptible to the kind of hubris or overconfidence that has been
shown to affect organizational risk-taking and other strategic actions (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick,
1997; Malmendier & Tate, 2005; Malmendier & Tate, 2008)? What is the relationship between
SPTM’s and phenomena like charisma, narcissism, and further transformational leadership (e.g.,
Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Dvir, Eden, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002)?
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CHAPTER 4.
TAKEN FOR GRANTED? THE IMPACT OF
STAKEHOLDER ORIENTATION ON CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND CEO’S WEALTH AND PROMINENCE:
EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT

4.1 Introduction
With the heightened expectations on corporations as influencers in the social and
environmental sphere, not only more companies are addressing corporate social responsibility
(CSR) in their board rooms, but also general consumers are also expressing the need for CSR.
The 2017 Global CSR survey for in U.S. conducted by Cone Communication, reported that the
87 percent of consumers that are said they would purchase a product because a company
supported an issue they care about. More importantly, a whopping 76 percent will refuse to buy
from a company if they learn it supports an issue contrary to their own beliefs. More interestingly,
more than 60 percent of American consumers hope firms will drive social and environmental
change in the absence of government regulation.
The importance of CSR has been strongly noted by research: the CSR is a business
approach that contributes to sustainable development by delivering economic, social, and
environmental benefits to all stakeholders (e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Surroca, Tribó, &
Waddock, 2010; Waddock & Graves, 1997) . According to latest chief executive officer (CEO)
survey, 64 percent of CEOs say that “CSR is core to business rather than being a stand-alone
program because they care about building trust with consumers, partners, governments, and
employees.” (PwC Global CEO survey, 2016). Taken together, a firm’s CSR strategy is interacted
with its stakeholder’s call and expectation. Recent, the firm’s CSR is not driven by a firm solely.
For example, the Indian government enacted a law about corporate giving in April 2014.
Following a change in Indian company law, businesses with annual revenues of more than 10
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billion rupees (approximately $131 million) must give away 2% of their net profit to charity
(India's. Companies Act of 2013). These arenas in which Indian businesses can invest the 2% of
their net profit include education, poverty, gender equality, and hunger, and, as such, CSR
becomes a business requirement rather than voluntary.
Many companies engage in a spectrum of CSR initiatives and heavily invest in publicizing
these social actions. While the intrinsic satisfaction of social responsibility and engagement is
important, CSR programs tend to be meaningful and sustained only when they align with
corporate financial needs (e.g., profit, revenue, and growth) or social needs (e.g., people,
community, and environment). Although firms’ CSR activities have been receiving more
attention from non-shareholders, and stakeholders are more likely to pressure firms to engage in
increased CSR, there are still long-standing academic and practical debates regarding the value
of shareholders and legal obligations to society that question how the plethora of CSR initiatives
or superior CSR performance beget positive (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Orts, 1992). Some firms have
responded to these concerns by devoting more resources to CSR. Other companies’ managers
have resisted, arguing that additional investment in CSR is inconsistent with their efforts to
maximize profits. In order to reconcile these views about the value of CSR for shareholders and
non-shareholders, many researchers have explored whether CSR that reflects a form of alignment
of firm policy leads to superior firm performance or whether CSR indeed increases the
shareholder’s value (e.g., Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield, 1985; Waddock & Graves, 1997).
Surprisingly, few studies have examined the effects of exogenous pressure for CSR by institutions,
such as governments, communities, and political parties. The implementation of CSR should be
followed by a current organization’s needs and capabilities since firms are expected to be efficient
and profitable and maintain shareholder interests in mind while CSR is concerned with societal
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and community expectations, such as the expectation that organizations will conduct their affairs
in fair and just ways. Given that one of the mechanisms that explain the positive relationship
between CSR and firm performance is satisfying the CSR need among stakeholders, and various
stakeholders encourage firms to engage in more and better CSR activity, I examine an unexplored
concern about CSR by asking several research questions: does enforced CSR activity lead to
superior firm performance and firm value? does superior CSR performance lead to superior CEO
wealth and status?
In this chapter, I argue that the potential impact of corporate attention to nonfinancial
shareholders on CSR and its effects on firms and CEOs. This question is difficult to empirically
address since stakeholder orientation is likely endogenous with respect to implementation of the
CSR. In particular, finding a positive relationship between stakeholder orientation and the quality
of CSR performance may be spurious if such relationship is driven by unobserved firm
characteristics that enhance a firm’s propensity to engage in both CSR performance and
stakeholder-friendly initiatives. This concern is particularly severe given that firm-level attributes,
such as firm performance or top management team’s attention to the corporate philanthropy
activities, while difficult to observe, are likely to drive a firm’s commitment to CSR and
stakeholder orientation alike. Moreover, the relationship between stakeholder-friendly policies
and CSR performance and its further impact is subject to reverse causality concerns. . For example,
a positive relationship between stakeholder orientation and CSR performance may indicate that
superior CSR performance occurs among firms that allocate more resources to cater to the
interests of non-shareholders. In short, while empirically challenging, leveraging a research
design that provides a clean, causal estimate is central to understanding the impact of a firm’s
stakeholder orientation on CSR and an organization’s CEO.

87
I address this empirical challenge by exploiting a natural experiment provided by the
enactment of constituency statutes in the state of Texas in 2006. These statutes encourage
corporate executives and directors to consider non-shareholders’ interests when making business
decisions, and, hence, they provide an exogenous variation in the weight that U.S. public
corporations give in the interest of nonfinancial stakeholders (Flammer & Kacperczyk, 2015; Orts,
1992). During 2002-2012, I apply a natural experiment approach to observe the impact of
constituency statutes within a firm in Texas. In 2006, the state of Texas enacted the constituency
statutes, and the legal enactments encouraged the Texan firms to take stakeholder’s values into
consideration. I find that the enactment of constituency statutes leads to a significant increase in
the quality of CSR; however, the superior CSR performance does not necessarily lead to superior
firm performance or value. These findings indicate that stakeholder orientation does indeed incite
firms to engage in better CSR activity; however, the more firms engage in superior CSR activities,
the less they gain from being corporate philanthropists. I argue that once CSR becomes an
enforced social responsibility, the marginal impact of CSR decreases compared to when firms
enact CSR on a voluntary basis.
I further argue that stakeholder orientation inhibits a firm’s CEO from obtaining more
compensation when they achieve superior CSR performance because the enactment of the
constituency statutes increases stakeholders’ expectations of CSR performance. For example, a
CEO may claim a larger compensation package in terms of their CSR performance before the
statutes were activated; however, after the statutes were enacted, the commitment to the CSR
would become enforced tasks. This enforced stakeholder orientation would decrease the marginal
impact of corporate philanthropic activities since the expectation of stakeholders is much more
increased, or the CSR effects on the shareholder’s value is decreased, or both.
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In addition, I posit that stakeholder orientation promotes a firm’s CEO to gain positive
exposure via public media, suggesting that external stakeholders prefer a CEO who engages in
superior CSR activity under an enforced stakeholder orientation era. Finally, the impact on
individual CEO’s wealth and status is larger for firms in non-consumer-focused industries (i.e.,
the business-to-business sector) since superior CSR performance is more conspicuous in sectors
where the CSR is not believed to be a common activity. Overall, evidence supports the view that
stakeholder orientation plays an important role not only in shaping corporate social responsibility
but also in influencing a CEO’s individual wealth and status because the policy changes would
affect stakeholder’s expectations of corporate philanthropic activities. In the following, I develop
the theoretical arguments in detail, describe the methodology, and present the empirical results and
implications.

4.2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
The concept of CSR refers to “voluntary managerial actions that appear to further some
social good, beyond interests of the firm and that which is required by regulation and policy” (e.g.,
Carroll, 1999; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). In other words, CSR is a form of corporate selfregulation integrated into a business model. CSR policy functions as a self-regulatory mechanism
whereby a business monitors and ensures its active compliance with not only legal and ethical
standards but also national and international norms (Rasche, Morsing, & Moon, 2017). The aim is
to increase long-term profits and shareholder trust through positive public and social relations and
high ethical standards to reduce business and legal risk by firms taking responsibility for corporate
actions. CSR strategies encourage firms to employ positive impacts on society and the
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environment as well as stakeholders, including consumers, employees, investors, communities,
and others.
CSR proponents support that corporations increase long-term profits by implementing
CSR activities while critics argue that CSR distracts from the primacy of shareholders. (e.g., Hine
& Preuss, 2009; Prahalad, 1994). To reconcile these conflicts, many studies have examined the
relationship between CSR and a shareholder’s value. The results from these studies have reported
positive, negative, and neutral positions in regards to the value of shareholders. For example,
Aupperle et al. (1985) found no relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and
profitability, and McGuire et al. (1988) found that prior performance was more closely related to
CSR than was subsequent performance; additionally, Waddock and Graves (1997) found
significant positive relationships between an index of CSP and performance measures, such as
ROA in the following year.
The inconsistency of the results from these studies is unsurprising since the effectiveness
of corporate philanthropic activities on firm performance is dependent on how stakeholders
interpret the value of CSR as a meaningful firm activity. A key feature of CSR is its voluntary
nature (e.g., Carroll, 1999). Voluntarism advocates firms to allocate resources, including tangible
and intangible assets in a socially efficient way that generates the optimal value for both the firm
and the society. Recently, governments, however, have imposed mandatory social, environmental,
and ethical reporting for companies for the community, society, and further non-shareholders. For
instance, India recently mandated CSR spending for the firms operating in the country. As per the
clause 135 of the Companies Act 2013, a firm operational in India should minimally spend 2%
of its average profit of the last three years on CSR activities. For the optimum value for
stakeholders, it is not uncommon that governments support the implementation of CSR not only
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through regulation but also through various bureaucratic mechanisms, including taxes, subsidies,
and charges (Nyquist, 2003). Some researchers in policy economics and corporate ethics have
argued whether CSR should remain voluntary or become mandatory: this argument is a longstanding academic debate over corporations’ purposes and legal obligations to society (e.g.,
Flammer & Kacperczyk, 2015; Orts, 1992).
Managers are continually subject to demands from multiple stakeholder groups to devote
firm resources to CSR. Conventionally, stakeholders are defined as persons or groups that have
or claim ownership and rights or interests in a corporation and its activities, past, present, and
future. Stakeholders with similar interests, claims, or rights can be classified as belonging to the
same group, such as employees, shareholders, and customers (Clarkson, 1995). While external
stakeholders have no financial stakes in a firm, they indirectly influence a firm’s strategic
behavior while internal stakeholders are directly and/or financially involved in a firm’s
operational processes. Satisfying these stakeholders is a fundamental task for both a firm and its
CEO.

4.2.1 Stakeholder orientation and expectation of corporate social responsibility of stakeholders
Stakeholder theory examines the firm in the context of a wider range of internal and
external stakeholders having legitimate expectations, urgent claims, and/or power regarding the
firm (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). The pressures for superior CSR
performance emerge from not only internal stakeholders, like employees, directors of board, or
institutional shareholders, but also external stakeholders, such as customers, community groups,
governments, and public media. Based on an assumption that firms implement CSR strategies to
capitulate to pressure from stakeholders, CSR literature puts more emphasis on its economic
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aspects and consequences. Little research has, however, considered how stakeholders take the
value of CSR, that is enforced by one of stakeholders (i.e., government).
A company’s stakeholder orientation represents how much a company attends to the
interests of all its relevant stakeholders. Many researchers have defined stakeholder orientation at
the firm-level perspective. For example, Jain, Aguilera, and Jamali (2017) defined stakeholder
orientation as the top management’s viewpoint of their firm’s legitimate stakeholders. Dhaliwal,
Li, Tsang, and Yang (2014) defined it as the extent to which management’s vision of its roles and
responsibilities includes the interests and claims of non-shareholders. These studies have
examined the impact of stakeholder orientation on a firm’s performance as well as further
strategic initiatives. For instance, Jain et al. (2017) argued that stakeholder orientation constitutes
a legitimacy signal consciously employed by firms to demonstrate their shareholder and specific
non-shareholder orientations amid institutional pressures emerging from country and industry
contexts. Flammer and Kacperczyk (2015) found that stakeholder orientation promotes a firm’s
innovation performance by ameliorating the relationship between the focal firm and its employees.
In a similar vein, I focus on the possibility that stakeholder orientation driven by an institution
would affect the expectation of stakeholders in respect to a firm’s CSR implementation and
activity. In other words, I argue that the enforced stakeholder orientation would affect the
perceived level of each stakeholder. As mentioned previously, the key feature of CSR is its aspect
of being voluntary: firms should choose whether they are implementing specific CSR strategies
based upon their demands and capabilities. However, what if a firm is receiving institutional
pressure by stakeholders? Would a firm’s CSR strategy be effective? Or, would stakeholders
appreciate the firm’s CSR activity under the era of pressured CSR?
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The central claim in this paper posits that stakeholder orientation affects the level of
expectation of perceived CSR performance, and, further, it would affect firm performance as well
as CEOs’ individual compensation and prominence. Assuming that translating CSR performance
to firm performance and further impact depends upon 1) how stakeholders appreciate a firm’s
CSR, and 2) the extent of the visibility or rarity of a firm’s CSR activity. I argue that stakeholder
orientation imposed by an institution would be one of the key factors to affect the link between
CSR and the value of shareholders. By focusing on the enactment of constituency statutes in the
U.S., which is one of the institutional pressures to foster a firm’s CSR implementation, I argue
that institutional pressure would affect the perceived value of each company’s CSR, from
voluntary to mandatory CSR.

4.2.2 The enactment of constituency statutes and the perceived value of CSR by stakeholders
A constituency statute, also called a stakeholder statute, allows corporate directors, in the
exercise of their fiduciary duties, to consider broader interests than merely profit maximization for
shareholders. In other words, the statute puts more emphasis on the non-shareholders’ interests
when making business decisions, and a firm should be lead in the interests of more groups than
just shareholders. For example, under these statutes, a firm’s executives, and directors are allowed
to consider the interests of employees, customers, suppliers, communities, environments, and any
other potentially affected constituency (Gelter, 2009; Hiller, 2013). Before enactment of the
constituency statutes, a firm’s top management team and board of directors are not explicitly
permitted by written law to consider non-shareholders’ interests in their decision-making.
Therefore, the enactment of constituency statutes provides corporate leaders the ability to cater to
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non-shareholder interests without hurting their fiduciary obligations to shareholders. For example,
Ohio’s statute reads as follows:
[A] director, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation, shall consider the interests of the corporation’s shareholders and, in his
discretion, may consider any of the following:
(1) The interests of the corporation’s employees, suppliers, creditors, and customers;
(2) The economy of the state and nation;
(3) Community and societal consideration;
(4) The long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders,
including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued
independence of the corporation.
-OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59[E]

Although the details may be state specific, the main motivation of the legislation remains
the same: constituency statutes emphasize the importance of considering the interests of
nonfinancial stakeholders and, hence, pursuing interests that are not limited to their own direct
shareholders. Most constituency statutes in the U.S. are permissive, which means “no penalty”
for violators. In other words, executives and directors in the top management team (TMT) may
not be required to take stakeholder interests into account. There are no express constraints on the
TMT’s discretion in deciding whether to consider stakeholder interests, and, if they decide to do
so, the TMT can choose which constituency groups’ interests to consider (Bainbridge, 1991). I
presume, however, that the enactment of a constituency statute by state legislation would make
stakeholders take a firm’s CSR for granted. Also, many firms would join the CSR implementation
followed by the call for institutions as well as for other competing firms. Therefore, I expect that
the impact of CSR on firm performance would be greater when the CSR activity encompasses
relevant tasks oriented by a firm rather than when CSR is pressured by stakeholders.
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Hypothesis 1. The positive relationship between CSR performance and firm performance is
negatively moderated when stakeholder orientation is stronger in society.

4.2.3 The impact of constituency statutes of CSR performance on CEO compensation
A CEO’s compensation is determined by assessing their performance standards and
expectations from internal stakeholders, such as directors. Many researchers have examined the
relationship between CSR performance and compensation for CEOs. Prior literature suggests that
the compensation structure (e.g., bonus and ownership) constitutes a major factor in motivating
CSR strategies at the firm level (e.g., Cai, Jo, & Pan, 2012; Mahoney & Thorn, 2006) 36 Mahoney
35 F

and Thorn (2006) examined the impact of a lagged executive compensation structure on CSR
engagement and conclude that the importance of the executive compensation structure influences
an executive’s focus on CSR. By using a U.S. sample and one-year of data, McGuire et al. (2003)
argued that there is a significant, positive correlation between CEO compensation and CSR
engagement. These studies observe that CEO compensation is one of the most important factors
of CSR engagement.
Based upon the perspective that enforced CSR implementation affects a stakeholder’s
evaluation and its effects on firm performance, I, likewise, argue that CSR is important for CEO
compensation. Effective CSR activities enable a manager and firm to establish and maintain
positive relationships that are congruent with the perceptions they want to convey to their
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I recognize that Cai et al. (2011) examines that there is a negative relationship between CSR performance and
CEO compensation. In the present paper, I examine the relationship between the growth of CEO pay and CSR
performance rather than “absolute amount of CEO pay” and CSR, by controlling for previous CEO pay. This is
important to consider, as the current level of CEO pay is highly correlated with previous CEO pay or vice versa
(previous CEO pay can explain almost 60.9% of current CEO pay). There are some differences between this paper
and Cai et al., (2011). I am measuring CSR performance with ASSET4, which provides z-score between zero and
100, that is designed for benchmarking within and cross sectors, but the Cai et al (2011) is measuring CSR with
KLD dataset, that is based on the discrete number of strength and weakness, that is not able to consider idiosyncratic
features at the industry-level. My focus in this paper is that the amount of increasing in CEO pay due to the quality
of CSR performance, not the entire CEO compensation package.
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stakeholders. Through the lens of internal stakeholders (e.g., board of directors, shareholders, and
employees), successful CSR implementation would be a sort of “right impression” that facilitates
desired social and financial outcomes. In this process, a CEO with successful CSR would convey
an impression of competency in the workplace (Jones & Pittman, 1982). Additionally, the positive
impression on internal stakeholders could trigger material rewards, such as higher salaries or
better working conditions for their CEOs.
Arguably, a CEO with superior CSR performance would be more attractive to internal
stakeholders. Reiterating the logic developed earlier, as firms become more successful in CSR,
their CEOs will be appraised by internal stakeholders. As a result, I expect some CEOs to be
observed more than other executives as the ability to capture the information arising from such
demand for CSR is also valuable human capital. Considering that the level of competition for
CEO positions is greater than ever (e.g., Burns, Minnick, & Starks, 2017), many firms provide
attractive compensation structures (Carnahan et al., 2012), promotion ladders (Bloom & Michel,
2002), and rewards (Giarratana, Mariani, & Weller, 2018). Given that the ability of implementing
CSR strategies is also a form of valuable human capital for CEOs, internal stakeholders would
assess each CEO’s commitment and quality to being a “corporate philanthropist”; a CEO with
superior CSR performance could negotiate their future compensation with internal stakeholders,
such as compensation directors and chairpersons of boards. However, the diffusion of stakeholder
orientation affects the perceived value of CSR by external stakeholders, and it further affects the
impact of CSR on firm performance. In other words, the enforced CSR activity would be less
appreciated by stakeholders compared to when it is voluntarily implemented by a firm. Thus, I
expect the following:
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between CSR performance and CEO compensation is
negatively moderated when stakeholder orientation is stronger in the society.
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4.2.4 The impact of constituency statutes of CSR performance on CEO prominence
While the literature examines the post-impact of CEO prominence on firms’ strategic
actions and outcomes, little research addresses how superior human capital arises through the
interaction with external stakeholders, such as CEOs appearing in public media and their potential
status as a business celebrity. Hayward, Rindova, and Pollock (2004) described that a celebrity
CEO is born when public media (e.g., magazines and journalists) attribute a firm’s positive
performance to its CEO’s actions. Public media appraise specific CEOs and firms about their
financial achievements, innovations, and significant transactions, such as M&A. Public
awareness is increasing in terms of social, environmental, and humanitarian issues. Responsible
external stakeholders are urging firms to ethically behave both in society and toward their
stakeholders. Firms should maintain and expand communication with their external stakeholders
and keep them informed of initiatives and projects, related to CSR. Public media, one of the major
external stakeholders, creates and distributes information related to CSR activity, and, then,
further evaluates its quality. Public media is recognized as a relevant channel for enhancing and
fostering relations between the effectiveness of impression management and external
stakeholders; thus media channels are becoming an important tool used to propagate CSR efforts.
The media has a critical role to play in how CSR is broadcast to society. It is not enough
for firms to engage in CSR for social causes or for the media to pressure firms into actively and
wisely practicing CSR. The public media have a prominent role in advocating for corporations to
follow socially conscious policies and programs, and major public news groups, such as CNN,
Financial Times, and Businessweek frequently issue special reports about the CSR activities of
global firms. The media not only appraise the success of CSR but also penalize corporate social
irresponsibility (i.e., CSI) (Kölbel, Busch, & Jancso, 2017). Achieving superior CSR performance
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with stakeholders is often considered a means of contributing to public perception of a company
while inferior CSR performance or CSI can harm a firm’s reputation.
I expect, therefore, that superior CSR performance would lead to a firm’s CEO attaining
media exposure by or getting appraised by external stakeholders. However, the suggested
relationship would be more pronounced when the diffusion of stakeholder orientation is prevalent
in society. Thus, I expect stakeholder orientation to yield a positive impact of CSR performance
on the change of CEO’s exposure to the media, and I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between CSR performance and CEO prominence is
positively moderated when stakeholder orientation is stronger in the society.

4.2.5 Contingent effect of industry characteristic on constituency statutes
I further expect that the impact of stakeholder orientation is also dependent upon the extent
to which CSR activity is more prevalent in the industry. For instance, CSR is a common strategic
initiative in a consumer-oriented industry, such as the retailing industry. In the business-toconsumer (B2C) industry, most consumers agree that while achieving business targets, companies
should engage in CSR effort at the same time (Homburg, Stierl, & Bornemann, 2013), and
consumers believe companies doing charity work will receive a positive response. Somerville
(2013) also found that consumers are loyal and willing to spend more on retailers that support
charity. Thus, companies in B2C industries are under more pressure from their stakeholders than
in B2B industries. When stakeholder orientation is stronger after the enactment of constituency
statutes, the difference between the impact of constituency statutes of CSR on CEO compensation
is larger in the B2B industry than in the B2C industry. In fact, CSR activity by a firm is much
more conspicuous and effective in the B2B industry where competing firms are less likely to
engage in CSR before the enactment of constituency statutes; however, the effectiveness of CSR
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activities would decrease in the B2B industry after the enactment of constituency statutes. In the
consumer-oriented industry (B2C), where CSR is taken for granted (Lev, Petrovits, &
Radhakrishnan, 2010), there would be fewer difference in the effectiveness of CSR because CSR
strategies are a common resource endowment regardless of enforced stakeholder orientation.
Likewise, similar logic can be applied to the argument for CEO prominence. The public
media are likely to highlight CSR when it is less likely to be expected. In other words, CSR
activity in the B2C industry is more likely to be regarded as general firm initiatives, but the
activity in the B2B industries would be seen as more meaningful to stakeholders because it is less
expected. Thus, the suggested causal relationship is more pronounced in the B2B industry where
CSR is not taken for granted.

4.3 Methods
4.3.1 The enactment of constituency in the state of Texas in 2006
To date, a total of 35 states in the U.S. have adopted constituency statutes: two of them
adopted a constituency statute during the sample period (2002-2012), including Texas in 2006 and
Nebraska in 2007. Since there are only three companies from Nebraska in the sample, I use Texan
firms to implement a natural experiment that can observe the impact of “the obligation” from “the
responsibility” regarding CSR and CEOs’ wealth and prominence. In order to capture whether the
setting is proper to test research questions in this paper, I checked the impact of the 2006
constituency statutes in Texas by searching articles that mentioned “corporate social responsibility,”
“CSR,” or “non-shareholders” by Texan local media (i.e., news, articles, journals, etc). Figure 4.1
depicts that the number of articles referencing “CSR” increased after the enactment of constituency
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statutes. Interestingly, the number of articles is similar between 2006 and 2007, and represents a
one-year time lag for media attention.
250
Before

200

After

150
100
50
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 4.1 The number of articles that mentioned “corporate social responsibility”
in Texan local media

Note: From Factiva, I count the number of articles (i.e., journals, magazines, newspaper) that
mention “corporate social responsibility” or “CSR” in Texan local media during 2002-2012. The
constituency statutes in Texas were effective January 1, 2006.

4.3.2 Sample
I will combine multiple data sources and construct a hand-collected dataset to study the
effects of stakeholder orientation on CSR performance on CEO wealth and prominence that
includes the following data: (i) Thomson Reuter Asset4; (ii) CEO-level data from Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and Execucomp; (iii) accounting and financial data from
Compustat and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP); (iv) information regarding
corporate governance from I/B/E/S; (v) other data from company websites and other web-based
sources, such as Factiva, Bloomberg Businessweek, Financial Times, and Forbes.
The primary sample for this study starts from 1,000 of the largest U.S. firms that are listed
as having publicly traded in the U.S. during 2002-2012. I then matched these firms with those in
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the Asset4 database by a firm identifier and tracked CEO pay and prominence changes at the focal
firm-year level using prominent media sources and other web-based materials. This process
incurred 901 firms and 5,638 firm-year observations with 1,391 CEOs for the sample period. To
capture the impact of stakeholder orientation as exogenous shock and observe the within-variation
at a focal firm, I limited the sample firms that were only in the state of Texas during the period.
Thus, the final sample consisted of 88 firms and 595 firm-year observations with 146 CEOs (see
Appendix F) 37.
36F

4.3.3 Dependent Variables
To measure the impact of stakeholder orientation on CSR and CEO, I followed common
practice in CSR literature and used firm-level proxies for firm performance and CEO-level proxies
for CEO’s wealth and prominence.
Firm level: Firm performance and firm value. Return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE),
and Tobin’s q are primary performance measures. I estimated ROA as using net income scaled by
the book value of total assets 38 and ROE as using net income scaled by the book value of total
37F

equity. In addition, I estimated Tobin’s q as the market value of total assets divided by the
replacement cost of assets.
CEO level: CEO pay and CEO prominence. The first dependent variable at the CEO-level is CEO
pay, which reflects a CEO’s individual wealth. This variable is measured by total CEO pay,
consisting of salary, bonuses, the value of restricted stock granted, the value of options granted,

37
During the panel analyses, one firm was dropped since the observations were not enough to get lagged and
forwarded value. In addition, initial observations at the firm-year level were dropped since all dependent variables
were forwarded. Thus, final observation included an analysis of 87 firms with 505 firm-year observations.
38
In robustness checks, I calculated ROA measured as earnings before interests, tax, depreciation, and amortization
(EBITDA) divided by the book value of total assets and obtained similar results.
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long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation. The variable is constructed as the natural
logarithmic value. The information is derived from EXECUCOMP and SEC filings (e.g., Custódio,
Ferreira, & Matos, 2013). The second dependent variable is CEO media exposure, reflecting a
CEO’s prominent status to non-shareholders. Following prior literature (Chatterjee & Hambrick,
2007; Roussanov & Savor, 2014), I calculated the number of articles that mention a CEO’ s name
based on the Factiva Dow Jones database.

4.3.4 Independent variable: measuring CSR performance
The main independent variable in the model is CSR performance. I derived the
information from Thomson Reuters Asset4 database, which provides objective, relevant,
auditable, and systematic CSR information and ratings (Chatterji, Durand, Levine, & Touboul,
2016; Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). This Swiss-based institution provides a standardized
z-score for four major domains: environmental performance, social performance, corporate
governance, and economic performance. Using approximately 250 key performance indicators,
the Asset4 scales CSR performance between 0-100.
This indicator qualifies CSR efforts at each firm and asks several questions. Has the
company received product awards with respect to environmental responsibility? Does the
company use product labels (e.g., FSC, Energy Star, MSC), indicating the environmental
responsibility of its products? Does the company describe, claim to have, or mention processes in
place to improve its use of sustainable packaging? Does the company promote the social
responsibility of its products or services through product labels, fair trade labels or local suppliers
support labels that the company is qualified to use or has received? For this analysis, CSR
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performance in this paper is measured as an equally-weighted average value of the sum of ESG
domains (environmental, social, and governance) (Cheng et al., 2014).

4.3.5 Contingent variables
I further examined whether the effect of stakeholder orientation on CSR performance and
CEOs’ wealth and status differs depending on industry characteristics. To distinguish between
the B2C and B2B sectors, I used the partition based on the four-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes (Lev et al., 2010: 188). I refer to B2C industries as “CSR-prevalent
industries” and B2B as “CSR-less-prevalent industries,” assuming that the impact of stakeholder
orientation on CSR and CEOs is more salient in the industry where CSR is not a common strategic
initiative.
4.3.6 Control variables
In the analysis, I controlled for a vector of CEO- and firm-level characteristics that may
affect firm performance and CEO’s wealth and prominence.
CEO-level controls. CEO age is measured in years (logarithmic value), and CEO ownership is
constructed as the proportion of outstanding shares owned by corporate CEOs in a given year. I
included CEO tenure, which is a proxy for experience in a given firm, and CEO duality to account
for managerial discretion (Rechner & Dalton, 1991).
Firm-level controls. In order to control for corporate governance features, I included Board size
(the logarithmic value of number of board members), Female board (the number of female
directors), Active CEO director (the number of directors who serves other firm’s CEO
simultaneously), Multiple director (the number of directors who serves other firm’s director
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simultaneously), and Outside director (the number of outsider directors). I also included
institutional ownership as the proportion of ownership held by all institutional investors.
I further controlled for firm size, which is the natural logarithm of the total sales. To
capture the effects of capital availability and capital structure on a firm’s CSR initiatives, I
controlled for Firm cash as a natural logarithm value of total cash at a focal firm. Also, I controlled
for R&D expenditure measured as a natural logarithm value of R&D expenditure in order to rule
out the concern that R&D is highly correlated with CSR performance (McWilliams & Siegel,
2000). I controlled for a focal Firm’s status since the firm’s current reputation is likely to affect
their employees’ welfare and prominence as well as firm performance. Fortune magazine
annually reports Most Admired Companies 39, and I coded one if a focal firm had been listed in
38F

“Top 50 Most Admired Companies” in a given year and zero otherwise.

4.3.7 Empirical design
To examine whether an increase in a firm’s orientation toward stakeholders affects CSR
performance and its further impact on the firm and CEO, I used a panel OLS with fixed effect
based on the enactment of constituency statutes in Texas in 2006 (see Table 4.1). 40 Specifically, I
39F

estimated the following regression:
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡

Where i indexes firms; t indexes years; d indexes industries; 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 and 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 are firm, year, and
industry-fixed effects, respectively. The dependent variables of interest are y, which are firm

40

During the sample period, there were two states that enacted the constituency statutes. Texas enacted the statutes
in 2006, and Nebraska enacted the statutes in 2007. In the full sample, there were only three firms in Nebraska.
Thus, I use only Texan samples to capture the effects of stakeholder orientation.
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performance (e.g., ROA, ROE, Tobin’s q, CEO compensation, CEO prominence). Constituency
statutes is the “treatment dummy” (i.e., a dummy variable that equals one after the year of 2006
and zero otherwise). Constituency statutes in Texas were effectively enacted on January 1, 2006.
X is the control variable that included the model. All control variables were lagged by one year. 𝜀𝜀

is the error term. The regression was estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) with fixed effects
in order to capture the impact of constituency statutes within variation. Robust standard errors
were clustered at the firm level to account for heteroscedasticity and non-independence of the
observations.
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Table 4.1 Constituency statutes by state in U.S.
State
Ohio
Illinois
Maine
Arizona
Minnesota
New Mexico
New York
Wisconsin
Idaho
Louisiana
Tennessee
Virginia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Massachusetts
Missouri
New Jersey
Oregon
Mississippi
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Wyoming
Nevada
North Carolina
North Dakota
Connecticut
Vermont
Maryland
Texas
Nebraska

Year
1984
1985
1986
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1988
1988
1988
1988
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1991
1993
1993
1997
1998
1999
2006
2007
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4.4 Results
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive summary statistics and correlation matrix for the data.
The main results are presented in Table 4.3. In Model 1, the dependent variable is CSR
performance. As shown, the coefficient on the constituency statue dummy is positively significant
(𝛽𝛽=13.540, p<0.01). The result shows that the stakeholder orientation encourages Texan firms to
engage in better CSR activity. Since CSR performance is rated on a 0-100 score, the enactment of
constituency statutes increased by 13.54 points compared to before the enactment. In Appendix G,
I assess the dynamics of the post constituency statutes. To do so, I replaced the constituency
statutes dummy with a set of nine dummy variables, indicating the four years prior to the enactment
(Constituency Statue [-4], Constituency Statue [-3], Constituency Statue [-2], and Constituency
Statue [-1]); the year of the enactment (Constituency Statue [0]); the first, second, third year
(Constituency Statue [1], Constituency Statue [2], and Constituency Statue [3], respectively); and,
four or more years after the enactment (Constituency Statue [+4]). As shown, Constituency
Statutes (-4) are negatively significant, and the other coefficients of all pre-enactment dummies
are insignificant. This finding affirms that, before enactment of constituency statutes, on average,
Texan firms were less likely to engage in superior CSR activity. However, after the enactment of
constituency statutes, all coefficients are positively significant except for the year of enactment,
which is 2006. It may suggest that it takes about one year for the increase in stakeholder orientation
to translate into a firm’s focus on CSR activities. The coefficients of Constituency Statue (2),
Constituency Statue (3), and Constituency Statue (+4) remain large and positively significant,
indicating that stakeholder orientation has a long-lasting effect on a firm’s endeavor in CSR.
Models 2 to 4 in Table 4.3 demonstrate that increased stakeholder orientation affects the
impact of superior CSR activity on firm performance. The dependent variables for firm
performance are ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q as proxy for firm value. Interestingly, superior CSR
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performance leads to greater firm performance (ROA and ROE), but it does not necessarily
increase firm value. In Model 2, the coefficient of interaction terms, Post Constituency Statutes X
CSR Performance is negatively significant on ROA (𝛽𝛽=-0.002, p<0.05), suggesting that the impact
of CSR on firm performance is greater when CSR activity is voluntarily derived. In other words,
the impact of CSR on firm performance is smaller when stakeholder orientation is prevalent in the
society. To elaborate on the interpretation of the stakeholder orientation and CSR performance on
firm performance, I plotted the interaction while holding other variables at their mean values.
Figure 4.2 indicates that the impact of CSR on firm performance is greater when there is less
stakeholder orientation; however, the impact of CSR on firm performance is less when there is
more stakeholder orientation. Analysis of the economic significance of this finding indicates that
before the enactment of constituency statutes, a firm’s ROA increased 7.39% from mean of CSR
to mean plus one standard deviation of CSR while a firm’s ROA increased 1.71% from mean of
CSR to mean plus one standard deviation of it after enactment of constituency statutes 41. In Model
40 F

3, the impact of stakeholder orientation on CSR and ROE shares similar results with the result
shown in Model 2 (𝛽𝛽=-0.003, p<0.05), suggesting that, with more stakeholder orientation in
society, the marginal effects of CSR performance on firm performance becomes smaller and
ineffective. Model 4 shows that the interaction term on firm value measured as Tobin’s q is
insignificant, conveying that, in the long run, CSR performance is indifferent from increases in the
firm value.

41

Before the enactment of constituency statutes, the change of slope is calculated as ((1.091281-1.016138)
/1.091281)=0.0739496, and, after the enactment of constituency statutes, the change of slope is calculated as
((0.9446609-0.9287887)/0.9287887)=0.01708914

Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Variables

M

SD Min Max 1

1. Con. Statutes 0.74 0.44
2. CSR Perf.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

1

4. CEO Prom.

56.2 21.9 11.8 97.4 0.11 1
0 11.3 0.01 0.26 1
128 191 0 1394 0.00 0.19 0.03

5. CEO Age

4.02 0.12 3.69 4.32 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.07

6. CEO Own.

0.01 0.03

0

7. CEO Tenure 1.72 0.82

0

3. CEO Comp. 8.65 1.33

1
1

0.31 0.10 -0.04 -0.34 -0.04 0.09 1
3.61 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.37 0.25 1
8. CEO Duality 0.63 0.48 0
1 -0.08 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.26 0.04 0.25 1
9. Board Size 2.26 0.23 1.61 2.83 -0.05 0.39 0.25 0.11 0.02 -0.17 -0.18 0.07
10. Female Dir. 1.11 1.09

0

11. CEO Dir.

0.43 1.16

0

12. Multi Dir.

1.95 1.26

0

13. Outside Dir. 7.39 2.43

1

6 -0.04 0.50 0.16 0.11 -0.04 -0.04 -0.16
10 0.22 0.07 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08
6 -0.43 0.19 0.14 0.02 0.10 -0.12 -0.04
15 0.00 0.48 0.29 0.10 0.03 -0.19 -0.11

1

0.12 0.61 1
0.01 0.18 0.20

1

0.14 0.22 0.20 0.17

1

15. Firm Size

0.15 0.81 0.56 0.20 0.20 1
0.76 0.24 0 1.13 0.14 -0.08 0.05 -0.10 0.12 -0.13 0.03 0.00 -0.19 -0.18 -0.04 -0.01 -0.15 1
8.74 1.36 6.03 12.9 -0.06 0.61 0.38 0.32 0.21 -0.24 -0.15 0.19 0.55 0.54 0.16 0.26 0.56 -0.22 1

16. Firm Cash

5.60 1.93

14. Inst. Own.

0

10.4 0.00 0.39 0.19 0.26 0.13 -0.14 -0.15
17. R&D Exp. 1.50 2.41 0 7.69 -0.03 0.45 0.17 0.14 -0.14 0.00 -0.03
18. Firm Status 0.07 0.25 0
1 -0.06 0.17 0.00 0.34 -0.03 0.01 -0.11
19. ROA
0.95 0.76 0.13 3.90 -0.04 0.21 -0.05 0.05 0.13 -0.07 -0.11

0.03 0.31 0.30 0.08 0.21 0.32 -0.08 0.61 1
0.09 0.22 0.34 0.08 0.23 0.32 -0.05 0.32 0.30 1
0.02 0.12 0.27 0.03 0.01 0.09 -0.10 0.27 0.18 0.20 1
0.11 0.17 0.33 0.06 0.03 0.16 -0.09 0.43 0.23 -0.02 0.14 1
20. ROE
0.12 0.33 -1.99 1.79 0.10 0.17 0.12 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.07 -0.02 0.13 0.06 0.10 1
21. Firm Value 1.40 0.78 0 5.66 -0.08 0.02 -0.12 -0.03 -0.05 0.10 0.13 0.06 -0.15 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.12 0.16 -0.18 -0.08 0.31 0.15 0.13 0.15 1
22. B2C Ind.
0.14 0.34 0
1 -0.01 -0.03 -0.14 0.11 -0.08 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.27 -0.02 -0.07 0.05 -0.20 0.09 -0.01 -0.17 0.05 0.48 0.41 -0.04 0.03
Note: N=585. Bolded pairwise correlations are significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 4.3 The effect of enforced stakeholder orientation on CSR and firm performance
Estimation
Models
Dependent Variable
Post Constituency Statutes
CSR Performance t−1

t−1

Post Constituency Statutes
CSR Performance

t−1

CEO Prominence

t−1

CEO Compensation
CEO Age

CEO Tenure

CEO Duality
Board Size

t−1

t−1

t−1
t−1

t−1

Female Director

t−1

Active CEO Diretor
Multiple Director
Outside Director

t−1

t−1

t−1

Institutional Ownership
Firm Size

Firm Cash

t−1

t−1

R&D Expenditure
Firm Status
ROA
ROE

t−1

t−1

t−1

t−1

Tobin′ s Q

t−1

t−1

CEO Ownership

t−1

Year/Industry FE

X

t−1

1
CSR Performance t
13.540***
(3.374)
0.396***
(0.056)
0.951*
(0.570)
0.001
(0.005)
-4.571
(8.984)
13.934*
(7.717)
1.523*
(0.870)
-0.361
(1.462)
4.366
(5.891)
-0.831
(1.106)
-0.198
(0.681)
0.455
(0.532)
-0.720
(0.661)
-11.308*
(6.648)
1.535
(2.019)
-0.642*
(0.379)
-0.363
(1.451)
0.144
(1.837)
-0.681
(2.915)
1.720
(1.097)
0.841
(1.231)
Yes

Panel OLS FE
2
3
ROA t
ROE t
-0.002**
-0.003**
(0.001)
(0.001)
-0.002
0.099
(0.084)
(0.094)
0.003***
0.003**
(0.001)
(0.002)
-0.012
-0.023
(0.011)
(0.017)
0.000
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.161
0.124
(0.170)
(0.263)
-0.425
-1.836**
(0.556)
(0.857)
-0.006
-0.002
(0.020)
(0.030)
0.033
-0.041
(0.032)
(0.049)
0.091
-0.299*
(0.112)
(0.175)
0.010
0.031
(0.018)
(0.028)
-0.024**
-0.025
(0.011)
(0.016)
0.016
0.027**
(0.011)
(0.013)
0.001
0.054***
(0.010)
(0.016)
0.005
-0.171
(0.130)
(0.195)
0.011
0.004
(0.035)
(0.050)
0.006
-0.020
(0.009)
(0.014)
0.009
0.018
(0.019)
(0.030)
-0.020
-0.012
(0.048)
(0.073)
0.229***
-0.100
(0.055)
(0.078)
0.039
0.191***
(0.032)
(0.049)
0.044*
0.096***
(0.024)
(0.031)
Yes
Yes

4
Tobin′ s Q t
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.057
(0.179)
0.000
(0.002)
0.002
(0.039)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.035
(0.310)
-0.592
(0.723)
0.006
(0.056)
0.113*
(0.063)
0.075
(0.253)
0.021
(0.038)
-0.021
(0.029)
-0.016
(0.023)
0.016
(0.026)
0.340
(0.240)
-0.344***
(0.079)
0.063**
(0.029)
0.034
(0.054)
0.118
(0.170)
0.127
(0.102)
0.051
(0.053)
0.244***
(0.085)
Yes

110
Table 4.3 continued
30.304
0.928
(34.683)
(0.709)
N (Firms)
505 (87)
505 (87)
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2
0.387
0.389
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.148
(1.091)
505 (87)
0.379

Constant

3.044**
(1.501)
505 (87)
0.368

1.15
1.1

ROA

1.05
1
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
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Figure 4.2 Interaction plot of stakeholder orientation of CSR on firm performance

Table 4.4 demonstrates how CSR performance affects CEO compensation and CEO
prominence before and after the enactment of constituency statutes. First, a CEO that performs
superior CSR will be offered greater compensation (β =0.009, p<0.05). If a CEO achieved one
point more in terms of CSR performance during 2002-2012, the CEO’s compensation increased

by 0.9%. Given that the average CEO compensation in the Texan firm is $9 million, it is a
considerable amount of money (approximately $81,000). However, the positive relationship
between CSR performance and CEO compensation is negatively moderated after the enactment of
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constituency statutes. In order to better understand the stakeholder orientation of CSR on CEO
compensation, I plotted the interaction plot in Figure 4.3, which illustrates that the slope of CSR
on CEO compensation before the enactment of constituency statutes is much steeper than after the
enactment. Analysis of the economic significance of the finding indicates that, before the
enactment of constituency statutes, CEO compensation increased approximately 2.61% from mean
of CSR to mean plus one standard deviation of CSR while CEO compensation increased 0.16%
from mean of CSR to mean plus one standard deviation of it after the enactment of constituency
statutes. In fact, the benefit from superior CSR performance on CEO compensation is greater when
the CSR is not mandatory. (i.e., not obligated by the government). After the enactment of the
constituency statutes, superior CSR performance may not directly transfer firm performance well,
or there would be many firms that start with CSR activity, so the efforts of CSR would not be
visible by stakeholders. To support the evidence, I tested a subsample analysis to confirm the
causal relationship. In order to better understand the impact of constituency statutes, I split the full
sample into two sub categories: B2C (business-to-company) in Model 2 and B2B (business-tobusiness) in Model 3, respectively. The underlying logic maintains that, if the impact of CSR on
CEO compensation depends on how stakeholder perceives the value of CSR, the effect would be
greater in the industry where CSR is not a common strategic initiative. Interestingly, in the B2C
industry, stakeholder orientation has no effect at all; however, in the B2B industry, the social
atmosphere toward stakeholders reduces the impact of CSR on CEO compensation. In particular,
before the enactment of constituency statutes, in the B2B industry, if CSR performance increased
from mean to mean plus one standard deviation, it would increase 3.9% more for CEO
compensation. After the enactment of constituency statutes, however, it only increased by 1.23%.
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While constituency statutes reduced the marginal effect of CSR on CEO compensation, the
stakeholder orientation helped CEOs gain public media exposure. Model 4 demonstrates that
superior CSR performance positively affected CEO prominence, and the positive relationship is
much stronger under strong stakeholder orientation (β =1.079, p<0.05). Likewise, the stakeholder
orientation enhances the relationship between CSR performance and CEO prominence, and Model

6, shows that the relationship is much more salient in the B2B industry. Figure 4.4 demonstrates
that the impact of CSR performance on CEO prominence is much greater in the era of stakeholder
orientation. Intuitively, CEOs may use their CSR performance as means to increase their status or
fame by being exposed by the public media when stakeholders increase the pressure on firms to
engage in CSR 42.

(ln) CEO Compensation
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Figure 4.3 Interaction plot of stakeholder orientation of CSR on CEO compensation

42

CSR performance increases from mean to mean plus one standard deviation; the number of CEO media exposure
increases 38% before the enactment of stakeholder orientation while 71% increases after the enactment of
stakeholder orientation.
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Table 4.4 The impact of enforced constituency statutes on CSR and CEO wealth and
prominence
Estimation
Models
Dependent Variable

1

Sample

Full

B2C

-0.012**

2.125

1.039**

(0.005)

(0.019)

(0.005)

(0.469)

(2.960)

(0.482)

1.265**

0.355

1.585**

-17.897

-168.49

-13.811

(0.591)

(1.003)

(0.706)

(29.485)

(154.08)

(30.361)

0.009**
(0.004)
0.040
(0.082)
-0.003*
(0.001)
0.535
(0.946)
2.444
(1.548)
-0.081

0.022
(0.018)
0.170
(0.224)
-0.005**
(0.001)
-5.836
(3.340)
-17.829
(74.930)
0.068

0.013**
(0.004)
0.031
(0.098)
-0.002*
(0.001)
1.261
(1.254)
2.601
(1.665)
-0.106

0.857*
(0.494)
-0.922
(5.288)
0.229***
(0.041)
19.639
(82.564)
37.580
(268.977)
-5.089

2.857
(2.955)
19.622
(24.088)
0.031
(0.175)
-40.494
(348.249)
6,050.1
(8,112.1)
52.339

0.589
(0.538)
-0.977
(5.564)
0.236***
(0.043)
16.221
(90.091)
41.367
(262.216)
-7.901

t−1

(0.097)

(0.205)

(0.136)

(9.511)

(38.419)

(10.594)

0.242

1.253

0.132

-22.833

-84.137

-27.005*

t−1

(0.173)

(0.787)

(0.194)

(15.618)

(73.147)

(16.239)

-0.076

-0.239

0.207

-109.4*

19.112

-85.658

(0.447)

(1.580)

(0.471)

(54.980)

(285.886)

(59.834)

-0.117

-0.041

-0.116

-25.09*

-30.748

-22.974**

(0.073)

(0.106)

(0.084)

(8.927)

(33.461)

(9.525)

0.083*

0.018

0.081*

-9.590**

3.414

-9.691**

(0.042)

(0.073)

(0.048)

(4.171)

(17.412)

(4.332)

CEO Prominence

t−1

CEO Compensation

t−1

t−1

CEO Ownership

t−1

t−1

Female Director

t−1

Active CEO Diretor
Multiple Director
Outside Director

t−1

Firm Cash

t−1
t−1

t−

B2B

0.050

-0.066

0.071

4.422

-19.096

4.772

t−1

(0.059)

(0.154)

(0.060)

(5.141)

(17.929)

(5.516)

0.038

0.003

0.019

2.851

-11.961

1.873

t−1

(0.044)

(0.085)

(0.045)

(5.073)

(20.684)

(5.485)

-0.153

-0.244

-0.399

127.134*

-240.455

187.214**

(0.496)

(0.967)

(0.448)

(61.461)

(303.394)

(64.779)

0.175

1.420**

0.084

41.548**

252.22**

32.037*

(0.131)

(0.477)

(0.152)

(16.815)

(105.00)

(17.384)

0.061**

0.128

0.035

0.700

-15.076

-0.070

(0.028)

(0.084)

(0.031)

(4.290)

(16.629)

(4.557)

Institional Ownership
Firm Size

t

1.079**

t−

B2C

6

-0.013**

t−1

Board Size

5
CEO Prominence

-0.017

CSR Performance

CEO Duality

t

Panel OLS FE
4
Full

Post Constituency Statutes

CEO Tenure

3

B2B

Post Constituency Statutes
CSR Performance t−1

CEO Age

2
CEO Compensation

t−1
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Table 4.4 continued
-0.093
-0.177
-0.031
(0.078)
(0.164)
(0.079)
-0.108
0.100
-0.108
Firm Status t−1
(0.122)
(0.257)
(0.149)
0.161
-1.099
0.092
ROA t−1
(0.156)
(0.737)
(0.132)
-0.042
0.251
-0.035
ROE t−1
(0.079)
(0.271)
(0.141)
-0.186
0.224
-0.206
Tobin′ s Q t−1
(0.175)
(0.460)
(0.205)
Year/Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
4.093
17.841*
1.547
Constant
(4.139)
(9.153)
(5.298)
N (Firms)
505 (87)
70 (13)
435 (74)
0.252
0.509
0.256
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
R&D Expenditure

t−1

-41.048**
(9.303)
50.624**
(23.009)
-14.033
(25.585)
7.374
(12.374)
2.370
(9.799)
Yes
-50.686
(343.741)
505 (87)
0.041

10.769
(38.190)
96.543
(65.983)
-13.588
(109.712)
40.551
(39.044)
-64.164
(43.521)
Yes
-1,537.839
(1,383.511)
70 (13)
0.108

-49.398**
(10.159)
35.357
(25.483)
-28.871
(27.341)
3.479
(19.028)
11.982
(10.246)
Yes
-47.641
(381.859)
435 (74)
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Figure 4.4 Interaction plot of stakeholder orientation of CSR on CEO prominence
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4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
How can companies transfer their CSR performance to firm performance without friction?
How does stakeholder orientation affect CEOs’ wealth and further human capital? Should CEOs
follow the call from non-shareholders as being corporate philanthropists? Since the norm of CSR
is ubiquitous, those questions have received considerable attention in scholarship, yet very little is
known about the role of stakeholder orientation on both companies and CEOs. Motivated by this
research gap, this study examines if and how an inclination to the company’s nonfinancial
shareholders affects the impact of CSR on firm performance and CEOs’ individual welfare and
prominence.
To examine the impact of stakeholder orientation on CSR and firms and CEOs, I exploited
a natural experiment provided by the 2006 enactment of constituency statutes in the state of Texas.
These constituency statutes encouraged corporate TMTs and directors to account for nonshareholder interests when making corporate strategic initiatives and, hence, provide exogenous
variation in the way public U.S. corporations cater to stakeholders. I found that the introduction of
constituency statutes lead to a significant increase in CSR performance; however, superior CSR
performance does not necessarily transfer to superior firm performance because mandatory CSR
activities that is shaped by enforced constituency statutes may lose a key feature of CSR: the
voluntary aspect of it. These findings may elucidate how CSR leads to firm performance. The
effectiveness of CSR on firm performance would be highly related with the view of nonshareholders around the companies. The marginal effect of CSR would be more effective when
stakeholders regarded a firm’s CSR as “pro-society voluntary activity.” In other words, after
enactment of constituency statutes, stakeholders then regarded CSR activity by a firm as an
obligation. Since there would be more companies joining in on CSR activities, whether voluntary
or mandatory, the impact of CSR by a firm would be diluted.
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I further argue that stakeholder orientation refrains each CEO from obtaining greater
compensation even when they achieve superior CSR performance. I explain the logic behind this
result in three ways: 1) Under stakeholder orientation, internal stakeholders (i.e., directors and
compensation committees) may not be impressed by the superior CSR performance compared to
under non-stakeholder orientation; 2) CSR performance may not lead to superior shareholder’s
value under stakeholder orientation; or, 3) a CEO’s CSR performance is less likely to be
conspicuous under the era of stakeholder orientation. In support of this argument, I find that the
causal relationship between CSR performance and CEO compensation is more salient in a lessconsumer-oriented industry where CSR activities lack prevalence, indicating that CSR
performance is dependent upon how stakeholders interpret the value of CSR activity by a firm or
CEO. I also find that a CEO that has superior CSR performance attracts more attention by the
public media under stakeholder orientation than under non-stakeholder orientation, suggesting that
meeting the expectations of stakeholders help CEOs gain celebrity status. In support of this
argument, I find that the impact of stakeholder orientation on CEO prominence through superior
CSR performance is becoming salient in less-consumer oriented industries, implying that the
effects of CSR on firms as well as on CEOs are dependent on how specific stakeholders take
account for the value of CSR performance and its visibility. Moreover, stakeholder orientation
heterogeneously affects CEO wealth and prominence since the determinants of CEO wealth are
driven by internal stakeholders while prominence is driven by external stakeholders.
This study relates to the large body of literature on CSR and the attention to stakeholders
and performance outcomes (e.g., Flammer, 2013; McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006; Teece,
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). The results presented in this paper may provide one answer for the
underexplored mechanisms regarding the caveat that firms that engage in CSR earn the same rate
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of profit as firms that do not engage in CSR: since obligated CSR may not impress stakeholders
or stakeholders may not value corporate philanthropic activities, this would not lead to superior
firm performance (e.g., Aupperle et al., 1985; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). Moreover, the results
indicate that the impact of CSR on firm performance is related to exogenous institutional factors
such as policy, rules or legal aspects (Jones, 1995). Interestingly, governments and policy makers
may encourage firms to engage in more CSR activity so that firms performance would increase by
establishing better relationship with stakeholders; however, this may not be the case. Reconciling
the tradeoff of the value of shareholders and non-shareholders and encouraging CSR activity
requires implementing proper policies and expecting the right reactions from stakeholders.
This study also contributes to the vibrant body of work regarding the origin of human
capital (Miller, Xu, & Mehrotra, 2015; Schultz, 1961). By evidencing that a CEO can increase
their compensation by implementing superior CSR, a CEO that satisfies the need for stakeholders
in terms of being a corporate philanthropist has more visibility with the public media. It
contributes to the human capital literature by showing that a person’s human capital (i.e., wealth
and status) can be achieved by meeting the expectations of stakeholders. Many researchers have
documented that superior human capital is one of the main sources of attaining a competitive
advantage (Coff, 1997; Wright, Coff, & Moliterno, 2014); yet, the origin of human capital or how
a CEO obtains superior human capital, however, has been unexplored by research.
This essay’s finding also can be linked with the corporate governance literature. Given
the fact that there are still 15 states in the U.S. that have not enacted constituency statutes (i.e.,
California and Michigan), corporate directors should evaluate whether corporate CSR yields
superior firm performance or whether their CEO should personally appropriate corporate
resources to gain better compensation or better visibility to stakeholders. Not surprisingly, higher
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institutional ownership deters CSR performance (see Model 1 in Table 4.3) may indicate that
there would be agent behavior in pursuing corporate CSR (e.g., Chang, Oh, Park, & Jang, 2017).
To the extent that stakeholder orientation can be both beneficial and detrimental to firms and
CEOs (benefits include increased firm performance, increased CEO compensation, and increased
CEO prominence while the negatives include CSR performance not leading to firm performance
and CEOs overinvesting in CSR to increase their CEO status), directors actively account for the
benefits and costs.

4.5.1 Limitations and future research
Like all studies, the limitations of this study can offer opportunities for future research.
Perhaps the most obvious limitation of this study is that measuring CSR performance is based
upon outputs rather than inputs, assuming that superior outputs are highly related with greater
inputs. Even though the data provided by Asset4 is a comprehensive and reliable source for
measuring CSR performance, the data may not provide exact mechanisms on how superior CSR
can be achieved. Furthermore, the results cannot reveal whether CEOs’ increased compensation
or prominence would hurt their shareholders’ value. Also, CEOs’ political ideologies are evident
manifestations of their different personal views about CSR. Each CEO may exercise different
powers according to their organizational outcomes and missions. In fact, their political ideologies
are expected to influence their preferences for CSR outcomes and its further impact on a CEO’s
wealth and prominence. Making ground on these questions is a promising avenue for future work.

119

CHAPTERS .

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I attempt to advance our understanding on underexplored aspects of
strategic human capital and the role of managers on competitive advantage. In Essay 1, I argue
that superior resource recovery technique that embedded in an organization or a manager would
be one of critical sources of firm heterogeneity in creating value. The implications of Essay extend
beyond extant research on strategic renewal by focusing on distinctive managerial techniques for
dealing with organizational human capital in the context of interdependence that an organization
requires. Although many scholars have documented the importance of the strategic renewal
process and managerial roles, few empirical studies have been conducted because it is difficult to
empirically measure two distinctive resource management techniques: resource picking and
capability building and objectively capture the value of strategic human capital within an
organization. By using a natural experiment that affects the type of interdependence, shifting from
pooled interdependence to reciprocal interdependence, Essay 1 (Chapter 2) not only provided a
proper empirical setting for the topic at hand but also depicted very specific managerial effects on
firm recovering from unexpected human capital loss.
Essay 1 also reveals the importance of business model conditions (e.g., desired
interdependence) for firm HRM and development. The consequences of industrial environmental
change have been well-documented. However, researchers have recently acknowledged the need
to better understand the impact of external factors and the role of managers in the strategic renewal
process (Helfat & Martin, 2015). The present study was a response to this call by proposing
managerial capabilities as an important mechanism for recovering a firm’s established capabilities
and routines that have been disrupted by unexpected external and internal hazards. Superior
resource picking is more effective when an organization capability is driven by a few talented
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human assets, and capability building is much more important when an organization capability is
driven by coordinated human capital.
In Essay 2, I mainly propose one new concept for an organizational manager, which is a
star performer-turned manager (SPTM). By focusing on the possibility that a manager’s prior
stardom can inspire the manager’s current subordinate employee and motivate them to invest in
their human capital more voluntarily. Essay 2 (Chapter 3) contributes to understanding the effects
of stars on organizational performance in several ways: First, this study contributes to strategic
human capital research by highlighting the ongoing roles that star performers can continue to play
even after being promoted into management. Specifically, the taxonomy I introduce in Table 3.1
contributes to theory by categorizing the various mechanisms that a SPTM might, at least in
principle, employ to help an organization create and/or capture more value than other managers.
Second, the Chapter 3 introduces the SPTM as a new concept for strategic human capital
research – moreover, a phenomenon that merits further study because it is already known to be of
great interest and practical relevance to managers (Adler, 1996; McKee, 2015). Third, I
specifically disentangle how SPTM’s and other managers differ in the mechanisms by which they
succeed. Specifically, the results suggest that SPTM’s can improve organizational performance
via inspirational role modeling, while other managers do not. Finally, I capture manager-specific,
subordinate-specific, and situation-specific contingency factors that influence the strength of this
inspirational role modeling effect in a way that is consistent with social comparison theory. In this
regard, the results of Chapter 3 provide a bridge between the resource-based view of human capital
and socio-psychological theories of human resource development.
The findings also have practical managerial implications for human capital recruitment. By
identifying the importance of an effective match between employees and their manager, the results
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can begin to answer questions like: What kinds of employees should be hired to work under
SPTM’s versus other managers? What kinds of organizations should hire SPTM’s versus other
managers? For example, the results suggest that SPTM’s can be more effective as managers of
employees who: (1) have themselves directly witnessed the manager’s prior star-level performance,
(2) are less experienced, (3) have experienced poor performance, (4) do not have star-level
colleagues, and (5) are closer in age to the SPTM. So, organizations composed of such employees
may benefit more from hiring a SPTM, and organizations that are led by a SPTM may benefit
more from hiring such employees.
In Essay 3 (Chapter 4), I propose one underexplored mechanism to explain the missing link
between CSR performance and firm performance. Essay 3 relates to the large body of literature on
CSR and the attention to stakeholders and performance outcomes (e.g., Flammer, 2013;
McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). The results presented in
Essay 3 may provide one answer for the underexplored mechanisms regarding the caveat that firms
that engage in CSR earn the same rate of profit as firms that do not engage in CSR: since obligated
CSR may not impress stakeholders or stakeholders may not value corporate philanthropic activities,
this would not lead to superior firm performance. Moreover, the results indicate that the impact of
CSR on firm performance is related to exogenous institutional factors such as policy, rules or legal
aspects (Jones, 1995). Interestingly, governments and policy makers may encourage firms to
engage in more CSR activity so that firm performance would increase by establishing better
relationship with stakeholders; however, this may not be the case. Reconciling the tradeoff of the
value of shareholders and non-shareholders and encouraging CSR activity requires implementing
proper policies and expecting the right reactions from stakeholders.
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Chapter 4 also contributes to the vibrant body of work regarding the origin of human capital
(Miller, Xu, & Mehrotra, 2015; Schultz, 1961). By evidencing that a CEO can increase their
compensation by implementing superior CSR, a CEO that satisfies the need for stakeholders in
terms of being a corporate philanthropist has more visibility with the public media. It contributes
to the human capital literature by showing that a person’s human capital (i.e., wealth and status)
can be achieved by meeting the expectations of stakeholders. Many researchers have documented
that superior human capital is one of the main sources of attaining a competitive advantage (Coff,
1997; Wright, Coff, & Moliterno, 2014); yet, the origin of human capital or how a CEO obtains
superior human capital, however, has been unexplored by research.
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APPENDIX A. DIMENSIONS FOR RESOURCE PICKING AND
CAPABILITY BUILDING IN HUMAN RESOURCE

Variables

Components
1. the amount of change in a newly-hired starting player’s PER over
the previous season

Resource Picking

2. the number of improved newly-hired staring players
3. the amount of change in a newly-hired rotating player’s PER over
the previous season
4. the number of improved newly-hired rotating players
1. the amount of change in an incumbent starting player’s PER over
the previous season
2. the number of improved incumbent starting players

Capability Building

3. the amount of change in an incumbent rotating player’s PER over
the previous season
4. the number of improved incumbent rotating players

132

APPENDIX B. SCREEPLOT AFTER FACTOR ANALYSIS

Scree plot of eigenvalues after factor

0

2

4

Number

6

8
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APPENDIX C. RESULTS OF THREE-WAY INTERACTION OF
UNTESTED HYPOTHESES
Dependent Variable
Estimation
Models
Post Rule Change X Star Employee Out X
Capability Building
Star Employee Out X Capability Building
Post Rule Change X Capability Building
Post Rule Change X Star Employee Out
Post Rule Change X Non-Star Employee Out X
Resource Picking
Non-Star Employee Out X Resource Picking
Post Rule Change X Resource Picking
Post Rule Change X Non-Star Employee Out
Star Employee Out
Non-Star Employee Out
Post Rule Change
Resource Picking
Capability Building
Previous Organization Performance
Employee Age
Employee Age Squared
Manager Age
Manager Age Squared
Manager-Executive Duality
Manager Outsiderness
Manager Other League Experience
Organization Payroll
Manager Tenure

Organization Performance
Panel OLS Fixed Effects
A1
A2
-0.063
(0.044)
0.026
(0.029)
0.020*
(0.011)
0.085
(0.070)
0.018
(0.013)
-0.013
(0.012)
-0.002
(0.013)
-0.015
(0.011)
-0.085**
-0.047
(0.037)
(0.033)
-0.014***
-0.006
(0.005)
(0.007)
-0.007
-0.087*
(0.033)
(0.046)
0.012**
0.016
(0.005)
(0.010)
0.010
0.021***
(0.010)
(0.006)
0.220***
0.220***
(0.060)
(0.058)
0.031
0.021
(0.127)
(0.128)
-0.000
-0.000
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.002
0.000
(0.006)
(0.005)
0.000
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.025
-0.023
(0.024)
(0.024)
0.022*
0.024*
(0.013)
(0.013)
0.008
0.007
(0.012)
(0.011)
0.061*
0.064**
(0.032)
(0.029)
0.006***
0.006***
(0.002)
(0.001)
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APPENDIX C. continued
Season/Organization/Division Dummies
Constant
Observations
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the organization-level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Yes
-1.258
(1.563)
522
0.570

Yes
-1.146
(1.622)
522
0.578
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APPENDIX D. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS: RULE CHANGE AND
COMPENSATION GINI COEFFICIENT
Compensation Gini
Coefficient
Estimation
Panel OLS Regression
Model
1
-0.025**
After Rule Change
(0.010)
0.079***
Organization Payroll
(0.009)
0.005***
Organization Size
(0.001)
0.000
Organization Quality
(0.003)
0.087***
Previous Organization
Performance
(0.027)
0.000
Organization Age
(0.003)
0.009**
The Number of Star Employees
(0.004)
0.005*
The Number of Rookies
(0.003)
-0.059***
BIG Market
(0.023)
Season/Organization/League
Included.
-1.014***
Constant
(0.159)
N
609
0.277
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the organization-level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable

APPENDIX E. LIST OF STAR PERFORMER-TURNED-MANAGERS
Playing Seasons in NBA
1982-1995
1970-1979
1980-1992

Selections as All-Star
1
1
12

Larry Brown

1968-1972

3

Bill Cartwright
Mack Calvin
Maurice Cheeks
Doug Collins
Dave Cowens
Lionel Hollins
Jeff Hornacek
Dan Issel
Mark Jackson
Dennis Johnson
Magic Johnson
Jason Kidd
Bob Lanier
Kevin McHale
Doug Moe
Terry Porter
Doc Rivers
Paul Silas
Jerry Sloan
Reggie Theus
Isiah Thomas
Rudy Tomjanovich
Wes Unseld
Kiki Vandeweghe
Paul Westphal
Lenny Wilkens
Brian Winters

1980-1995
1970-1981
1979-1993
1974-1981
1971-1983
1976-1985
1987-2000
1971-1985
1988-2004
1977-1990
1980-1991, 1995-1996
1995-2013
1971-1984
1981-1993
1968-1972
1986-2002
1984-1996
1965-1980
1966-1976
1979-1991
1982-1994
1971-1981
1969-1981
1981-1993
1970-1984
1961-1975
1975-1983

1
5
4
4
8
1
1
7
1
5
11
12
8
7
3
2
1
2
2
2
12
5
5
2
5
9
2

NBA Head Coaching Experience
1996-2000 (PHO*)
1994-1996 (NJN)
1997-2000 (IND)
1988-1992 (SAS), 1992-1993 (LAC), 1993-1997 (IND), 1997-2003 (PHI),
2003-2005 (DET), 2005-2006 (NYK), 2008-2010 (CHB)
2001-2003 (CHI*)
1991-1992 (LAC)
2001-2005 (POR), 2005-2008 (PHI*), 2013-2014 (DET)
1986-1989 (CHI), 1995-1998 (DET), 2001-2003 (WAS), 2010-2013 (PHI*)
1996-1999 (CHH), 2000-2001 (GSW)
1999-2000 (VAN), 2003-2004 (MEM), 2009-2013 (MEM), 2014-2016 (BKN)
2013-2016 (PHO*)
1992-1995 (DEN*), 1999-2002 (DEN*)
2011-2014 (GSW)
2002-2003 (LAC)
1993-1994 (LAL*)
2013-2014 (BKN), 2014-2017 (MIL)
1994-1995 (GSW)
2004-2005 (BOS), 2008-2009 (MIN), 2011-2015 (HOU)
1980-1991 (DEN), 1992-1993 (PHI)
2003-2005 (MIL); 2008-2009 (PHO)
1999–2003 (ORL), 2004–2013 (BOS), 2013–Present (LAC*)
1999-2002 (CHH), 2002-2003 (NOH), 2003-2005 (CLE), 2010-2012 (CHB)
1988-2011 (UTA)
2007-2008 (SAC)
2000-2003 (IND), 2006-2008 (NYK)
1992-2003 (HOU*), 2004-2005 (LAL)
1987-1994 (WAS*)
2009-2010 (NJN)
1992-1995 (PHO*), 1998-2000 (SEA*), 2009-2012 (SAC)
1986-1993 (CLE*), 1993-2000 (ATL), 2000-2003 (TOR), 2004-2005 (NYK)
1995-1997 (VAN)

Notes: * indicates a team that SPTM both played for and coached. “Present” indicates 2016-2017 season.
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Coach Name
Danny Ainge
Butch Beard
Larry Bird
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APPENDIX F. DESCRIPTION OF INDUSTRY BY A FIRM
Industry description
Firms
Observations
Oil & Gas Extraction
27
207
General Building Contractors
2
18
Heavy Construction, Except Building
3
25
Special Trade Contractors
1
4
Food & Kindred Products
2
15
Paper & Allied Products
2
20
Chemical & Allied Products
2
9
Petroleum & Coal Products
4
28
Stone, Clay, & Glass Products
2
6
Primary Metal Industries
2
10
Industrial Machinery & Equipment
8
45
Electronic & Other Electric Equipment
2
15
Transportation Equipment
2
13
Instruments & Related Products
1
2
Water Transportation
1
4
Transportation by Air
1
11
Communications
1
10
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services
9
53
Wholesale Trade – Durable Goods
1
3
Wholesale Trade – Nondurable Goods
1
11
General Merchandise Stores
1
11
Food Stores
1
10
Furniture & Home furnishings Stores
1
8
Eating & Drinking Places
1
4
Miscellaneous Re
1
2
Personal Services
1
4
Business Services
7
36
Health Services
1
11
Observations
88
595
Note: During the panel analyses, one firm was dropped since the observations were not enough to get lagged and
forwarded value. In addition, initial observations at the firm-year level were dropped since all dependent variables
were forwarded. Thus, final observation in the analyses 87 firms with 505 firm-year observations.
.
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APPENDIX G. THE IMPACT OF CONSTI STATUTES ON CSR
PERFORMANCE
Estimation
Model
Dependent Variable

Panel OLS FE
1
CSR Performance t
-9.720**
Constituency Statue (-4)
(3.690)
-3.022
Constituency Statue (-3)
(2.614)
-0.147
Constituency Statue (-2)
(2.193)
-2.321
Constituency Statue (-1)
(2.068)
1.146
Constituency Statue (0)
(2.852)
5.596**
Constituency Statue (1)
(2.425)
6.919**
Constituency Statue (2)
(2.682)
12.341***
Constituency Statue (3)
(2.460)
14.038***
Constituency Statue (4+)
(2.378)
All Control Variables
Included
37.180
Constant
(37.853)
N (Firms)
505 (87)
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2
0.251
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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